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Abstract
Making accurate predictions is one of the most critical functions of the brain. Whether made by a monkey
deciding where to forage, a deer deciding which way to run, or a wall-street broker deciding how to invest,
decisions are informed by expectations about possible future outcomes. These expectations are learned over
time through experience and are rapidly adjusted when they fail to match observations. Here I propose and
support the thesis that learning systems in the brain optimize the accuracy of predictions in a changing world,
even though this necessitates becoming insensitive to incoming sensory information under some conditions.
Furthermore I propose a biologically inspired model for achieving accurate predictions and suggest a novel
role for the arousal system in optimally adjusting the influence of incoming sensory information. I support
these theses with a series of experiments that utilize computational modeling, as well as behavioral and
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  Making	  accurate	  predictions	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  critical	  functions	  of	  the	  brain.	  Whether	  made	  by	  a	  monkey	  deciding	  where	  to	  forage,	  a	  deer	  deciding	  which	  way	  to	  run,	  or	  a	  wall-­‐street	  broker	  deciding	  how	  to	  invest,	  decisions	  are	  informed	  by	  expectations	  about	  possible	  future	  outcomes.	  	  These	  expectations	  are	  learned	  over	  time	  through	  experience	  and	  are	  rapidly	  adjusted	  when	  they	  fail	  to	  match	  observations.	  Here	  I	  propose	  and	  support	  the	  thesis	  that	  learning	  systems	  in	  the	  brain	  optimize	  the	  accuracy	  of	  predictions	  in	  a	  changing	  world,	  even	  though	  this	  necessitates	  becoming	  insensitive	  to	  incoming	  sensory	  information	  under	  some	  conditions.	  Furthermore	  I	  propose	  a	  biologically	  inspired	  model	  for	  achieving	  accurate	  predictions	  and	  suggest	  a	  novel	  role	  for	  the	  arousal	  system	  in	  optimally	  adjusting	  the	  influence	  of	  incoming	  sensory	  information.	  I	  support	  these	  theses	  with	  a	  series	  of	  experiments	  that	  utilize	  computational	  modeling,	  as	  well	  as	  behavioral	  and	  pupillometric	  measurements	  in	  humans.	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CHAPTER 1 	  	  
	  
Understanding	  the	  brain:	  	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  	  	  The	  human	  brain	  contains	  approximately	  100	  billion	  neurons	  interconnected	  by	  100	  trillion	  synapses	  	  (Williams	  and	  Herrup,	  1988).	  This	  tremendous	  complexity	  enables	  feats	  of	  information	  processing	  that	  humble	  even	  the	  greatest	  achievements	  of	  artificial	  intelligence	  and	  computer	  vision.	  However,	  this	  complexity	  also	  poses	  a	  formidable	  challenge	  to	  anyone	  wishing	  to	  understand	  the	  how	  the	  system	  functions.	  Not	  only	  is	  measuring	  each	  cog	  in	  the	  machine	  technically	  impossible,	  it	  is	  also	  not	  clear	  what	  one	  would	  do	  with	  perfect	  descriptions	  of	  each	  of	  the	  components.	  David	  Marr	  best	  formalized	  the	  issue	  in	  terms	  of	  perception	  as	  follows:	  	  	  “[T]rying	  to	  understand	  perception	  by	  studying	  only	  neurons	  is	  like	  trying	  to	  understand	  bird	  flight	  by	  studying	  only	  feathers:	  It	  just	  cannot	  be	  done.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  bird	  flight,	  we	  have	  to	  understand	  aerodynamics;	  only	  then	  do	  the	  structure	  of	  feathers	  and	  the	  different	  shapes	  of	  birds’	  wings	  make	  sense”	  	  (Marr,	  1982)	  (p.	  27)	  	  Marr	  suggests	  three	  complementary	  levels	  of	  analysis	  necessary	  for	  completely	  understanding	  a	  system.	  	  The	  top	  level,	  which	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  computational	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level,	  requires	  a	  normative	  approach.	  	  That	  is,	  one	  must	  determine	  the	  critical	  problem	  being	  solved	  by	  the	  system	  and	  ask	  how	  the	  problem	  could	  be	  optimally	  solved.	  The	  normative	  approach	  does	  not	  necessarily	  provide	  any	  information	  about	  “how”	  the	  brain	  might	  solve	  a	  certain	  problem,	  but	  it	  will	  likely	  provide	  a	  set	  of	  rules,	  which	  must	  be	  obeyed	  for	  any	  possible	  solution	  to	  the	  problem,	  much	  like	  aerodynamics	  provides	  for	  flight.	  The	  second	  level	  of	  analysis	  proposed	  by	  Marr	  is	  the	  algorithmic	  or	  representational	  level:	  how	  does	  the	  brain	  represent	  the	  variables	  necessary	  to	  solve	  the	  problem.	  	  What	  are	  the	  actual	  algorithms	  employed	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  function?	  Marr’s	  third	  level	  of	  analysis	  is	  one	  of	  implementation:	  how	  does	  the	  system	  realize	  the	  algorithm	  in	  physical	  hardware	  	  (Marr,	  1982).	  	  	  	  My	  dissertation	  explores	  how	  the	  brain	  learns	  using	  each	  of	  these	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  The	  following	  sections	  aim	  to	  provide	  a	  coherent	  introduction	  to	  the	  concepts	  relevant	  to	  my	  theses	  at	  each	  level.	  The	  first	  section	  examines	  a	  possible	  normative	  framework	  for	  understanding	  learning	  in	  terms	  of	  prediction.	  The	  second	  section	  examines	  the	  constraints	  on	  animal	  and	  human	  learning	  algorithms	  revealed	  through	  behavioral	  studies.	  	  Finally,	  the	  third	  section	  discusses	  the	  biological	  architecture	  available	  for	  mediating	  those	  algorithms.	  	  	  
Learning	  as	  predictive	  inference.	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Learning,	  or	  experience	  dependent	  change	  in	  behavior,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  robust	  behavioral	  phenomena	  observed	  across	  species.	  It	  has	  previously	  been	  suggested	  that	  some	  forms	  of	  learning	  serve	  to	  provide	  predictions	  for	  the	  future,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  be	  used	  for	  appropriate	  behavioral	  modifications	  	  (Preuschoff	  and	  Bossaerts,	  2007;Courville	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  However,	  a	  point	  that	  has	  been	  underappreciated	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  optimal	  predictive	  behavior	  depends	  on	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  environment	  for	  which	  it	  is	  designed.	  Here	  I	  examine	  some	  features	  of	  a	  series	  of	  optimal	  prediction	  algorithms	  designed	  for	  increasingly	  complex	  environments.	  The	  comparison	  of	  these	  different	  predictive	  models	  will	  reveal	  hallmarks	  of	  optimal	  inference	  in	  dynamic	  environments	  that	  are	  very	  different	  from	  what	  one	  sees	  in	  optimal	  inference	  models	  tailored	  to	  static	  or	  continuously	  changing	  environments.	  	  The	  outcome	  of	  future	  actions	  can	  often	  be	  predicted	  due	  to	  regularities	  in	  the	  process	  by	  which	  outcomes	  are	  generated.	  	  For	  example,	  sticking	  ones	  finger	  in	  an	  electrical	  outlet	  leads	  to	  a	  fairly	  unambiguous	  and	  consistent	  result.	  	  This	  makes	  the	  problem	  of	  predicting	  future	  electrical	  socket-­‐related	  outcomes	  fairly	  simple;	  it	  takes	  only	  one	  such	  experience	  to	  recognize	  that	  all	  such	  future	  actions	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  negative	  outcomes.	  Future	  decisions	  can	  then	  be	  biased	  away	  from	  actions	  that	  involve	  self-­‐electrocution.	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Some	  processes	  lead	  to	  far	  less	  reliable	  results.	  Take	  for	  example	  a	  monkey	  attempting	  to	  predict	  the	  caloric	  yields	  he	  might	  attain	  by	  choosing	  one	  of	  several	  foraging	  locations.	  	  The	  yield	  attained	  on	  one	  day	  may	  differ	  from	  that	  on	  the	  next,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  variability	  that	  cannot	  be	  controlled	  by	  the	  monkey.	  	  Within	  this	  document	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  a	  stable	  source	  of	  irreducible	  variability	  as	  noise.	  	  To	  specifically	  define	  noise,	  here	  I	  will	  assume	  that	  the	  foraging	  values	  at	  a	  given	  location	  are	  drawn	  independently	  on	  each	  observation	  from	  a	  normal	  distribution	  with	  mean	  µ	  and	  standard	  deviation	  σn:	  	   	  	  Noise	  does	  not	  prohibit	  predictions,	  but	  it	  does	  provide	  an	  upper	  bound	  on	  prediction	  accuracy.	  	  The	  prediction	  minimizing	  squared	  errors	  simply	  becomes	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  distribution,	  µ.	  	  Furthermore,	  noise	  changes	  the	  optimal	  strategy	  for	  updating	  those	  predictions	  over	  time.	  	  Unlike	  the	  electrical	  outlet	  example,	  each	  daily	  yield	  provides	  a	  fairly	  unreliable	  estimate	  of	  the	  true	  underlying	  distribution	  of	  possible	  daily	  yields.	  The	  best	  possible	  strategy	  for	  forming	  a	  prediction	  involves	  pooling	  all	  of	  the	  pertinent	  data,	  which	  can	  be	  done	  by	  simply	  taking	  the	  average	  of	  all	  previous	  yields,	  which	  provides	  the	  best	  possible	  approximation	  of	  µ.	  This	  strategy	  can	  also	  be	  implemented	  in	  a	  Markov	  form,	  such	  that	  the	  observer	  need	  not	  store	  all	  previous	  outcomes	  in	  memory.	  	  One	  such	  strategy	  for	  maintaining	  and	  updating	  predictions	  efficiently	  is	  the	  delta	  rule,	  which	  was	  simultaneously	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developed	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  animal	  behavior	  and	  machine	  learning	  	  (Rescorla	  and	  Wagner,	  1972;Sutton	  and	  Barto,	  1998):	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Where	  Bt+1	  	  is	  the	  updated	  belief,	  which	  serves	  as	  a	  prediction	  for	  time	  t+1.	  	  The	  prediction	  error,	  δt,	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  observed	  outcome	  (Xt)	  and	  the	  the	  predicted	  outcome	  (Bt)	  at	  time	  t:	  	   	  	  The	  learning	  rate,	  αt,	  determines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  each	  new	  observation	  influences	  the	  updated	  prediction.	  	  When	  αt	  is	  equal	  to	  1	  predictions	  are	  set	  equal	  to	  the	  most	  recent	  observation,	  whereas	  when	  αt	  is	  equal	  to	  0	  the	  updated	  prediction	  is	  simply	  equal	  to	  the	  prediction	  on	  the	  previous	  time-­‐step,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  new	  observation.	  For	  the	  case	  of	  the	  average	  over	  all	  previous	  outcomes,	  which	  is	  the	  optimal	  strategy	  for	  updating	  predictions	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  noise,	  αt	  	  depends	  on	  the	  total	  number	  of	  observations	  (including	  the	  current	  one):	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  As	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  figure	  1.1,	  this	  strategy	  for	  updating	  predictions	  rapidly	  converges	  on	  the	  true	  mean	  of	  the	  underlying	  distribution.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  learning	  rate	  term,	  which	  determines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  predictions	  are	  influenced	  by	  new	  data,	  decays	  to	  zero.	  Although	  the	  average	  of	  all	  data	  is	  the	  best	  prediction	  of	  a	  noisy	  but	  stable	  variable,	  it	  does	  not	  perform	  well	  under	  situations	  where	  the	  variable	  of	  interest	  changes	  in	  time.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  certain	  foraging	  locations	  are	  slowly	  becoming	  more	  fruitful,	  whereas	  other	  foraging	  locations	  are	  becoming	  more	  barren.	  	  Statistically,	  we	  can	  model	  a	  continuous	  change	  by	  assuming	  that	  a	  random	  variable,	  Dt,	  is	  added	  to	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  outcome	  distribution	  at	  each	  time-­‐step	  (µt)	  to	  produce	  the	  mean	  for	  the	  next	  trial:	  	  	  	  Here	  we	  will	  assume	  that	  Dt	  is	  drawn	  from	  a	  normal	  distribution	  with	  mean	  µd	  and	  variance	  σd:	  	  	  When	  σd	  is	  large,	  past	  observations	  rapidly	  become	  meaningless,	  as	  the	  µt	  is	  an	  uncertain	  predictor	  of	  µt+1	  and	  an	  even	  more	  uncertain	  predictor	  of	  µt+n	  .	  	  Such	  circumstances	  require	  relying	  more	  on	  recent	  observations,	  as	  these	  observations	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are	  more	  accurate	  predictions	  of	  the	  mean	  on	  the	  current	  time-­‐step.	  The	  optimal	  strategy	  for	  updating	  predictions	  under	  such	  conditions	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Kalman	  filter	  and	  is	  depicted	  in	  figure	  1.2.	  The	  Kalman	  filter	  does	  a	  relatively	  good	  job	  of	  estimating	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  distribution	  (ie	  best	  possible	  prediction)	  even	  though	  the	  mean	  is	  changing	  at	  each	  time-­‐step.	  	  Unlike	  the	  optimal	  updating	  algorithm	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  change,	  the	  Kalman	  filter	  uses	  a	  learning	  rate,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Kalman	  gain,	  that	  decays	  to	  a	  non-­‐zero	  asymptote	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  drift	  and	  noise	  variances	  (σd	  and	  σn).	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  Kalman	  filter	  can	  provide	  optimal	  and	  efficient	  predictions	  in	  a	  continuously	  changing	  environment,	  it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  abrupt	  and	  discontinuous	  changes	  (ie.	  the	  fruit	  tree	  at	  a	  certain	  foraging	  location	  dies	  and	  stops	  bearing	  fruit).	  Change-­‐points	  can	  render	  past	  information	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  predicting	  future	  outcomes	  and	  thus	  pose	  a	  major	  problem	  to	  standard	  learning	  algorithms.	  Optimal	  predictions	  in	  a	  discontinuously	  changing	  environment	  have	  been	  derived	  according	  to	  Bayes	  rule	  and	  rely	  on	  the	  intuition	  that	  optimal	  inference	  after	  a	  change-­‐point	  simply	  requires	  taking	  the	  average	  of	  all	  observations	  since	  the	  most	  recent	  change-­‐point	  	  (Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010;Adams	  and	  MacKay,	  2007;Fearnhead	  and	  Liu,	  2007).	  Since	  change-­‐point	  locations	  are	  unknown,	  they	  must	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  data	  themselves	  (ie	  lack	  of	  fruit	  at	  a	  previously	  high	  yield	  location).	  	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  an	  optimal	  predictive	  model	  must	  consider	  all	  possible	  run	  lengths	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  outcomes	  predicted	  by	  these	  separate	  possible	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models	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Each	  run	  length	  has	  a	  separate	  predictive	  distribution	  over	  possible	  outcomes	  and	  thus	  the	  probabilities	  of	  each	  possible	  run	  length	  can	  be	  computed	  recursively	  according	  to	  Bayes	  rule	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  likelihood	  with	  which	  each	  possible	  run	  length	  would	  produce	  the	  new	  outcome	  	  (Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Predictions	  made	  by	  such	  a	  model	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  mean	  during	  stable	  periods	  but	  rapidly	  adjust	  to	  the	  new	  mean	  after	  a	  change-­‐point	  (see	  figure	  1.3).	  	  	  	  One	  interesting	  feature	  of	  optimal	  inference	  amid	  change-­‐points	  is	  that	  not	  all	  data	  are	  equally	  influential.	  	  Where	  the	  inference	  model	  rapidly	  adjusts	  predictions	  in	  response	  to	  some	  observations	  (such	  as	  those	  subsequent	  to	  change-­‐points)	  it	  is	  relatively	  unaffected	  by	  other	  observations	  (such	  as	  those	  occurring	  after	  a	  long	  run	  of	  stable	  data).	  This	  effect	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  learning	  rates	  in	  figure	  1.3	  b.	  	  Thus,	  environments	  with	  change-­‐points	  demand	  an	  optimal	  agent	  to	  perform	  frequent	  online	  adjustments	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  new	  observations	  on	  predictions,	  while	  environments	  with	  only	  noise	  and	  continuous	  drift	  prescribe	  observation	  influence	  to	  decay	  to	  some	  asymptotic	  value	  and	  then	  remain	  constant.	  	  The	  thesis	  that	  I	  will	  support	  in	  the	  ensuing	  chapters	  is	  that	  predictive	  learning	  systems	  in	  the	  brain	  are	  attempting	  to	  optimize	  predictions	  in	  discontinuously	  changing	  environments.	  Following	  directly	  from	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  prediction	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  information	  on	  predictions	  should	  depend	  heavily	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  outcomes	  including	  the	  presence	  and	  recency	  of	  change-­‐points.	  To	  test	  this	  idea	  of	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developed	  a	  predictive	  inference	  task	  in	  which	  subjects	  directly	  report	  predictions	  allowing	  direct	  measurement	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  each	  outcome	  on	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  observer.	  	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  influence	  depends	  critically	  on	  features	  characteristic	  of	  a	  discontinuously	  changing	  environment,	  in	  particular	  probability	  and	  recency	  of	  change-­‐points.	  	  	  	  	  
Algorithms	  underlying	  learning.	  	  	  Over	  the	  last	  50	  years,	  behavioral	  psychology	  has	  gained	  substantial	  insight	  into	  the	  exact	  rules	  that	  guide	  how	  humans	  and	  animals	  update	  expectations	  in	  response	  to	  experience.	  Some	  of	  the	  earliest	  learning	  studies	  were	  performed	  in	  classical	  conditioning	  paradigms	  where	  predictions	  were	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  implicit	  response	  to	  an	  innocuous	  (conditioned)	  stimulus	  that	  was	  previously	  paired	  with	  an	  aversive	  or	  rewarding	  (unconditioned)	  stimulus.	  Behavior	  in	  such	  paradigms	  suggests	  that	  the	  transfer	  of	  implicit	  responding	  is	  greatest	  when	  the	  absolute	  difference	  between	  the	  expected	  and	  actual	  outcome	  valence	  is	  greatest.	  	  These	  findings	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  Rescorla-­‐Wagner	  model	  for	  classical	  conditioning,	  which	  bears	  a	  notable	  resemblance	  to	  the	  delta	  rule	  described	  above	  	  (Rescorla	  and	  Wagner):	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  where	  Vx	  is	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  association	  between	  the	  conditioned	  stimulus	  (x)	  and	  the	  unconditioned	  stimulus,	  Vtot	  	  is	  the	  total	  associative	  strength	  of	  all	  conditioned	  stimuli,	  α	  and	  β	  are	  rate	  parameters	  specific	  to	  the	  conditioned	  and	  unconditioned	  stimulus,	  and	  λ	  is	  the	  maximum	  conditioning	  possible.	  	  A	  slight	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  equations	  reveals	  that	  they	  are	  identical	  to	  the	  delta	  rule	  format	  described	  above,	  albeit	  with	  two	  separate	  rate	  terms.	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  classical	  conditioning,	  operant	  conditioning	  probes	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  research	  subject	  alters	  choice	  behavior	  based	  on	  outcome	  history.	  	  The	  delta	  rule	  family	  of	  models,	  including	  an	  actor	  critic	  implementation	  based	  on	  biological	  architecture,	  has	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  behavior	  in	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  operant	  tasks	  across	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  species	  	  (Daw	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  However,	  until	  very	  recently	  such	  models	  have	  been	  assumed	  to	  contain	  a	  learning	  rate	  that	  is	  constant	  for	  all	  trials	  of	  a	  given	  task	  performed	  by	  a	  given	  subject.	  	  As	  described	  above,	  this	  constraint	  does	  not	  allow	  optimal	  learning	  under	  a	  large	  subset	  of	  circumstances.	  	  In	  particular,	  such	  models	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  performing	  well	  when	  learning	  to	  predict	  outcomes	  that	  can	  change	  discontinuously.	  Equally	  important	  is	  the	  functional	  implication	  of	  this	  idea:	  if	  learning	  rates	  are	  constant	  then	  each	  observation	  should	  affect	  stored	  beliefs	  equivalently.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  there	  is	  no	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necessity	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  amplify	  the	  impact	  of	  some	  pieces	  of	  sensory	  information.	  	  I	  contend	  that	  human	  learning	  might	  be	  better	  described	  by	  a	  delta	  rule	  where	  the	  learning	  rate	  is	  not	  constant,	  but	  rather	  adjusted	  according	  to	  the	  statistics	  of	  recent	  observations.	  To	  support	  this	  hypothesis	  I	  propose	  such	  a	  model	  to	  describe	  the	  behavior	  of	  human	  subjects	  in	  a	  predictive	  inference	  task	  designed	  to	  probe	  the	  influence	  of	  new	  observations	  on	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  observer.	  	  The	  model,	  which	  contains	  a	  learning	  rate	  that	  is	  adjusted	  according	  to	  Bayesian	  estimates	  of	  change-­‐point	  probability	  and	  uncertainty,	  provides	  an	  improved	  description	  of	  subject	  behavior	  over	  a	  fixed-­‐learning	  model,	  as	  well	  as	  achieving	  better	  predictive	  performance	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment.	  	  	   	  	  
Implementation	  of	  delta-­rule	  updating	  in	  the	  brain.	  	  	  The	  delta	  rule	  is	  a	  strong	  candidate	  for	  a	  neural	  belief	  updating	  algorithm	  because	  of	  its	  computational	  simplicity,	  effectiveness	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  problems,	  and	  relationship	  to	  known	  brain	  mechanisms.	  For	  example,	  neurons	  with	  activity	  reflecting	  decision-­‐related	  beliefs	  have	  been	  reported	  in	  several	  prefrontal	  areas,	  including	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (ACC)	  	  (Kennerley	  and	  Wallis,	  2009),	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  (OFC)	  	  (Padoa-­‐Schioppa	  and	  Assad,	  2006),	  and	  lateral	  pre-­‐
	   12	  
frontal	  cortex	  (LPFC)	  	  (Kennerley	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Prediction	  error-­‐like	  signals	  have	  been	  reported	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  ascending	  dopaminergic	  system	  	  (Schultz	  et	  al.,	  1997),	  but	  also	  in	  the	  lateral	  habenula	  	  (Matsumoto	  and	  Hikosaka,	  2007)	  and	  the	  ACC	  	  (Kennerley	  et	  al.,	  2011;Matsumoto	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  Although	  neural	  correlates	  of	  learning	  rate	  have	  remained	  relatively	  unexplored	  relative	  to	  prediction	  errors,	  two	  recent	  fMRI	  studies	  identified	  an	  area	  in	  dorsal	  ACC	  with	  BOLD	  activity	  related	  to	  learning	  rate.	  Specifically,	  activity	  in	  dorsal	  ACC	  correlates	  with	  volatility,	  a	  statistical	  estimate	  of	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  reward	  contingencies	  are	  changing	  	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  In	  a	  Bayesian	  belief-­‐updating	  model,	  this	  volatility	  estimate	  determined	  the	  influence	  of	  new	  outcomes	  on	  the	  adjusted	  belief.	  More	  recently,	  a	  BOLD	  response	  in	  the	  same	  region	  was	  shown	  to	  correlate	  with	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  learning	  rates	  used	  by	  a	  model	  fit	  to	  subject	  behavior	  	  (Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  	  Although	  human	  fMRI	  studies	  suggest	  a	  cortical	  representation	  of	  learning	  rate,	  rodent	  behavioral	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  learning	  rate	  might	  also	  depend	  on	  the	  LC,	  a	  brainstem	  nucleus	  that	  provides	  the	  noradrenergic	  (NA)	  modulation	  of	  cortical	  and	  thalamic	  circuitry.	  LC	  is	  reciprocally	  connected	  to	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (ACC	  and	  OFC),	  and	  noradrenaline	  is	  thought	  to	  modulate	  processing	  related	  to	  attention	  and	  action	  monitoring	  in	  these	  regions	  	  (Aston-­‐Jones	  and	  Cohen,	  2005).	  LC	  activity	  and	  prefrontal	  NA	  are	  greatest	  after	  the	  action-­‐outcome	  contingency	  is	  altered	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  the	  environmental	  change-­‐points	  discussed	  previously	  	  (Bouret	  and	  Sara,	  2004;Dalley	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  These	  increased	  prefrontal	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NA	  levels	  are	  thought	  to	  facilitate	  behavioral	  adaptation.	  This	  idea	  is	  supported	  by	  behavioral	  experiments	  involving	  set-­‐shifting,	  in	  which	  an	  animal	  is	  forced	  to	  switch	  from	  a	  behavioral	  strategy	  that	  depends	  on	  one	  sensory	  cue	  to	  a	  new	  behavioral	  strategy	  that	  depends	  on	  a	  different	  sensory	  cue.	  The	  ability	  of	  rodents	  to	  adapt	  in	  such	  experiments	  is	  enhanced	  by	  pharmacological	  activation	  of	  LC	  	  (Devauges	  and	  Sara,	  1990).	  This	  facilitation	  of	  behavioral	  adaptation	  can	  be	  blocked	  by	  direct	  application	  of	  α1	  antagonists	  to	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (mPFC)	  	  (Lapiz	  and	  Morilak,	  2006),	  the	  evolutionary	  precursor	  to	  the	  cortical	  region	  thought	  to	  encode	  learning	  rate	  in	  humans	  (ACC).	  NA	  deafferentation	  in	  the	  mPFC	  also	  leads	  to	  impairment	  of	  adaptive	  set-­‐shifting	  behavior	  	  (McGaughy	  et	  al.,	  2008;Tait	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Such	  behavioral	  effects	  are	  also	  seen	  when	  NA	  levels	  are	  modulated	  through	  manipulation	  of	  the	  NA	  transporter,	  NET.	  Inhibition	  of	  NA	  re-­‐uptake	  leads	  to	  increased	  prefrontal	  NA	  and	  enhanced	  performance	  of	  rodents	  and	  monkeys	  performing	  tasks	  that	  require	  reversal	  of	  a	  previously	  learned	  action-­‐outcome	  contingency.	  This	  performance	  gain	  was	  specifically	  attributed	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  errors	  of	  perseveration,	  suggesting	  that	  NA	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  controlling	  the	  rate	  of	  behavioral	  adaptation	  	  (Seu	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Many	  of	  these	  results	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  a	  computational	  model	  in	  which	  the	  LC	  responds	  to	  environmental	  change-­‐points,	  thereby	  modulating	  prefrontal	  cortical	  processing	  via	  NA	  release	  such	  that	  unexpected	  outcomes	  lead	  to	  greater	  behavioral	  adjustment	  	  (Yu	  and	  Dayan,	  2005;Yu	  and	  Dayan,	  2003).	  	  	  
	   14	  
Although	  measuring	  LC	  activity	  directly	  is	  technically	  difficult,	  there	  is	  a	  recent	  move	  to	  establish	  pupil	  diameter	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  LC	  activity.	  Although	  direct	  confirmation	  is	  still	  needed,	  this	  idea	  is	  supported	  by	  several	  lines	  of	  evidence,	  including	  1)	  a	  compelling	  example	  of	  simultaneous	  measurements	  of	  locus	  coeruleus	  activity	  and	  pupil	  diameter	  in	  a	  monkey	  that	  are	  closely	  correlated	  	  (Aston-­‐Jones	  and	  Cohen,	  2005),	  2)	  similar	  modulations	  of	  pupil	  diameter	  and	  locus	  coeruleus	  activity	  under	  certain	  task	  conditions	  such	  as	  changes	  in	  utility	  that	  affect	  behavioral	  engagement	  	  (Jepma	  and	  Nieuwenhuis,	  2010;Gilzenrat	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  3)	  a	  proposed	  anatomical	  substrate	  involving	  common	  activation	  from	  the	  nucleus	  paragigantocellularis,	  which	  contributes	  to	  both	  locus	  coeruleus	  and	  sympathetic	  nervous	  system	  function	  (Nieuwenhuis	  et	  al.,	  2010;Aston-­‐Jones	  et	  al.,	  1986).	  	  I	  examined	  whether	  LC	  activation	  might	  dictate	  an	  adaptive	  learning	  rate	  to	  allow	  optimal	  predictions	  in	  dynamic	  environments	  by	  using	  pupillometry	  to	  measure	  arousal	  levels,	  and	  by	  proxy	  LC	  activity,	  while	  subjects	  made	  predictive	  inferences	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment.	  	  Subject	  pupils	  were	  larger	  during	  periods	  of	  uncertainty	  after	  change-­‐points	  and	  increased	  in	  diameter	  during	  change-­‐point	  trials.	  Trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  learning	  rates	  used	  by	  subjects	  could	  be	  predicted	  based	  on	  pupil	  response	  both	  within	  and	  across	  subjects.	  	  In	  addition,	  a	  task	  irrelevant	  manipulation	  that	  caused	  a	  robust	  increase	  in	  pupil	  diameter	  also	  systematically	  altered	  learning	  rates,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  pupil-­‐linked	  arousal	  system	  plays	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  setting	  the	  adaptive	  learning	  used	  to	  optimize	  inference	  in	  dynamic	  environments.	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Figure	  1.1	  	  Optimal	  inference	  in	  a	  stable	  but	  noisy	  environment.	  	  A)	  Optimal	  inference	  in	  a	  
noisy	  but	  stable	  environment.	  	  B)	  Influence	  of	  each	  successive	  observation	  on	  updated	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Figure	  1.2	  	  Optimal	  inference	  in	  a	  noisy	  and	  continuously	  drifting	  environment.	  	  A)	  Optimal	  
inference	  in	  a	  noisy	  and	  continuously	  drifting	  environment.	  	  B)	  Influence	  of	  each	  successive	  
observation	  on	  updated	  prediction	  measured	  in	  units	  of	  the	  learning	  rate	  from	  a	  delta-­rule	  
model.	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Figure	  1.3	  	  Optimal	  inference	  in	  a	  discontinuously	  changing	  environment	  with	  unknown	  
change-­point	  locations.	  	  A)	  Predicted	  (blue)	  and	  actual	  (red)	  outcomes	  over	  time	  (ordinate).	  	  
B)	  Estimation	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  each	  observation	  on	  the	  updated	  prediction.	  	  Although	  the	  
optimal	  algorithm	  cannot	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  simple	  delta	  rule,	  here	  we	  compute	  the	  learning	  
rate	  for	  each	  trial	  that	  would	  allow	  a	  delta	  rule	  to	  reproduce	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  optimal	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CHAPTER 2 	  
 
An	  approximately	  Bayesian	  delta-­rule	  model	  explains	  the	  dynamics	  of	  belief	  
updating in a changing environment 
 Matthew	  R.	  Nassar,	  Robert	  C.	  Wilson,	  Benjamin	  Heasly,	  and	  Joshua	  I.	  Gold.	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  of	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  2010,	  30:12366-­‐78	  
 
Abstract	  
	  Maintaining	  appropriate	  beliefs	  about	  variables	  needed	  for	  effective	  decision-­‐making	  can	  be	  difficult	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment.	  One	  key	  issue	  is	  the	  amount	  of	  influence	  that	  unexpected	  outcomes	  should	  have	  on	  existing	  beliefs.	  In	  general,	  outcomes	  that	  are	  unexpected	  because	  of	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  the	  environment	  should	  carry	  more	  influence	  than	  outcomes	  that	  are	  unexpected	  because	  of	  persistent	  environmental	  stochasticity.	  Here	  we	  use	  a	  novel	  task	  to	  characterize	  how	  well	  human	  subjects	  follow	  these	  principles	  under	  a	  range	  of	  conditions.	  We	  show	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  an	  outcome	  depends	  on	  both	  the	  error	  made	  in	  predicting	  that	  outcome	  and	  the	  number	  of	  similar	  outcomes	  experienced	  previously.	  We	  also	  show	  that	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  these	  tendencies	  varies	  considerably	  across	  subjects.	  Finally,	  we	  show	  that	  these	  patterns	  of	  behavior	  are	  consistent	  with	  a	  computationally	  simple	  reduction	  of	  an	  ideal-­‐observer	  model.	  The	  model	  adjusts	  the	  influence	  of	  newly	  experienced	  outcomes	  according	  to	  ongoing	  estimates	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  the	  process	  by	  which	  outcomes	  are	  generated.	  A	  prior	  that	  quantifies	  the	  expected	  frequency	  of	  such	  environmental	  changes	  accounts	  for	  individual	  variability,	  including	  a	  positive	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relationship	  between	  subjective	  certainty	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  new	  information	  influences	  existing	  beliefs.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  brain	  adaptively	  regulates	  the	  influence	  of	  decision	  outcomes	  on	  existing	  beliefs	  using	  straightforward	  updating	  rules	  that	  take	  into	  account	  both	  recent	  outcomes	  and	  prior	  expectations	  about	  higher-­‐order	  environmental	  structure.	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Introduction	  	  Behavior	  often	  depends	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  predict	  future	  outcomes	  from	  past	  experiences.	  In	  an	  unchanging	  environment,	  beliefs	  that	  underlie	  effective	  predictions	  are	  typically	  stable.	  However,	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment	  the	  past	  does	  not	  always	  predict	  the	  future,	  and	  beliefs	  must	  therefore	  sometimes	  adapt	  rapidly,	  particularly	  after	  unexpected	  outcomes	  	  (Rushworth	  and	  Behrens,	  2008).	  One	  common	  and	  effective	  algorithm	  for	  describing	  such	  adaptation	  is	  the	  delta	  rule	  	  (Sutton	  and	  Barto,	  1998;Williams,	  1992):	  	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   [1]	  	  where	  a	  new	  belief	  at	  time	  t+1	  (Bt+1)	  depends	  on	  the	  previous	  belief	  (Bt)	  and	  the	  error	  made	  in	  predicting	  the	  most	  recent	  outcome	  (δt).	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  new	  outcome	  is	  controlled	  by	  the	  learning	  rate	  (αt).	  When	  αt=0,	  the	  updated	  belief	  reflects	  the	  previous	  belief	  but	  not	  the	  most	  recent	  outcome.	  When	  αt=1,	  the	  updated	  belief	  reflects	  the	  most	  recent	  outcome	  but	  not	  the	  previous	  belief.	  	  Assigning	  influence	  to	  new	  outcomes	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment	  is	  difficult	  because	  the	  source	  of	  prediction	  errors	  is	  generally	  unknown	  	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007;Yu	  and	  Dayan,	  2005).	  One	  source	  of	  error	  is	  stochastic	  fluctuations	  in	  an	  otherwise	  stable	  action-­‐outcome	  relationship	  (“noise”).	  Noise	  can	  make	  each	  outcome	  a	  bad	  
	   21	  
predictor	  of	  the	  next,	  implying	  that	  new	  outcomes	  should	  affect	  beliefs	  only	  minimally.	  Another	  source	  of	  error	  is	  a	  fundamental	  change-­‐point	  in	  the	  action-­‐outcome	  relationship	  (“volatility”).	  Change-­‐points	  can	  render	  historical	  outcomes	  irrelevant,	  implying	  that	  new	  outcomes	  should	  influence	  beliefs	  strongly.	  	  Previous	  work	  has	  shown	  that,	  on	  average,	  human	  subjects	  elevate	  learning	  rates	  during	  periods	  of	  volatility	  on	  probabilistic	  decision	  tasks.	  Such	  behavior	  can	  be	  fit	  by	  both	  a	  Bayesian	  model	  for	  optimal	  belief	  updating	  and	  a	  computationally	  frugal	  extension	  of	  delta-­‐rule	  updating	  	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007;Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Our	  goal	  was	  to	  build	  on	  these	  studies	  and,	  instead	  of	  relying	  on	  model	  fitting	  to	  average	  behavior	  on	  simple	  choice	  tasks,	  directly	  measure	  the	  learning	  rates	  used	  by	  subjects	  in	  noisy	  and	  volatile	  environments.	  We	  also	  sought	  to	  reconcile	  these	  data	  with	  both	  the	  Bayesian	  and	  delta-­‐rule	  models	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  underlying	  neural	  computations.	  	  We	  developed	  a	  novel	  task	  that	  required	  subjects	  to	  predict	  the	  next	  numerical	  value	  to	  be	  presented	  in	  a	  sequence	  (Fig.	  1A).	  The	  values	  were	  chosen	  randomly	  from	  a	  Gaussian	  distribution	  with	  a	  mean	  that	  changed	  occasionally,	  giving	  rise	  to	  both	  noisy	  and	  volatile	  prediction	  errors.	  The	  subject	  updated	  each	  prediction	  as	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  current	  prediction	  error,	  equivalent	  to	  setting	  the	  learning	  rate	  (αt).	  Thus,	  the	  task	  provided	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  measurement	  of	  outcome	  influence.	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We	  present	  several	  new	  findings.	  First,	  subjects	  recognized	  change-­‐points	  from	  unexpectedly	  large	  prediction	  errors,	  which	  temporarily	  increased	  prediction	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  subsequent	  outcomes.	  Second,	  there	  were	  strong	  individual	  differences,	  including	  some	  subjects	  who	  were	  highly	  influenced	  by	  new	  outcomes	  and	  others	  who	  generally	  ignored	  them.	  Third,	  these	  behaviors	  were	  consistent	  with	  a	  modified	  delta-­‐rule	  model,	  derived	  from	  a	  systematic	  reduction	  of	  the	  Bayesian	  ideal	  observer	  	  (Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010;Adams	  and	  MacKay,	  2007;Fearnhead	  and	  Liu,	  2007),	  in	  which	  individual	  differences	  were	  attributed	  to	  different	  expectations	  about	  the	  rate	  of	  occurrence	  of	  change-­‐points.	  The	  results	  provide	  a	  novel,	  quantitative	  framework	  describing	  the	  dynamics	  of	  belief	  updating	  in	  a	  changing	  environment.	  	  
Materials	  and	  Methods	  	  
Behavioral	  tasks	  
Human subject protocols were approved by the University of Pennsylvania internal 
review board. Thirty subjects (13 female, 17 male; mean age = 25.2 years, range = 19 –
 31 years) participated in the study after providing informed consent. Twenty-seven 
subjects completed both the estimation and confidence tasks (see below), in that order. 
One subject completed only the estimation task, and two subjects completed only the 
confidence task.  	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Estimation	  task.	  This	  task	  required	  subjects	  to	  predict	  each	  subsequent	  number	  to	  be	  presented	  in	  a	  series	  of	  numbers.	  For	  each	  trial	  t,	  a	  single	  number	  (Xt)	  was	  presented	  that	  was	  a	  rounded	  pick	  sampled	  independently	  and	  identically	  from	  a	  Gaussian	  distribution	  whose	  mean	  (μt)	  changed	  at	  unsignaled	  change-­‐points	  and	  whose	  standard	  deviation	  (σt)	  was	  fixed	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  experimental	  blocks	  of	  200	  trials	  (5,	  15,	  25,	  or	  35,	  presented	  blockwise	  in	  ascending	  order	  for	  14	  subjects	  and	  descending	  order	  for	  14	  subjects);	  that	  is,	   .	  Change-­‐points	  in	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution	  occurred	  after	  at	  least	  5	  trials	  plus	  a	  random	  pick	  from	  an	  exponential	  distribution	  with	  a	  mean	  of	  20	  trials.	  Thus,	  the	  true	  rate	  of	  change-­‐points,	  or	  hazard	  rate	  (H,	  in	  units	  of	  change-­‐points/trial)	  was	  0	  for	  the	  first	  5	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­‐point	  and	  0.05	  for	  all	  trials	  thereafter.	  The	  average	  hazard	  rate	  of	  a	  change-­‐point	  across	  all	  trials	  was	  0.04.	  	  The	  display	  showed	  a	  line	  representing	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  numbers	  (0	  to	  300),	  a	  bar	  representing	  the	  current	  estimate,	  a	  bar	  representing	  the	  most	  recent	  number	  presented,	  and	  a	  line	  between	  these	  bars	  representing	  the	  current	  prediction	  error	  (Fig.	  1A).	  The	  subject	  updated	  his	  or	  her	  prediction	  on	  each	  trial	  to	  an	  integer	  value	  between	  the	  previous	  prediction	  and	  the	  newly	  generated	  number	  (ensuring	  that	  learning	  rates	  would	  fall	  between	  zero	  and	  one)	  using	  a	  video	  gamepad.	  Each	  subject	  first	  performed	  two	  training	  blocks	  (standard	  deviations	  of	  3	  and	  20).	  Each	  session	  consisted	  of	  four	  test	  blocks.	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Subjects	  were	  told	  that	  the	  numbers	  were	  generated	  from	  a	  noisy	  process	  that	  would	  change	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  task.	  They	  were	  instructed	  to	  minimize	  their	  prediction	  errors,	  on	  average,	  across	  all	  blocks	  of	  the	  task;	  i.e.,	  minimize	   .	  Payout	  depended	  on	  how	  well	  they	  achieved	  this	  goal.	  Because	  prediction	  errors	  depended	  substantially	  on	  the	  specific	  sequence	  of	  numbers	  generated	  for	  the	  given	  session,	  we	  computed	  two	  benchmark	  error	  magnitudes	  to	  help	  determine	  payout.	  The	  lower	  benchmark	  (LB)	  was	  computed	  as	  the	  mean	  absolute	  difference	  between	  sequential	  generated	  numbers,	   .	  The	  higher	  benchmark	  (HB)	  was	  the	  mean	  difference	  between	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution	  on	  the	  previous	  trial	  and	  the	  generated	  number,	   .	  Payout	  was	  computed	  as	  follows:	  	   	  >	  LB	  	   	   	   	   	   =	  $8	  	  LB	  >	   	  >	  2/3	  LB	  +	  1/3	  HB	   	   =	  $10	  	  2/3	  LB	  +	  1/3	  HB	  >	   	  >	  1/2	  (LB	  +	  HB)	  	   =	  $12	  	  <	  1/2	  (LB	  +	  HB)	   	   	   	   =	  $15	  	  The	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model,	  when	  given	  the	  true	  hazard	  rate	  (0.04),	  was	  capable	  of	  achieving	  the	  maximum	  payout	  for	  all	  task	  sessions.	  	  
Confidence	  task.	  This	  task	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  estimation	  task,	  except	  subjects	  also	  indicated	  their	  confidence	  in	  each	  prediction.	  A	  series	  of	  numbers	  was	  generated	  as	  above	  (3	  blocks	  of	  200	  trials	  with	  standard	  deviations	  10,	  20,	  and	  30).	  Subjects	  were	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instructed	  not	  only	  to	  make	  a	  prediction	  on	  each	  trial,	  as	  described	  above,	  but	  also	  to	  indicate	  a	  symmetric	  window	  around	  the	  prediction	  that	  they	  believed,	  with	  85%	  confidence,	  would	  contain	  the	  next	  number.	  Subjects	  earned	  “points”	  on	  each	  trial	  in	  which	  the	  generated	  number	  fell	  within	  the	  specified	  window.	  Feedback	  included	  a	  sound	  to	  indicate	  when	  the	  generated	  number	  fell	  within	  the	  specified	  window	  and	  a	  running	  tally	  of	  points	  earned	  by	  the	  subject.	  	  	  Point	  values	  were	  chosen	  to	  incentivize	  confidence	  windows	  that	  were	  85%	  likely	  to	  contain	  the	  next	  number	  in	  the	  sequence,	  as	  follows.	  The	  expected	  value	  of	  points	  earned	  across	  all	  possible	  window	  sizes	  was	  defined	  by	  a	  Gaussian	  distribution	  with	  a	  mean	  equal	  to	  the	  minimum	  range	  capable	  of	  including	  85%	  of	  the	  probability	  density	  under	  the	  generative	  distribution.	  The	  number	  of	  points	  at	  stake	  for	  a	  given	  window	  size	  was	  computed	  by	  dividing	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  that	  window	  size	  by	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  new	  outcome	  would	  fall	  within	  this	  window	  (assuming	  the	  window	  is	  centered	  on	  the	  actual	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution).	  Thus,	  total	  points	  earned	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session	  depended	  both	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  correctly	  estimate	  the	  mean,	  but	  also	  the	  use	  of	  windows	  that	  approximated	  85%	  confidence	  intervals.	  Points	  earned	  by	  subjects	  (SP)	  were	  compared	  to	  the	  number	  points	  that	  would	  be	  earned	  by	  the	  two	  benchmark	  strategies	  described	  above,	  if	  those	  strategies	  used	  confidence-­‐window	  sizes	  that	  maximized	  expected	  point	  value	  (LBP	  &	  HBP).	  Payout	  was	  computed	  as	  follows:	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SP	  <	  LBP	   	   	   	   	   	   =	  $8	  LBP	  <	  SP	  <	  2/3	  LBP	  +	  1/3	  HBP	   	   	   =	  $10	  2/3	  LBP	  +	  1/3	  HBP	  <	  SP	  <	  1/2	  (LBP	  +	  HBP)	   =	  $12	  SP	  >	  1/2	  (LBP	  +	  HBP)	   	   	   	   =	  $15	  	  
Data	  analysis.	  Prediction	  errors	  were	  computed	  by	  subtracting	  the	  subject’s	  prediction	  (Bt	  in	  Eq.	  1)	  from	  the	  actual	  outcome	  (Xt)	  on	  each	  trial.	  Learning	  rates	  were	  calculated	  for	  each	  trial	  according	  to	  Eq.	  1:	  the	  current	  update,	  Bt+1–Bt,	  was	  divided	  by	  the	  current	  prediction	  error,	  δt.	  Trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  error	  z-­‐scores	  were	  computed	  by	  dividing	  the	  absolute	  error	  magnitude	  by	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution.	  Error-­‐independent	  learning	  rates	  were	  computed	  by	  first	  fitting	  a	  sigmoid-­‐shaped,	  cumulative	  Weibull	  function	  (with	  four	  parameters,	  governing	  shape,	  offset,	  lower	  bound,	  and	  upper	  bound)	  to	  learning	  rate	  as	  a	  function	  of	  error	  z-­‐score.	  The	  residuals	  to	  this	  fit	  represented	  learning	  rates	  that	  were	  relatively	  independent	  of	  error	  magnitude.	  Relative	  uncertainty	  was	  computed	  by	  taking	  the	  z-­‐score	  of	  confidence	  window	  size	  for	  a	  given	  generative	  standard	  deviation.	  
	  
Models	  Optimal	  task	  performance	  requires	  knowledge	  about	  the	  probability	  distribution	  
p(Xt+1	  |	  X1:t),	  which	  is	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  over	  possible	  outcomes	  on	  trial	  t+1,	  
p(Xt+1),	  given	  all	  previous	  samples,	  (X1:t).	  Optimal	  performance	  on	  the	  estimation	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task	  requires	  specifying	  the	  mean	  of	  this	  predictive	  distribution,	  whereas	  optimal	  performance	  on	  the	  confidence	  task	  requires	  knowledge	  about	  the	  width	  of	  this	  predictive	  distribution,	  as	  well.	  Computing	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  current	  predictive	  distribution	  is	  difficult	  because	  of	  unsignaled	  change-­‐points	  in	  the	  generative	  process.	  If	  the	  most	  recent	  change-­‐point	  was	  known	  to	  have	  occurred	  rt	  trials	  ago,	  the	  predictive	  mean	  could	  be	  computed	  simply	  by	  taking	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  last	  rt	  outcomes:	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [2]	  	   	   	  However,	  because	  change-­‐points	  are	  unsignaled,	  the	  optimal	  solution	  must	  be	  reformulated	  in	  terms	  of	  all	  possible	  run-­‐lengths,	  which	  describe	  the	  number	  of	  data	  points	  that	  could	  have	  been	  generated	  from	  the	  current	  distribution:	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [3a]	  
 
where p(Xt+1| rt) is the predictive distribution in X, conditional on run length, which is 
computed from the previous rt samples treated as if they were generated by the current 
distribution: 
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 [3b] 
and p(rt | X1:t) is the distribution of possible run lengths, given all previous data. Thus, the 
mean of the predictive distribution can be described in terms of rt:  
 
       [4] 
 
We applied two different classes of model to our task: a Bayesian ideal-observer model 
that computes the full run-length distribution, and a reduced Bayesian model that 
approximates the run-length distribution using only its first moment. 
	  
Full	  Bayesian	  model.	  The	  full	  Bayesian	  model	  computes	  the	  entire	  run-­‐length	  distribution	  recursively	  to	  generate	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  	  (Fearnhead	  and	  Liu,	  2007;Adams	  and	  MacKay,	  2007).	  An	  alternative	  but	  mathematically	  equivalent	  approach,	  which	  does	  not	  use	  run	  length	  explicitly	  but	  instead	  maintains	  representations	  of	  probability	  distributions	  over	  all	  possible	  values	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  generative	  process	  	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007),	  is	  also	  possible,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  use	  it	  here.	  Both	  approaches	  depend	  strongly	  on	  the	  hazard	  rate,	  which	  specifies	  the	  prior	  probability	  of	  a	  change-­‐point.	  When	  the	  hazard	  rate	  is	  known,	  the	  full,	  recursive	  solution	  of	  the	  run-­‐length-­‐based	  model	  uses	  the	  message-­‐passing	  algorithm	  depicted	  in	  Fig.	  6A.	  After	  t	  trials,	  the	  model	  updates	  predictive	  distributions	  (in	  Xt+1)	  for	  each	  of	  the	  t+1	  possible	  run	  lengths,	  as	  well	  as	  the	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probability	  distribution	  over	  those	  run	  lengths.	  When	  the	  hazard	  rate	  is	  unknown,	  like	  for	  our	  subjects,	  the	  optimal	  solution	  is	  more	  complicated.	  It	  requires	  maintaining	  a	  distribution	  over	  not	  only	  possible	  run	  lengths,	  but	  also	  possible	  hazard	  rates,	  thus	  at	  least	  (t+1)3	  separate	  predictive	  distributions	  are	  required	  for	  inference	  at	  time	  t	  	  (Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  To	  make	  this	  algorithm	  more	  tractable	  computationally,	  we	  implemented	  a	  pruning	  algorithm	  previously	  shown	  to	  reduce	  computations	  with	  a	  minimal	  loss	  of	  performance	  (Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
Reduced	  Bayesian	  model.	  We	  also	  developed	  an	  even	  more	  computationally	  tractable	  and	  neurally	  feasible	  inference	  algorithm	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  systematic	  reduction	  of	  the	  full	  Bayesian	  model.	  In	  this	  model,	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  is	  not	  computed	  across	  all	  possible	  run	  lengths	  but	  instead	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  single,	  expected	  run	  length	  ( ).	  On	  each	  trial,	  the	  model	  considers	  two	  possibilities:	  that	  a	  change-­‐point	  did	  or	  did	  not	  occur.	  Accordingly,	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  change-­‐point	  (cp)	  on	  a	  given	  trial,	  Ω,	  can	  be	  computed	  using	  Bayes’	  rule:	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   [5]	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where	  U(Xt|0,	  300)	  is	  the	  uniform	  distribution	  from	  which	  Xt	  is	  generated	  (independent	  of	  the	  previous	  generative	  distribution)	  if	  a	  change-­‐point	  occurred,	  	  is	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  if	  a	  change-­‐point	  did	  not	  occur	  (and	  thus	  depends	  on	  both	   	  and	  recent	  outcomes),	  and	  H	  is	  the	  hazard	  rate	  (set	  to	  0.04,	  the	  average	  value	  for	  the	  task).	  	  The	  variance	  of	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  depends	  on	  both	  the	  run	  length	  and	  the	  expected	  amount	  of	  noise	  from	  the	  generative	  distribution:	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [6]	  	  where	  N	  is	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution;	  see	  below	  for	  an	  alternative	  model	  in	  which	  this	  quantity	  is	  inferred	  from	  the	  data.	  In	  Eq.	  6,	  the	  first	  term	  on	  the	  right-­‐hand	  side	  reflects	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  outcome	  for	  the	  given	  μ,	  and	  the	  second	  term	  reflects	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  actual	  location	  of	  μ.	  As	  run	  length	  increases,	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  location	  of	  μ	  decreases,	  but	  uncertainty	  implicit	  in	  the	  stochasticity	  of	  the	  generative	  process	  (noise)	  remains.	  	  The	  expected	  (mean)	  value	  of	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  is	  based	  on	  two	  possibilities,	  one	  that	  a	  change-­‐point	  occurred	  and	  thus	  only	  the	  most	  recent	  data	  point	  is	  relevant:	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   [7a]	  	  and	  a	  second	  possibility	  that	  a	  change-­‐point	  did	  not	  occur	  and	  thus	  the	  mean	  is	  updated	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  new	  data	  point:	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [7b]	  	  The	  mean	  of	  the	  posterior	  distribution	  is	  an	  average	  of	  these	  two	  possibilities,	  weighted	  by	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  change-­‐point	  occurred:	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [7c]	  	   	  An	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  this	  update	  equation	  can	  be	  rearranged	  as	  a	  delta	  rule:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  [7d]	   	  	  where	  δt	  is	  the	  prediction	  error	   	  and	  αt	  is	  the	  learning	  rate:	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [7e]	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Similarly,	  the	  expected	  run-­‐length	  is	  updated	  on	  each	  trial	  according	  to	  the	  two	  possible	  generative	  scenarios	  and	  their	  respective	  probabilities:	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  [8]	   	  	  
Computing	  best-­fitting	  hazard	  rates.	  To	  test	  whether	  prior	  expectations	  about	  hazard	  rate	  could	  account	  for	  across-­‐subject	  variability,	  we	  fit	  the	  reduced	  model	  to	  data	  from	  each	  subject	  with	  the	  hazard	  rate	  as	  a	  free	  parameter.	  The	  model	  was	  applied	  separately	  to	  each	  block,	  with	  N	  (Eq.	  6)	  fixed	  to	  the	  true	  generative	  standard	  deviation	  for	  that	  block.	  The	  best-­‐fitting	  hazard	  rates	  were	  determined	  using	  a	  constrained	  search	  algorithm	  (fmincon	  in	  MATLAB,	  min/max	  hazard=0/1)	  that	  found	  the	  value	  of	  H	  that	  minimized	  the	  total	  squared	  difference	  between	  model	  and	  subject	  predictions.	   	  	  We	  considered	  two	  possible	  implementations	  of	  the	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model.	  The	  first	  made	  predictions	  as	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  current	  predictive	  distribution	  ( ).	  The	  second	  made	  predictions	  as	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  distribution	  at	  time	  t+1.	  This	  quantity	  depends	  on	  not	  only	  the	  current	  predictive	  distribution,	  but	  also	  the	  uniform	  prior	  distribution,	  because	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  a	  change-­‐point	  might	  occur	  and	  thus	  the	  next	  number	  would	  come	  from	  a	  new	  distribution.	  All	  analyses	  were	  done	  with	  the	  first	  implementation,	  which	  provided	  better	  fits	  to	  the	  behavioral	  data	  (the	  ratio	  of	  Bayesian	  information	  criteria	  of	  fits	  using	  the	  first	  versus	  the	  second	  model	  had	  a	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median	  [interquartile	  range]	  value	  across	  task	  blocks	  of	  0.93	  [0.86-­‐0.97],	  paired	  Wilcoxon	  test	  for	  H0:	  median=0,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  
Inferring	  noise	  using	  the	  reduced	  model.	  Because	  subjects	  were	  not	  told	  explicitly	  the	  amount	  of	  noise	  (the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  distributions	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  numbers),	  we	  also	  developed	  a	  version	  of	  the	  reduced	  model	  that	  included	  an	  algorithm	  to	  infer	  the	  amount	  of	  noise	  from	  the	  data.	  This	  model	  computes	  a	  quantity	  whose	  expectation	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  generative	  noise:	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   [9]	  	  where	   	  is	  the	  inferred	  variance,	  which	  is	  updated	  according	  to	  a	  delta	  rule	  that	  depends	  on	  both	  the	  run	  length	  and	  prediction	  error.	  The	  expected	  value	  of	  the	  prediction-­‐error	  term	  (in	  parentheses)	  is	  zero	  for	  non-­‐change-­‐point	  trials.	  	  The	  learning	  rate,	  αt(N),	  affects	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  new	  prediction	  errors	  influence	  the	  noise	  estimate	  and	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  proportional	  to	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  trial	  contained	  information	  about	  variance	  (i.e.,	  was	  not	  a	  change-­‐point	  trial)	  and	  inversely	  proportional	  to	  the	  the	  amount	  of	  such	  information	  previously	  collected:	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  [10]	  	  Thus,	  αt(N)	  goes	  to	  zero	  if	  a	  change-­‐point	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  occurred	  or	  as	  the	  number	  of	  previous	  non-­‐change-­‐point	  trials	  goes	  to	  infinity.	  	  	  Although	  this	  algorithm	  is	  capable	  of	  inferring	  noise,	  it	  uses	  learning	  rates	  that	  tend	  toward	  zero	  after	  only	  a	  few	  trials	  and	  thus	  seem	  unlikely	  to	  be	  used	  by	  subjects.	  We	  therefore	  modeled	  the	  possibility	  that	  learning	  rates	  used	  to	  infer	  noise	  were	  related	  to	  those	  used	  to	  infer	  μ.	  Specifically,	  we	  instituted	  a	  minimum	  α(N)	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  hazard	  rate	  (H),	  the	  model	  parameter	  that	  dictates	  the	  average	  learning	  rate	  (see	  Fig.	  8B):	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [11]	  	  where	   	  is	  a	  scaling	  constant.	  For	  Fig.	  9C,F,I,	   	  was	  set	  to	  0.5	  (results	  were	  similar	  using	  values	  ranging	  from	  0.2	  to	  1).	  
	  
Reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  with	  under-­weighted	  likelihood	  information.	  To	  more	  closely	  match	  our	  measured	  behavioral	  data,	  we	  revised	  the	  reduced	  model	  to	  reduce	  the	  weight	  of	  likelihood	  information	  in	  change-­‐point	  detection.	  Thus,	  in	  lieu	  of	  Eq.	  5,	  this	  version	  computed	  Ωt	  as:	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  [12]	  	  where	  the	  likelihood	  weight,	  λ,	  is	  a	  fractional	  term	  (0…1)	  that	  limits	  the	  use	  of	  likelihood	  information	  in	  change-­‐point	  detection.	  When	  λ=0,	  the	  model	  becomes	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  delta-­‐rule	  model	  in	  which	  the	  learning	  rate	  is	  determined	  by	  H.	  When	  λ=1,	  the	  model	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  discussed	  above.	  This	  model	  was	  fit	  to	  subject	  data	  with	  λ	  and	  H	  as	  free	  parameters,	  using	  a	  constrained	  search	  algorithm	  to	  minimize	  the	  squared	  difference	  between	  subject	  and	  model	  predictions.	  	  	  
Reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  with	  drifting	  mean.	  A	  final	  alternative	  model	  used	  a	  generative	  framework	  that	  assumed	  that	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution	  drifted	  from	  trial	  to	  trial.	  Although	  such	  drift	  did	  not	  actually	  occur,	  we	  wanted	  to	  test	  whether	  subjects	  behaved	  as	  if	  it	  did.	  This	  kind	  of	  drift	  is	  often	  accounted	  for	  using	  a	  Kalman	  filter,	  which	  provides	  an	  efficient	  means	  for	  updating	  beliefs	  based	  on	  noisy	  samples	  from	  a	  drifting	  process.	  However,	  this	  approach	  performs	  poorly	  in	  environments	  with	  discontinuous	  changes,	  such	  as	  in	  our	  task.	  Conversely,	  the	  pure	  change-­‐point	  model	  provides	  an	  efficient	  algorithm	  for	  updating	  beliefs	  when	  the	  world	  changes	  only	  at	  discreet	  change-­‐points.	  We	  therefore	  combined	  these	  approaches,	  as	  follows.	  The	  drift	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  N	  ~	  (0,	  D2),	  where	  D	  is	  the	  drift	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rate.	  This	  generative	  framework	  prescribes	  more	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  location	  of	  the	  true	  mean,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  wider	  predictive	  distribution	  (to	  replace	  Eq.	  6):	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [13]	  	  To	  consolidate	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  mean	  into	  a	  single	  variable	  and	  allow	  correct	  computation	  of	  the	  learning	  rate	  (Eq.	  7e),	  we	  re-­‐computed	  the	  run	  length	  to	  reflect	  the	  total	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  distribution:	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   [14]	  	  This	  adjusted	  run	  length	  was	  used	  for	  the	  learning	  rate	  (Eq.	  7e)	  and	  update	  (Eq.	  8)	  equations.	  This	  model	  was	  fit	  to	  subject	  data	  with	  N,	  D,	  and	  H	  as	  free	  parameters.	  	  
	  
Results	  	  We	  used	  a	  novel	  estimation	  task	  to	  quantify	  how	  human	  subjects	  update	  beliefs	  in	  the	  face	  of	  both	  noise	  and	  volatility.	  Below,	  we	  first	  describe	  the	  task	  and	  show	  that	  subjects	  tended	  to	  use	  different	  learning	  rates	  to	  update	  beliefs	  under	  different	  conditions.	  Second,	  we	  show	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  learning	  rate	  depended	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  estimation	  errors	  were	  larger	  than	  expected,	  the	  recency	  of	  such	  an	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unexpectedly	  large	  error,	  and	  the	  relative	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  subject.	  Third,	  we	  introduce	  a	  novel	  model,	  which	  is	  a	  form	  of	  Bayesian	  ideal	  observer	  reduced	  to	  implement	  delta-­‐rule	  updating,	  that	  captures	  many	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  data.	  Fourth,	  we	  use	  the	  model	  to	  show	  that	  individual	  differences	  in	  performance	  suggest	  differences	  in	  whether	  errors	  tend	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  either	  noise	  or	  volatility.	  Fifth,	  we	  introduce	  several	  model	  variants	  that	  even	  more	  closely	  match	  human	  behavior.	  
	  
Learning	  rate	  varied	  from	  trial	  to	  trial.	  Thirty	  subjects	  performed	  the	  estimation	  and	  confidence	  tasks	  in	  57	  total	  sessions.	  The	  tasks	  required	  the	  subject	  to	  sequentially	  update	  a	  belief	  about	  the	  next	  number	  in	  a	  series.	  The	  numbers	  were	  picked	  from	  a	  Gaussian	  distribution	  with	  a	  mean	  that	  changed	  at	  random	  intervals	  (change-­‐points)	  and	  a	  standard	  deviation	  (noise)	  that	  was	  stable	  over	  each	  block	  of	  200	  trials	  (Fig.	  1A).	  Subjects	  were	  instructed	  to	  estimate	  the	  next	  number	  that	  would	  be	  generated	  by	  the	  computer	  and	  to	  minimize	  the	  error	  on	  these	  estimates.	  Visual	  feedback	  consisted	  of	  a	  bar	  that	  reflected	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  subject's	  estimate	  and	  the	  most	  recently	  generated	  number	  shown	  on	  each	  trial	  and	  the	  mean	  absolute	  error	  shown	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  200-­‐trial	  block.	  Payment	  scaled	  inversely	  with	  the	  mean	  absolute	  error	  for	  the	  session.	  	  In	  principle,	  payout	  maximization	  required	  basing	  estimates	  on	  the	  median	  (in	  this	  case	  also	  the	  mean)	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution.	  However,	  information	  about	  the	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generative	  distribution	  was	  not	  given	  to	  subjects	  explicitly.	  Therefore,	  they	  were	  required	  to	  infer	  properties	  of	  this	  distribution	  based	  on	  the	  previously	  observed	  numbers.	  The	  behavioral	  data	  were	  consistent	  with	  a	  sequential-­‐updating	  strategy	  that	  approximated	  the	  central	  tendency	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution	  (data	  from	  an	  example	  session	  are	  shown	  in	  Fig.	  1B).	  Estimates	  tended	  to	  approximate	  the	  mean	  during	  periods	  of	  stability	  and	  then	  change	  relatively	  rapidly	  at	  change-­‐points	  in	  the	  generative	  distribution	  to	  re-­‐settle	  at	  the	  new	  mean.	  	  In	  theory,	  a	  delta-­‐rule	  algorithm	  might	  generate	  qualitatively	  similar,	  adaptive	  behavior	  even	  when	  the	  learning	  rate	  is	  fixed	  to	  a	  constant	  value,	  because	  update	  magnitude	  would	  be	  proportional	  to	  error	  magnitude.	  However,	  such	  a	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model	  was	  not	  a	  valid	  description	  of	  behavior	  for	  this	  task	  (Fig.	  1D).	  The	  subjects	  used	  learning	  rates	  that	  differed	  from	  trial	  to	  trial	  and	  spanned	  the	  allowed	  range	  from	  0	  to	  1.	  Moreover,	  although	  the	  learning	  rates	  used	  by	  different	  subjects	  varied	  considerably	  (the	  mean	  learning	  rate	  per	  subject	  ranged	  from	  0.07	  to	  0.71),	  the	  particular	  sequence	  of	  learning	  rates	  chosen	  by	  each	  subject	  provided	  better	  predictions	  than	  randomly	  ordered	  sequences	  of	  the	  same	  values	  (the	  median	  [95%	  confidence	  intervals]	  value,	  computed	  across	  subjects,	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  mean	  absolute	  error	  between	  1000	  randomized	  sequences	  versus	  the	  actual	  sequence	  per	  subject	  =	  2.59	  [2.46	  2.72],	  Wilcoxon	  test	  for	  H0:median=0,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  Thus,	  subjects	  made	  effective	  predictions	  by	  assigning	  some	  outcomes	  more	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influence	  than	  others.	  The	  remaining	  analyses	  aimed	  to	  understand	  the	  rules	  that	  governed	  how	  this	  assignment	  of	  influence	  was	  made.	  	  
Learning	  rate	  depended	  on	  surprising	  outcomes.	  One	  important	  factor	  that	  governs	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  chosen	  learning	  rate	  is	  the	  occurrence	  of	  change-­‐points	  in	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution.	  In	  general,	  when	  a	  change-­‐point	  occurs,	  information	  obtained	  prior	  to	  the	  change-­‐point	  is	  no	  longer	  useful	  in	  making	  predictions,	  and	  thus	  the	  learning	  rate	  should	  increase	  to	  emphasize	  newly	  arriving	  information.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  idea,	  subjects	  typically	  used	  higher	  learning	  rates	  on	  change-­‐point	  trials	  (the	  first	  trial	  of	  a	  new	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution)	  than	  on	  other	  trials	  (Fig.	  2A).	  	  Change-­‐point	  locations	  were	  unknown	  to	  the	  subjects	  and	  thus	  must	  have	  been	  inferred	  from	  statistical	  features	  of	  the	  sequential	  trial	  outcomes.	  One	  such	  feature	  is	  the	  magnitude	  of	  error	  (δ)	  relative	  to	  expected	  errors.	  Change-­‐points	  are	  likely	  to	  correspond	  to	  a	  surprisingly	  large	  error,	  where	  surprise	  is	  defined	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  expectation	  of	  |δ|.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  idea,	  the	  overall	  positive	  relationship	  between	  α	  and	  |δ|	  depended	  heavily	  on	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution	  (Fig.	  2B,C).	  A	  given	  absolute	  error	  magnitude	  tended	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  higher	  learning	  rate	  for	  less	  noisy	  distributions,	  when	  such	  an	  error	  was	  less	  expected.	  To	  further	  quantify	  this	  effect,	  we	  normalized	  absolute	  prediction	  errors	  by	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution.	  This	  “z-­‐scored	  error”	  was	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predictive	  of	  learning	  rate,	  relatively	  independent	  of	  the	  noise	  magnitude	  (Fig.	  2C;	  Spearman’s	  ρ	  across	  all	  subjects	  was	  0.15,	  permutation	  test	  for	  H0:	  ρ=0,	  p	  <	  0.001	  ).	  We	  also	  note	  that	  this	  basic	  trend	  was	  consistent	  but	  varied	  considerably	  in	  magnitude	  across	  subjects	  (Fig.	  2D),	  a	  finding	  that	  we	  analyze	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  a	  change-­‐point	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  learning	  rate	  persisted	  for	  many	  trials	  beyond	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  change-­‐point.	  In	  the	  trials	  following	  a	  change-­‐point,	  prediction	  errors	  tended	  to	  decrease	  sharply,	  as	  subjects	  adjusted	  their	  estimates	  to	  match	  the	  new	  distribution	  (Fig.	  3A,	  gray).	  In	  contrast,	  learning	  rates	  tended	  to	  decrease	  more	  gradually	  following	  a	  change-­‐point	  (Fig.	  3A,	  black).	  This	  gradual	  decay	  in	  learning	  rate	  did	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  relative	  (z-­‐scored)	  prediction	  error:	  after	  adjusting	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  learning	  rate	  and	  z-­‐scored	  error	  (see	  Fig.	  2D),	  there	  were	  still	  changes	  in	  learning	  rate	  that	  persisted	  for	  many	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­‐point.	  The	  peak	  value	  in	  this	  adjusted	  learning	  rate	  tended	  to	  occur	  on	  the	  first	  trial	  following	  a	  change-­‐point	  and	  then	  decay	  gradually	  (Fig.	  3B).	  	  
Learning	  rate	  magnitude	  was	  related	  to	  confidence.	  Ideal-­‐observer	  theory	  suggests	  that	  any	  information	  acquired	  after	  a	  change-­‐point	  should	  be	  highly	  influential	  because	  the	  observer	  is	  uncertain	  about	  the	  current	  belief	  	  (Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010;Yu	  and	  Dayan,	  2003).	  Conversely,	  subsequent	  acquisition	  of	  information	  from	  a	  stable	  environment	  should	  lead	  the	  observer	  to	  become	  more	  confident	  and	  less	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influenced	  by	  each	  new	  outcome.	  To	  examine	  this	  relationship	  between	  confidence	  and	  learning	  rate	  and	  test	  how	  well	  it	  could	  explain	  the	  slowly	  decaying	  learning	  rates	  shown	  in	  Fig.	  3,	  we	  trained	  subjects	  on	  a	  task	  that	  required	  specification	  of	  an	  85%	  confidence	  window.	  This	  task	  probed	  not	  only	  the	  central	  tendency	  of	  the	  subject’s	  belief	  about	  the	  generative	  distribution,	  but	  also	  uncertainty	  that	  subjects	  had	  in	  their	  own	  estimates.	  The	  example	  session	  in	  Fig.	  4A	  shows	  estimates	  (solid	  blue)	  and	  the	  85%	  confidence	  windows	  (dashdot	  blue)	  specified	  by	  a	  subject	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  full	  session.	  	  There	  was	  a	  systematic	  relationship	  between	  the	  size	  of	  the	  confidence	  window	  and	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution,	  with	  greater	  uncertainty	  corresponding	  to	  higher	  noise	  (Fig.	  4B).	  Moreover,	  subjects	  tended	  to	  make	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  adjustments	  to	  the	  confidence	  window	  to	  reflect	  changes	  in	  uncertainty,	  particularly	  after	  a	  change-­‐point.	  On	  average,	  confidence	  windows	  were	  largest	  after	  a	  change-­‐point	  and	  gradually	  became	  smaller	  as	  subjects	  collected	  more	  data	  from	  the	  new	  distribution	  (Fig.	  4C).	  This	  effect	  was	  largest	  when	  there	  was	  less	  noise	  and	  change-­‐points	  were	  most	  easily	  detectable.	  The	  time	  course	  of	  this	  decay	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  error-­‐independent	  decay	  in	  learning	  rate	  (compare	  4C	  and	  3B).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  general	  trends	  across	  subjects,	  there	  was	  considerable	  individual	  variability	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  confidence-­‐window	  size	  (e.g.,	  whiskers	  in	  Fig.	  4B)	  that	  was	  related	  to	  learning	  rate.	  This	  relationship	  is	  typified	  by	  the	  behavior	  of	  
	   42	  
two	  example	  subjects,	  shown	  in	  Fig.	  5A	  &	  B.	  Subject	  SG	  (Fig.	  5A)	  used	  small	  learning	  rates	  and	  tended	  to	  specify	  large	  confidence	  windows,	  indicating	  high	  uncertainty	  (Fig.	  5A).	  In	  contrast,	  subject	  LY	  tended	  to	  use	  large	  learning	  rates	  and	  small	  confidence	  windows	  (Fig.	  5B).	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  differences	  in	  mean	  learning	  rate	  and	  uncertainty	  between	  these	  two	  subjects,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  variables.	  Subject	  SG,	  who	  tended	  to	  use	  small	  learning	  rates	  overall,	  also	  tended	  to	  use	  relatively	  larger	  learning	  rates	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  she	  was	  most	  uncertain	  about	  her	  previous	  estimate.	  In	  contrast,	  subject	  LY,	  who	  tended	  to	  use	  large	  learning	  rates	  overall,	  also	  tended	  to	  use	  smaller	  learning	  rates	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  she	  was	  most	  uncertain	  about	  her	  previous	  estimate.	  	  	  Across	  subjects,	  mean	  confidence-­‐window	  size	  was	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  mean	  learning	  rate	  (Fig.	  5C).	  This	  relationship	  implies	  that	  subjects	  who	  tended	  to	  use	  large	  learning	  rates	  and	  thus	  be	  highly	  influenced	  by	  new	  information	  (like	  subject	  LY)	  also	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  estimates.	  Moreover,	  the	  mean	  learning	  rate	  used	  by	  a	  given	  subject	  across	  all	  conditions	  was	  predictive	  of	  how	  that	  subject’s	  learning	  rate	  related	  to	  the	  confidence-­‐window	  size	  from	  the	  previous	  trial	  (Fig.	  5D).	  Subjects	  who	  tended	  to	  use	  small	  learning	  rates	  (like	  subject	  SG)	  chose	  larger	  learning	  rates	  following	  trials	  in	  which	  they	  specified	  a	  large	  confidence	  window,	  suggesting	  that	  these	  subjects	  were	  most	  influenced	  by	  outcomes	  when	  they	  were	  most	  uncertain.	  In	  contrast,	  subjects	  who	  tended	  to	  use	  large	  learning	  rates	  (like	  subject	  LY)	  chose	  larger	  learning	  rates	  following	  trials	  in	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which	  they	  specified	  a	  small	  confidence	  window,	  suggesting	  that	  these	  subjects	  were	  most	  influenced	  by	  outcomes	  when	  they	  were	  most	  certain.	  	  The	  overall	  negative	  relationship	  between	  confidence	  window	  size	  and	  learning	  rate	  might	  seem	  at	  first	  to	  contradict	  ideal-­‐observer	  theory.	  As	  noted	  above,	  an	  ideal	  observer	  should	  make	  extensive	  use	  of	  new	  information	  and	  therefore	  use	  high	  learning	  rates	  when	  uncertainty	  is	  high.	  However,	  as	  we	  show	  in	  the	  next	  section	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  sources	  of	  uncertainty,	  which	  for	  this	  task	  have	  potentially	  different	  effects	  on	  an	  ideal	  observer.	  Taking	  into	  account	  these	  multiple	  sources	  of	  uncertainty	  can	  help	  to	  clarify	  the	  relationship	  between	  actual	  and	  optimal	  behavior.	  	  
A	  reduced	  Bayesian	  delta-­rule	  model.	  Optimal	  prediction	  in	  a	  discontinuously	  changing	  environment	  is	  a	  computationally	  demanding	  problem	  	  (Yu	  and	  Dayan,	  2005;Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  A	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  requires	  maintaining	  a	  set	  of	  nodes,	  each	  of	  which	  maintains	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  for	  a	  possible	  duration	  of	  stability,	  or	  run	  length	  (r;	  	  Adams	  and	  MacKay,	  2007;Fearnhead	  and	  Liu,	  2007).	  Optimal	  predictions	  are	  made	  on	  each	  trial	  by	  taking	  a	  weighted	  average	  of	  these	  nodes.	  However,	  in	  this	  approach	  the	  number	  of	  nodes	  scales	  linearly	  with	  the	  number	  of	  observations	  if	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  change-­‐points	  occur,	  or	  hazard	  rate,	  is	  known	  (Fig.	  6A)	  or	  with	  the	  number	  of	  observations	  cubed	  if	  the	  hazard	  rate	  is	  unknown	  	  (Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Thus,	  the	  optimal	  solution	  to	  our	  task	  must	  maintain	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and	  update	  likelihood	  estimates	  for	  thousands	  of	  predictions	  based	  on	  different	  possible	  generative	  scenarios.	  	  Our	  goal	  was	  to	  test	  models	  that	  could	  at	  least	  approximate	  optimal	  performance	  while	  using	  more	  plausible	  mechanisms.	  We	  therefore	  considered	  a	  particular	  reduction	  of	  the	  full	  Bayesian	  ideal-­‐observer	  model	  (Fig.	  6B).	  Instead	  of	  maintaining	  information	  about	  each	  possible	  value	  of	  r,	  this	  model	  maintains	  only	  a	  single	  "expected	  run	  length"	  ( )	  node.	  On	  each	  trial,	  the	  model	  considers	  two	  possible	  generative	  scenarios:	  that	  the	  newly	  generated	  number	  came	  from	  the	  same	  distribution	  as	  the	  previous	  one,	  or	  that	  the	  new	  number	  came	  from	  a	  new	  distribution.	  Probabilities	  of	  these	  possible	  scenarios	  are	  computed	  according	  to	  Bayes’	  rule,	  and	   	  is	  updated	  accordingly.	  A	  compelling	  feature	  of	  this	  complexity	  reduction	  is	  that	  the	  new	  model	  implements	  a	  form	  of	  delta	  rule	  (Eq.	  7).	  The	  learning	  rate	  depends	  on	  both	   	  and	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  change-­‐point	  occurred	  (Eq.	  7e).	  In	  the	  limit	  as	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  change-­‐point	  goes	  to	  zero,	  the	  model	  prescribes	  a	  learning	  rate	  equal	  to	  1/( +1)	  (Fig.	  6C).	  However,	  as	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  change-­‐point	  goes	  to	  one,	  the	  learning	  rate	  increases	  linearly	  toward	  one,	  consistent	  with	  a	  discarding	  of	  historical	  information	  that	  is	  unlikely	  to	  pertain	  to	  the	  new	  environment.	  The	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  achieves	  similar	  performance	  to	  that	  of	  the	  full	  model,	  and	  both	  models	  performed	  better	  than	  a	  delta	  rule	  that	  used	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  that	  minimized	  absolute	  errors	  over	  a	  session	  (Fig.	  6D).	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The	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  exhibited	  many	  of	  the	  same	  characteristics	  as	  human	  subjects	  on	  the	  estimation	  task	  (Fig.	  7).	  Like	  for	  the	  psychophysical	  data,	  the	  model’s	  choice	  of	  learning	  rate	  tended	  to	  increase	  as	  a	  function	  of	  error	  magnitude,	  with	  larger	  increases	  when	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  prior,	  stable	  distribution	  was	  small	  (Fig.	  7A–C).	  Moreover,	  the	  model	  tended	  to	  have	  higher	  learning	  rates	  on	  the	  trial	  after	  a	  change-­‐point,	  which	  then	  decayed	  gradually	  over	  many	  trials	  (Fig.	  7D	  &	  E).	  In	  the	  model,	  this	  gradual	  decay	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  decay	  in	  uncertainty	  occurring	  over	  the	  same	  period	  (Fig.	  7F).	  Despite	  these	  overall	  trends	  that	  matched	  the	  subjects’	  behavior,	  the	  model	  tended	  to	  perform	  much	  better	  and	  in	  fact	  closely	  matched	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  full	  Bayesian	  model	  (Fig.	  6D).	  	  A	  straightforward	  manipulation	  of	  the	  model	  could	  also	  reproduce	  much	  of	  the	  across-­‐subject	  variability.	  A	  key	  parameter	  of	  the	  model	  is	  the	  hazard	  rate	  (H),	  which	  describes	  the	  expected	  rate	  of	  change-­‐points.	  This	  parameter	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  differ	  across	  subjects	  in	  change-­‐point	  detection	  tasks	  	  (Steyvers	  and	  Brown,	  2006).	  We	  fit	  the	  model	  to	  data	  from	  each	  subject	  separately	  for	  each	  different	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  generative	  process	  with	  the	  hazard	  rate	  as	  a	  single	  free	  parameter.	  This	  procedure	  allowed	  us	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  reduced	  model	  could	  explain	  not	  only	  the	  trends	  in	  subject	  learning	  rates,	  but	  also	  whether	  differences	  across	  subjects	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  varying	  expectations	  about	  the	  instability	  of	  the	  generative	  environment.	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Subjects	  that	  tended	  to	  use	  higher	  learning	  rates	  were	  best	  fit	  by	  higher	  hazard	  rates	  (Fig.	  8A).	  This	  effect	  is	  due	  largely	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  higher	  hazard-­‐rate	  models	  tend	  to	  use	  higher	  learning	  rates	  (Fig.	  8B)	  because	  they	  infer	  change-­‐points	  more	  frequently.	  The	  fit	  hazard	  rates	  tended	  to	  be	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  actual	  hazard	  rate	  of	  change-­‐points	  in	  our	  task,	  which,	  averaged	  across	  all	  conditions,	  was	  equal	  to	  0.04	  (vertical	  dashed	  line	  in	  Fig.	  8A).	  Thus,	  the	  model	  suggests	  that	  subjects	  tended	  to	  overestimate	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  changes	  occur,	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  varied	  considerably	  across	  subjects.	  Moreover,	  the	  different	  fit	  values	  of	  the	  hazard	  rate	  affected	  model	  performance	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  at	  least	  qualitatively	  matched	  across-­‐subject	  differences,	  including	  the	  dependence	  of	  learning	  rate	  on	  z-­‐scored	  error	  (compare	  Figs.	  2D	  and	  7C).	  	  
Models	  with	  inferred	  noise	  better	  matched	  behavior.	  We	  extended	  the	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  to	  account	  for	  our	  finding	  that	  subjects	  who	  tended	  to	  be	  most	  confident	  in	  their	  estimates	  were	  also	  the	  quickest	  to	  update	  those	  estimates	  given	  new	  information	  (Fig.	  5C).	  This	  finding	  seems	  counterintuitive	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  learning	  rate	  should	  be	  largest	  when	  confidence	  is	  lowest	  (and	  thus	  new	  information	  should	  be	  highly	  informative).	  However,	  two	  main	  types	  of	  uncertainty	  exist	  within	  the	  task	  that	  have	  opposite	  effects	  on	  the	  learning	  rate	  (Eq.	  6).	  One	  type	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  related	  to	  run	  length:	  when	  the	  run	  length	  is	  small,	  few	  samples	  contribute	  to	  the	  estimate	  of	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution,	  making	  that	  estimate	  uncertain	  and	  therefore	  imposing	  higher	  learning	  rates	  (Fig.	  6C).	  The	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second	  type	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  related	  to	  the	  expected	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution,	  or	  noise:	  when	  the	  estimate	  of	  noise	  is	  high,	  the	  model	  tends	  to	  underestimate	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  change-­‐point,	  leading	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  learning	  rate.	  We	  propose	  that	  this	  second	  form	  of	  uncertainty	  has	  a	  strong	  effect	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  learning	  rates.	  	  To	  examine	  this	  idea,	  we	  extended	  the	  model	  to	  include	  different	  forms	  of	  noise	  estimation	  (Fig.	  9)	  and	  compared	  performance	  of	  each	  form	  of	  the	  model	  to	  the	  behavioral	  data	  presented	  in	  Fig.	  5.	  The	  simplest	  form	  used	  estimates	  of	  noise	  that	  were	  fixed	  within	  a	  block	  (Fig.	  9A).	  In	  this	  case,	  overall	  uncertainty,	  like	  learning	  rate,	  declined	  with	  run	  length	  (Eq.	  6).	  Higher	  hazard-­‐rate	  models	  inferred	  lower	  run	  lengths,	  on	  average,	  leading	  to	  a	  strong,	  positive	  relationship	  between	  mean	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate	  across	  simulated	  sessions	  (Fig.	  9D).	  There	  was	  also	  a	  strong,	  positive	  relationship	  between	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate	  across	  simulated	  trials	  that	  tended	  to	  decline	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  mean	  learning	  rate,	  but	  never	  to	  below	  zero	  (Fig.	  9G).	  Thus,	  this	  model	  did	  not	  match	  the	  behavioral	  data.	  	  The	  second	  model	  used	  a	  sequentially	  updated	  estimate	  of	  noise	  (Eq.	  9).	  When	  applied	  to	  the	  same	  task	  conditions	  that	  the	  subjects	  experienced,	  this	  model	  generated	  estimates	  of	  noise	  that	  were	  highly	  unstable	  early	  in	  each	  session	  but	  then	  stabilized	  as	  more	  information	  was	  collected	  (Fig.	  9B).	  However,	  even	  these	  stabilized	  estimates	  tended	  not	  to	  match	  the	  value	  of	  the	  true	  generative	  noise	  (the	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ratio	  of	  estimated	  to	  actual	  noise	  ranged	  from	  0.5	  to	  1.2	  after	  200	  simulated	  trials,	  where	  hazard	  rate	  was	  set	  to	  the	  value	  that	  best	  fit	  performance	  of	  each	  individual	  subject).	  The	  model’s	  dependence	  on	  hazard	  rate	  (in	  particular	  via	  biased	  values	  of	  	  in	  the	  prediction-­‐error	  term	  in	  Eq.	  9)	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  hazard	  rate	  and	  noise	  estimates,	  because	  with	  high	  hazard	  rates,	  errors	  tended	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  change-­‐points	  rather	  than	  noise.	  Because	  high	  hazard	  rates	  correspond	  to	  larger	  learning	  rates,	  on	  average,	  these	  effects	  resulted	  in	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  overall	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate,	  like	  in	  the	  behavioral	  data	  (Fig.	  9E).	  There	  was	  also	  a	  strong,	  positive	  relationship	  between	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate	  across	  simulated	  trials	  that	  tended	  to	  decline	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  mean	  learning	  rate,	  but	  never	  to	  below	  zero	  (Fig.	  9H).	  Thus,	  this	  model	  also	  did	  not	  match	  the	  behavioral	  data.	  	  The	  third	  model	  used	  a	  more	  realistic,	  sub-­‐optimal	  strategy	  for	  inferring	  noise	  (Eq.	  11).	  This	  model	  assumed	  that	  beliefs	  about	  the	  noise	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution,	  like	  beliefs	  about	  its	  mean,	  were	  updated	  using	  learning	  rates	  that	  varied	  substantially	  across	  subjects.	  In	  particular,	  this	  model	  assumed	  that	  beliefs	  about	  noise	  were	  updated	  using	  learning	  rates	  proportional	  to	  those	  used	  to	  update	  beliefs	  about	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  distribution.	  This	  procedure	  led	  to	  more	  variable	  estimates	  of	  noise	  than	  the	  other	  two	  models	  (Fig.	  9C)	  and,	  like	  the	  second	  model,	  a	  strong,	  negative	  relationship	  between	  overall	  uncertainy	  and	  learning	  rate	  across	  simulated	  sessions	  (Fig.	  9F).	  Moreover,	  unlike	  the	  second	  model	  and	  like	  the	  behavioral	  data,	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this	  model	  showed	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  correlations	  between	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate	  that	  depended	  on	  hazard	  rate	  (Fig.	  9I).	  Specifically,	  high	  hazard	  rates	  corresponded	  to	  a	  negative	  correlation	  between	  learning	  rate	  and	  total	  uncertainty,	  whereas	  low	  hazard	  rates	  corresponded	  to	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  learning	  rate	  and	  uncertainty.	  These	  results	  imply	  that	  subjects	  use	  an	  imperfect	  noise-­‐inference	  algorithm	  that	  updates	  beliefs	  about	  noise	  rapidly	  and	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  they	  update	  beliefs	  about	  the	  mean,	  μ.	  This	  algorithm	  leads	  subjects	  who	  expect	  more	  changes	  to	  see	  less	  noise	  and	  can	  account	  for	  inter-­‐subject	  variability	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate.	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  hazard	  rate	  is	  central	  to	  an	  account	  of	  the	  across-­‐subject	  variability	  in	  learning	  rates,	  uncertainty,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  This	  account	  suggests	  a	  strategic	  tradeoff	  that	  was	  navigated	  in	  different	  ways	  by	  different	  subjects	  (Fig.	  10).	  Subjects	  who	  were	  fit	  by	  high	  hazard	  rates	  tended	  to	  perform	  relatively	  well	  in	  the	  first	  few	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­‐point	  but	  relatively	  poorly	  during	  periods	  of	  stability.	  Conversely,	  low-­‐hazard	  subjects	  tended	  to	  perform	  relatively	  poorly	  after	  change-­‐points	  but	  well	  during	  periods	  of	  stability.	  Thus,	  the	  choice	  of	  hazard	  rate	  reflected	  a	  tradeoff	  between	  successful	  prediction	  amid	  noise	  and	  successful	  adaptation	  after	  change-­‐points.	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Models	  that	  under-­weigh	  errors	  better	  matched	  behavior.	  Above	  we	  used	  a	  model	  with	  only	  a	  single	  free	  parameter,	  the	  hazard	  rate,	  to	  describe	  the	  main	  trends	  in	  updating	  behavior	  for	  individual	  subjects	  and	  the	  population.	  However,	  this	  model	  was	  quantitatively	  inconsistent	  with	  subject	  performance.	  In	  particular,	  subjects	  did	  not	  react	  to	  change-­‐points	  as	  effectively	  as	  the	  model.	  Subjects	  tended	  to	  use	  higher	  learning	  rates	  after	  change-­‐points	  than	  on	  other	  trials,	  but	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  than	  the	  model	  (Fig.	  11A).	  This	  sub-­‐optimal	  behavior	  of	  human	  subjects	  reflected	  a	  relationship	  between	  learning	  rate	  and	  z-­‐scored	  error	  that	  was	  too	  flat	  (Fig.	  11B).	  	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  difference	  might	  be	  that	  subjects	  underuse	  likelihood	  information	  when	  assessing	  whether	  a	  change-­‐point	  occurred	  on	  a	  given	  trial.	  Adding	  a	  parameter	  (λ	  in	  Eq.	  12)	  to	  the	  reduced	  model	  that	  allows	  for	  such	  sub-­‐optimal	  computation	  lets	  the	  model	  range	  from	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  delta-­‐rule	  model	  (λ=0)	  to	  the	  reduced-­‐Bayesian	  model	  (λ=1).	  Fits	  of	  this	  parameter	  indicate	  that	  all	  subjects	  fall	  between	  the	  two	  extremes,	  and	  that	  most	  of	  the	  subjects	  seemed	  to	  adjust	  learning	  rates	  only	  modestly	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  reduced-­‐Bayesian	  model	  (Fig.	  11C).	  	  A	  second	  possible	  explanation	  for	  the	  shallowness	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  learning	  rate	  and	  z-­‐scored	  error	  is	  that	  subjects	  maintain	  inaccurate	  beliefs	  about	  environmental	  statistics	  other	  than	  hazard	  rate.	  For	  example,	  subjects	  might	  expect	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution	  to	  drift	  from	  trial	  to	  trial.	  This	  possibility	  can	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be	  modeled	  by	  adding	  drift	  variance	  (D	  in	  Eq.	  13)	  to	  the	  variance	  on	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  after	  each	  timestep.	  This	  model	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  subject	  data	  with	  drift	  (D),	  hazard	  rate	  (H),	  and	  expected	  noise	  (N)	  all	  fit	  as	  free	  parameters	  (Eqs.	  13	  and	  14),	  producing	  predictions	  that	  have	  a	  more	  shallow	  relationship	  between	  learning	  rate	  and	  z-­‐scored	  error	  (Fig.	  11B).	  This	  model	  described	  subject	  behavior	  better	  than	  either	  the	  reduced-­‐Bayesian	  model	  with	  only	  the	  hazard	  rate	  as	  a	  free	  parameter	  (for	  30	  out	  of	  30	  subjects)	  or	  a	  delta-­‐rule	  model	  with	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  (for	  28	  of	  30	  subjects).	  The	  reduced-­‐likelihood	  model	  was	  similarly	  effective	  at	  describing	  subject	  behavior	  relative	  to	  the	  reduced-­‐Bayesian	  model	  with	  only	  the	  hazard	  rate	  as	  a	  free	  parameter	  (for	  30	  out	  of	  30	  subjects)	  or	  a	  delta-­‐rule	  model	  with	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  (for	  29	  of	  30	  subjects;	  Fig.	  11D).	  	  
Discussion 
 The	  goal	  of	  this	  work	  was	  to	  examine	  quantitatively	  the	  influence	  of	  sequential	  outcomes	  on	  the	  beliefs	  of	  human	  subjects	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment	  with	  both	  noise	  and	  abrupt,	  unsignaled	  change-­‐points.	  Unlike	  previous	  studies	  (e.g.,	  	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007;Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009;Corrado	  et	  al.,	  2005)),	  we	  used	  a	  task	  that	  allowed	  for	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  measurement	  of	  the	  learning	  rate	  (Fig.	  1),	  which	  reflects	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  new	  outcome	  influences	  an	  existing	  belief.	  This	  approach	  allowed	  us	  to	  identify	  two	  primary	  relationships	  between	  learning	  rates	  and	  the	  outcomes	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  them.	  The	  first	  was	  that	  the	  learning	  rate	  tended	  to	  increase	  as	  a	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function	  of	  the	  absolute	  magnitude	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  prediction	  error,	  scaled	  by	  the	  expectation	  of	  noise.	  The	  second	  was	  that	  the	  learning	  rate,	  along	  with	  uncertainty,	  also	  tended	  to	  rise	  immediately	  then	  decay	  slowly	  following	  a	  change-­‐point.	  	  	  To	  account	  for	  these	  results,	  we	  developed	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  ideal-­‐observer	  model.	  The	  model’s	  learning	  rates	  are	  analytically	  tractable	  and	  depend	  on	  only	  two	  variables:	  change-­‐point	  probability	  and	  run	  length.	  For	  a	  given	  run	  length,	  change-­‐point	  probability	  is	  monotonically	  related	  to	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  absolute	  error,	  scaled	  by	  the	  noise	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution.	  By	  relating	  learning	  rate	  to	  change-­‐point	  probability,	  the	  model	  simulates	  the	  positive	  relationship	  between	  learning	  rate	  and	  absolute	  error	  in	  our	  behavioral	  data	  (compare	  Figs.	  2C	  and	  7B).	  Thus,	  the	  model,	  like	  the	  subjects,	  resets	  beliefs	  when	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  applicable	  to	  the	  current	  environment.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  change-­‐point	  probability,	  run	  length	  is	  inversely	  related	  to	  both	  learning	  rate	  (Fig.	  6C)	  and	  uncertainty	  (Eq.	  6).	  When	  the	  model	  recognizes	  a	  change-­‐point,	  run	  length	  is	  reset	  to	  one,	  leading	  to	  increased	  uncertainty	  and	  driving	  any	  subsequent	  outcome	  to	  carry	  more	  influence	  (Fig.	  7E).	  Run	  length	  increases	  as	  a	  function	  of	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­‐point,	  leading	  to	  a	  narrower	  predictive	  distribution	  and	  smaller	  learning	  rates,	  consistent	  with	  our	  behavioral	  data	  (compare	  Fig.	  3B	  with	  7E,	  and	  4C	  with	  7F).	  Thus,	  the	  model,	  like	  the	  subjects,	  relies	  more	  heavily	  on	  historical	  outcomes	  when	  more	  pertinent	  outcomes	  have	  been	  observed.	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  Our	  reduced	  model	  shares	  commonalities	  with	  a	  number	  of	  relatively	  simple	  models	  developed	  previously	  to	  describe	  animal	  and	  human	  learning	  behavior.	  Several	  models	  of	  classical	  conditioning,	  including	  Rescorla-­‐Wagner,	  a	  straightforward	  form	  of	  delta	  rule,	  and	  Pearce-­‐Hall,	  which	  describes	  changes	  in	  associability	  between	  stimuli,	  learn	  from	  surprising	  outcomes	  	  (Pearce	  and	  Bouton,	  2001).	  However,	  unlike	  our	  approach,	  these	  models	  do	  not	  distinguish	  between	  noisy	  and	  volatile	  errors.	  Such	  a	  mechanism	  has	  been	  incorporated	  into	  a	  recently	  proposed	  extension	  to	  the	  delta	  rule,	  in	  which	  recent	  errors	  are	  compared	  to	  older	  ones	  	  (Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  This	  comparison	  allows	  the	  model	  to	  react	  to	  change-­‐points	  with	  increased	  learning	  rates,	  but	  not	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  scales	  with	  noise	  and	  without	  a	  notion	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  Bayesian	  approaches	  to	  belief	  updating,	  although	  often	  computationally	  demanding,	  can	  provide	  such	  a	  notion	  of	  uncertainty	  by	  assessing	  the	  probabilities	  of	  many	  possible	  generative	  scenarios.	  Such	  models	  can	  effectively	  describe	  human	  behavior	  on	  armed-­‐bandit	  tasks	  in	  which	  the	  reward	  structure	  either	  drifts	  	  (Daw	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  or	  changes	  discontinuously	  	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  We	  showed	  that	  a	  reduced	  version	  of	  the	  optimal	  belief-­‐updating	  algorithm,	  formulated	  as	  a	  delta	  rule,	  can	  effectively	  model	  behavior	  when	  it	  includes	  elements	  of	  both	  the	  true	  generative	  environment	  (discontinuous	  change)	  and	  a	  non-­‐existent	  element	  (drift).	  This	  result	  suggests	  that	  subjects	  adjust	  learning	  according	  to	  perceived	  generative	  processes	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that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  match	  the	  actual	  generative	  processes,	  an	  idea	  that	  likely	  extends	  to	  armed-­‐bandit	  tasks	  in	  which	  subjects	  are	  uncertain	  about	  the	  exact	  reward	  structure.	  	  	  Such	  differences	  between	  actual	  and	  perceived	  generative	  models	  might	  also	  explain	  the	  substantial	  variability	  across	  subjects	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  updated	  existing	  beliefs	  based	  on	  new	  information.	  Some	  subjects	  tended	  to	  maintain	  existing	  beliefs	  under	  nearly	  all	  conditions	  (i.e.,	  had	  learning	  rates	  near	  zero).	  In	  contrast,	  other	  subjects	  tended	  to	  adjust	  their	  beliefs	  dramatically	  in	  response	  to	  each	  new	  outcome	  (i.e.,	  had	  learning	  rates	  near	  one).	  This	  variability	  was	  related	  to	  subjective	  certainty,	  in	  that	  subjects	  who	  used	  higher	  learning	  rates	  were	  also	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  predictions	  and	  tended	  to	  show	  more	  negative	  relationships	  between	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate.	  
 
The reduced Bayesian model can account for this individual variability by adjusting the 
prior probability of change-points, or hazard rate. Increasing the hazard rate leads to 
higher estimates of change-point probability and thus higher learning rates, on average. 
Under these conditions, a larger proportion of errors are attributed to change-points, 
rather than noise. This attribution leads to a chronic underestimation of noise and 
accounts for the otherwise counterintuitive, negative relationship between average 
uncertainty and learning rate. Thus, the model suggests that individual variability reflects 
a form of perceptual bias about how errors are interpreted. 
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Such a perceptual bias might be useful if it reflects the true probability of change-points 
in the current environment, particularly if new information is scarce. However, we found 
that most subjects behaved as if they substantially overestimated the true hazard rate (Fig. 
8). Thus, individuals appear to have preconceived strategies for coping with probabilistic 
environments. Given the computational complexity of existing models for online 
inference of hazard rate  (Wilson et al., 2010), it seems plausible for such higher-order 
policies to develop over a longer time, either through experience on the developmental 
timescale or perhaps even evolutionary selection. However, this still leaves open the 
question of why such diverse policies exist across our subject pool. 
 
The answer to this question might involve a fundamental trade-off inherent in selecting a 
hazard rate. Using a high hazard rate implies high sensitivity to change-points, but over-
sensitivity to noisy outcomes during periods of stability. In contrast, lower hazard rates 
provide less sensitivity to noisy outcomes but also less sensitivity to change-points. 
Sensitivity to either change-points or noise might have different consequences under 
different conditions or for different individuals, giving rise to the diversity of 
predispositions about hazard rate that we observed. One potential genetic substrate of this 
predisposition is a polymorphism in monamine catabolism enzyme COMT that leads to 
lower learning rates in reversal tasks but improved performance in working-memory 
tasks  (Krugel et al., 2009;Bruder et al., 2005). Our task is, to our knowledge, the first to 
demonstrate both the advantages and disadvantages of hazard-rate policy and thus may 
serve as a valuable tool for determining whether COMT or other polymorphisms play a 
role in navigating this trade-off. 
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A strong motivation for the form of reduced Bayesian model that we used was its 
relationship to delta-rule models of learning, whose biological underpinnings have been 
studied extensively  (Niv, 2009). Among the strongest biological evidence is the 
discovery of signals in the brainstem dopaminergic system that encode a form of reward-
prediction error (δ in Eq. 1;  (Schultz, 1998)). More recent work has begun to link these 
prediction-error signals to activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a brain area 
thought to encode information related to subjective beliefs used for decision-making. 
ACC neurons encode subjective beliefs about outcome probability and value and action 
cost  (Kennerley et al., 2009). Single neurons in monkey ACC also encode prediction 
errors, a finding that is corroborated by human fMRI and EEG data  (Matsumoto et al., 
2007;Hayden et al., 2009;Debener et al., 2005). Ablation of ACC in macaques leads to 
impaired use of outcome history in the guidance of action selection, further suggesting a 
role in belief updating  (Kennerley et al., 2006). 	  Despite	  these	  advances	  in	  understanding	  neural	  substrates	  for	  delta-­‐rule	  learning	  in	  terms	  of	  prediction	  errors	  (δ	  in	  Eq.	  1),	  less	  is	  known	  about	  the	  learning	  rate	  (α	  in	  Eq.	  1).	  The	  learning	  rate	  regulates	  the	  relative	  contributions	  of	  stored	  information	  about	  previous	  outcome	  history	  and	  the	  new	  sensory	  information	  about	  the	  current	  outcome.	  One	  possible	  implementation	  involves	  interactions	  between	  top-­‐down	  cognitive	  control	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  sensory	  processing	  and	  thus	  might	  be	  related	  to	  similar	  mechanisms	  of	  attention	  	  (Dayan	  et	  al.,	  2000;Posner,	  2008).	  However,	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nothing	  is	  known	  about	  how	  those	  mechanisms	  relate	  to	  the	  learning	  rate	  we	  examined	  in	  this	  study.	  	  Our	  model	  provides	  several	  insights	  that	  might	  help	  identify	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	  mechansims.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  learning	  rate	  depends	  critically	  on	  the	  estimated	  change-­‐point	  probability.	  Change-­‐point	  probability	  is	  related	  to	  absolute	  prediction-­‐error	  magnitude,	  scaled	  by	  expected	  uncertainty.	  Absolute	  prediction-­‐error	  signals	  are	  encoded	  by	  neurons	  in	  monkey	  ACC,	  the	  same	  area	  thought	  to	  encode	  decision-­‐relevant	  beliefs	  and	  prediction	  errors	  related	  to	  those	  beliefs	  	  (Matsumoto	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Thus,	  the	  ACC	  might	  also	  contain	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  necessary	  variables	  to	  compute	  learning	  rate.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  idea,	  fMRI	  measurements	  of	  the	  ACC	  in	  human	  subjects	  engaged	  in	  a	  dynamic	  probabilistic	  task	  correlated	  with	  a	  model	  parameter	  (volatility)	  that	  reflected	  an	  optimal	  assessment	  of	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  reward	  contingencies	  were	  likely	  to	  be	  changing	  and	  learning	  rates	  fit	  to	  subjects	  	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007;Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  This	  signal	  might	  also	  include	  subjective	  hazard-­‐rate	  biases,	  because	  subjects	  who	  were	  best	  fit	  by	  high	  learning-­‐rate	  models	  tended	  to	  show	  larger	  ACC	  BOLD	  responses	  to	  new	  outcomes	  than	  subjects	  fit	  by	  low	  learning-­‐rate	  models.	  
 Another	  prediction	  of	  the	  model	  is	  that	  learning	  rates	  are	  computed	  according	  to	  run	  length.	  It	  is	  unknown	  whether	  the	  ACC	  encodes	  run	  length,	  however	  it	  would	  provide	  a	  parsimonious	  solution	  to	  the	  compartmentalization	  of	  belief	  updating	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machinery	  within	  the	  brain.	  Theoretical	  work	  has	  also	  suggested	  that	  an	  uncertainty	  signal	  inversely	  related	  to	  run	  length	  might	  be	  encoded	  by	  a	  more	  global	  neuromodulatory	  system,	  such	  as	  the	  locus	  coeruleus-­‐norepinephrine	  system	  	  (Yu	  and	  Dayan,	  2005).	  Our	  task	  and	  model	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  testing	  this	  possibility.	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Figure	  1.	  Estimation	  task	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  prediction	  errors	  and	  learning	  rate.	  
A,	  Schematized	  trial	  of	  the	  estimation	  task.	  The	  subject	  makes	  a	  prediction	  (blue)	  and	  is	  then	  shown	  the	  outcome	  (red)	  and	  the	  error	  made	  in	  predicting	  the	  outcome	  (teal).	  After	  the	  subject	  updates	  his	  prediction	  as	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  error,	  a	  new	  outcome	  is	  generated.	  B,	  An	  example	  session.	  Numbers	  (red	  line)	  are	  generated	  from	  a	  normal	  distribution	  with	  a	  variance	  that	  is	  constant	  within	  blocks	  of	  200	  trials	  (vertical,	  dotted	  lines)	  and	  a	  mean	  (dashed	  black	  line)	  that	  changes	  at	  random	  times.	  The	  subject’s	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  predictions	  are	  shown	  in	  blue.	  C,	  Trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  prediction	  errors	  from	  the	  session	  in	  B	  (actual	  in	  red	  minus	  prediction	  in	  blue).	  Histogram	  (right)	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  prediction	  errors	  made	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  entire	  session.	  D,	  Trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  learning	  rates	  from	  the	  session	  in	  B,	  computed	  as	  the	  fraction	  of	  the	  prediction	  error	  used	  to	  update	  the	  next	  prediction	  using	  a	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delta	  rule,	  as	  shown.	  Histogram	  (right)	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  learning	  rates	  across	  the	  entire	  session.	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median	  learning	  rates	  on	  change-­‐point	  and	  non-­‐change-­‐point	  trials,	  p<0.05.	  B,	  Learning	  rate	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  median	  absolute	  error	  magnitude,	  averaged	  using	  running	  bins	  of	  150	  trials,	  for	  four	  different	  standard	  deviations	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution,	  as	  indicated.	  Data	  averaged	  across	  all	  subjects.	  Solid	  and	  dashed	  lines	  indicate	  mean	  and	  SEM,	  respectively.	  C,	  Learning	  rate	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  median	  relative	  error	  magnitude,	  plotted	  as	  in	  B.	  Relative	  error	  magnitude	  was	  computed	  by	  dividing	  the	  absolute	  error	  magnitude	  by	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution.	  D,	  Individual	  subject	  learning	  rates	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  relative	  absolute	  error	  magnitude	  (gray	  lines).	  Black	  line	  indicates	  a	  cumulative	  Weibull	  function	  fit	  to	  data	  from	  all	  subjects.	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Figure	  3.	  Learning	  rates	  decayed	  slowly	  after	  change-­‐points.	  A,	  Prediction	  errors	  (gray,	  left	  ordinate)	  and	  learning	  rates	  (black,	  right	  ordinate)	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­‐point.	  Solid	  lines	  indicate	  mean	  across	  all	  subjects	  and	  all	  conditions,	  dotted	  lines	  indicate	  SEM.	  B,	  Learning	  rate	  residuals	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­‐point.	  Residuals	  were	  computed	  by	  subtracting	  the	  learning	  rates	  predicted	  by	  the	  cumulative	  Weibull	  fit	  shown	  in	  Fig.	  2D	  from	  the	  actual	  learning	  rates,	  and	  thus	  reflect	  the	  portion	  of	  learning	  rate	  that	  was	  not	  explained	  by	  relative	  error	  magnitude.	  Points	  and	  errorbars	  are	  mean±SEM	  across	  all	  subjects.	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Figure	  4.	  Subjective	  confidence	  measurements.	  A,	  An	  example	  session	  of	  the	  confidence	  task.	  Subjects	  specified	  a	  symmetric	  window	  (dashed	  blue	  lines)	  around	  their	  estimate	  (solid	  blue	  line)	  that	  they	  were	  85%	  certain	  would	  contain	  the	  next	  number	  (red)	  generated	  using	  the	  current	  mean	  (dashed	  black	  line)	  and	  standard	  deviation	  (stable	  in	  blocks,	  indicated	  by	  the	  vertical,	  dotted	  lines).	  B,	  Box-­‐and-­‐whisker	  plot	  (central	  line	  is	  median,	  box	  is	  interquartile	  range,	  and	  whiskers	  are	  the	  data	  range)	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  mean	  width	  of	  the	  85%	  confidence	  window	  computed	  per	  subject	  for	  each	  standard-­‐deviation	  condition.	  C,	  Relative	  uncertainty	  as	  a	  function	  of	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­‐point.	  Relative	  uncertainty	  was	  computed	  by	  dividing	  the	  specified	  confidence	  window	  size	  by	  the	  size	  of	  the	  smallest	  window	  capable	  of	  including	  85%	  of	  the	  probability	  density	  in	  the	  actual	  generative	  distribution	  (x-­‐axis	  markers	  in	  B).	  Solid	  and	  dotted	  lines	  indicate	  mean	  and	  SEM,	  respectively.	  
Nassar et al.
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Figure	  5.	  Relationship	  between	  confidence	  and	  learning	  rate.	  A,	  B,	  Trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  learning	  rates	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  uncertainty	  (confidence-­‐window	  width)	  for	  an	  example	  task	  block	  (std=20)	  for	  two	  different	  subjects.	  Solid	  lines	  are	  linear	  fits.	  Arrows	  indicate	  the	  mean	  values	  of	  the	  confidence-­‐window	  width	  and	  learning	  rate.	  
C,	  Mean	  relative	  uncertainty	  (computed	  as	  the	  z-­‐scored	  confidence-­‐window	  width	  across	  all	  conditions	  per	  subject)	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  mean	  learning	  rate.	  Symbols	  and	  error	  bars	  are	  mean±SEM	  per	  subject.	  Solid	  line	  is	  a	  linear	  fit	  (r=-­‐0.38,	  
H0:	  r=0,	  p=0.04).	  The	  negative	  correlation	  implies	  that	  subjects	  who	  used	  higher	  learning	  rates	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  certain	  about	  their	  predictions.	  D,	  Trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  relationship	  between	  relative	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate	  per	  subject	  (ordinate,	  computed	  as	  Spearman’s	  ρ	  as	  in	  A	  and	  B,	  with	  filled	  symbols	  indicating	  H0:	  ρ=0,	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higher/lower	  learning	  rates	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  they	  were	  more	  uncertain	  about	  their	  previous	  prediction)	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  average	  learning	  rate	  used	  by	  that	  subject.	  Symbols	  and	  errorbars	  are	  mean±SEM	  per	  subject.	  Solid	  line	  is	  a	  linear	  fit	  (r=-­‐0.44,	  H0:	  r=0,	  p=0.02).	  The	  negative	  correlation	  implies	  that	  subjects	  who	  used	  lower	  learning	  rates	  tended,	  on	  average,	  to	  have	  more	  positive	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  relationships	  between	  uncertainty	  and	  learning	  rate.	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Figure	  6.	  Bayesian	  model.	  A,	  Message-­‐passing	  algorithm	  for	  the	  full	  model.	  Run	  length	  (r)	  refers	  to	  the	  number	  of	  data	  points	  obtained	  previously	  from	  the	  current	  generative	  distribution.	  On	  each	  trial,	  the	  distribution	  either	  changes,	  and	  r	  is	  set	  to	  zero,	  or	  the	  generative	  distribution	  does	  not	  change,	  and	  r	  is	  increased	  by	  one.	  After	  
t	  trials,	  the	  algorithm	  must	  maintain	  and	  update	  t+1	  predictive	  distributions	  (one	  for	  each	  possible	  r)	  and	  the	  probability	  distribution	  across	  these	  possible	  values	  of	  r.	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rate	  that	  was	  not	  explained	  by	  relative	  error	  magnitude.	  Points	  and	  errorbars	  are	  mean±SEM	  across	  all	  simulated	  data.	  Compare	  to	  Fig.	  3B.	  F,	  Relative	  model	  uncertainty	  (computed	  as	  the	  minimal	  window	  containing	  at	  least	  85%	  of	  the	  probability	  density	  in	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  specified	  by	  the	  model	  divided	  by	  the	  85%	  width	  of	  the	  true	  generative	  distribution)	  plotted	  as	  a	  function	  of	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­‐point.	  Grayscale	  reflects	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  given	  task	  block,	  as	  indicated.	  Compare	  to	  Fig.	  4C.	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Figure 9. On-line noise inference. Individual variability was simulated by using models 
that employed the hazard rates fit to individual subject data (see text; in all 
panels, grayscale represents the different hazard rates, with lighter shades for higher 
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simulate performance. The first, simplest model (left column) used the actual standard 
deviation of the generative distribution. The second model (middle) inferred noise using 
an on-line algorithm with learning rates that assumed noise was constant over each block 
of 200 trials (Eqs. 9, 10). The third model (right) inferred noise using the same algorithm 
as the second model, but with a minimum learning rate that depended on hazard rate 
(Eqs. 9, 11). A, B, C, Noise estimates from each model over the course of each 200-trial 
block in which the standard deviation of the generative distribution was equal to 
10. D,E,F, The mean uncertainty estimate for each simulated block of trials plotted as a 
function of the mean learning rates used in that simulation. Lines are linear fits. Negative 
relationships in E and F reflect the fact that individuals modeled with higher hazard rates 
tended to use higher learning rates and thus infer less noise. G,H,I, Correlations between 
uncertainty and learning rate within single simulated task blocks plotted as a function of 
the mean learning rate simulated for that subject. Lines are linear fits. All models show a 
negative relationship, but only the third model matches the behavioral data, with low 
mean learning rates typically corresponding to positive relationships between learning 
rate and uncertainty and high mean learning rates typically corresponding to negative 
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Figure	  11.	  Better	  descriptive	  models	  to	  capture	  sub-­‐optimal	  performance.	  A,	  Although	  subjects	  (filled	  symbols;	  data	  plotted	  as	  in	  Fig.	  2A)	  and	  the	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  (open	  symbols)	  both	  used	  higher	  learning	  rates	  after	  change-­‐points	  than	  during	  a	  stable	  period,	  the	  model	  tends	  to	  show	  a	  larger	  effect.	  B,	  Relationship	  between	  learning	  rate	  and	  relative	  error	  magnitude	  for	  subjects	  (dotted	  line,	  the	  fit	  from	  Fig.	  2D)	  and	  several	  models	  fit	  to	  subject	  behavior,	  as	  indicated.	  C,	  Histogram	  of	  the	  average	  likelihood	  weight	  fit	  to	  each	  subject	  (λ	  in	  Eq.	  12).	  When	  λ	  =0,	  the	  model	  updates	  beliefs	  according	  to	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  delta	  rule.	  When	  λ=1,	  the	  model	  is	  the	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model.	  All	  subjects	  fell	  between	  these	  two	  extremes.	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CHAPTER 3 	  
 
Rational	  regulation	  of	  learning	  dynamics	  by	  pupil–linked	  arousal	  systems	  
 	  Matthew	  R.	  Nassar,	  Katherine	  M.	  Rumsey,	  Robert	  C.	  Wilson,	  Kinjan	  Parikh,	  Benjamin	  Heasly	  and	  Joshua	  I.	  Gold.	  Nature	  Neuroscience,	  2012,	  15:1040-­‐6	  	  	  
 
Abstract 
 The	  ability	  to	  make	  inferences	  about	  the	  current	  state	  of	  a	  dynamic	  process	  requires	  ongoing	  assessments	  of	  the	  stability	  and	  reliability	  of	  data	  generated	  by	  that	  process.	  We	  found	  that	  these	  assessments,	  as	  defined	  by	  a	  normative	  model,	  were	  reflected	  in	  non–luminance–mediated	  changes	  in	  pupil	  diameter	  of	  human	  subjects	  performing	  a	  predictive–inference	  task.	  Brief	  changes	  in	  pupil	  diameter	  reflected	  assessed	  instabilities	  in	  a	  process	  that	  generated	  noisy	  data.	  Baseline	  pupil	  diameter	  reflected	  the	  reliability	  with	  which	  recent	  data	  indicated	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  data–generating	  process	  and	  individual	  differences	  in	  expectations	  about	  the	  rate	  of	  instabilities.	  Together	  these	  pupil	  metrics	  predicted	  the	  influence	  of	  new	  data	  on	  subsequent	  inferences.	  Moreover,	  a	  task–	  and	  luminance–independent	  manipulation	  of	  pupil	  diameter	  predictably	  altered	  the	  influence	  of	  new	  data.	  Thus,	  pupil–linked	  arousal	  systems	  can	  help	  regulate	  the	  influence	  of	  incoming	  data	  on	  existing	  beliefs	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment.	  
 




Many decisions, from foraging to financial, depend on the ability to infer a state of 
the world from both historical and newly arriving information. Such inferences are 
particularly challenging when they must account for multiple sources of 
uncertainty. When the uncertainty results from noise, reflecting random 
fluctuations in the information generated by an otherwise stable state, the 
average over all historical information is most predictive of future observations. In 
contrast, when the uncertainty results from a change in the state itself, only the 
most recent information pertains to the new state. Thus, historical information 
should be discounted and beliefs should be updated rapidly to maximize their 
predictive power. Under certain conditions, human subjects appear to encode 
and respond appropriately to these different forms of uncertainty when making 
inferences in a dynamic environment  (Behrens et al., 2007;Nassar et al., 
2010;Yu and Dayan, 2005). Here we examined whether this ability is governed, 
at least in part, by arousal systems that affect pupil diameter, which are thought 
to include the noradrenergic brainstem nucleus locus coeruleus  (Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2010;Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005;Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2010;Gilzenrat 
et al., 2010). 
 
Non–luminance–mediated changes in pupil diameter have long been used as 
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indicators of clinical, cognitive, and arousal states  (Krugman, 1964;Granholm 
and Steinhauer, 2004;Schmidt and Fortin, 1982;Kahneman and Beatty, 1966). 
One interpretation of these pupil changes is that they reflect the amount of 
cognitive effort exerted at a given time, which can be related to task uncertainty  
(Kahneman and Beatty, 1966). Accordingly, changes in pupil diameter can be 
elicited via manipulations of the uncertainty associated with possible actions in 
certain choice tasks  (Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2010;Richer and Beatty, 1987)	  . 
Changes in pupil diameter can also reflect perceived changes in the world, 
including perceptual switches during perceptual rivalry, detection of targets in 
oddball or near–threshold tasks, responses to low–probability go signals in a 
go/no–go task, and perceived changes in task utility that can affect task 
engagement  (Gilzenrat et al., 2010;Richer and Beatty, 1987;Hakerem et al., 
1964;Einhäuser et al., 2008;van Olst et al., 1979) . 
 
These kinds of uncertainty– and change–related signals are thought to contribute 
to rational inference in a dynamic environment, including helping to regulate the 
relative influence of historical and newly arriving information on existing beliefs  
(Nassar et al., 2010;Yu and Dayan, 2005). Such regulation is a key feature of 
cognitive flexibility and can be equivalent to adjusting the learning rate in a 
reinforcement–learning framework  (Behrens et al., 2007;Sutton and Barto, 
1998). Our goal was to determine how such learning–rate adjustments relate to 
pupil–linked arousal systems. We show that the arousal system and possibly the 
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locus coeruleus can play important and computationally complex roles in 





We measured pupil diameter in thirty human subjects while they performed an 
isoluminant version of a predictive–inference task  (Nassar et al., 2010). Below we 
describe task performance, summarize a nearly optimal model that captures key 
features of performance, demonstrate that certain aspects of pupil diameter 
encode key variables in the model that can be used to predict performance, and 
finally show that a task–independent manipulation of arousal and pupil diameter 
can lead to predictable changes in task performance. 
 
Behavior 
The predictive–inference task required subjects to minimize errors in predicting 
the next number (outcome) in a series. The outcomes were picked from a 
Gaussian distribution with a mean that changed at random intervals (change 
points) and a standard deviation (set to either 5 or 10) that was stable over each 
block of 200 trials (Fig 1). After each prediction was recorded, the new outcome 
was shown using an iso–luminant display for 2 s, during which time the subject 
maintained fixation and pupil diameter was measured (Fig. 1). After this interval, 
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the outcome disappeared and the previous prediction reappeared, to be updated 
for the subsequent trial. Payment scaled inversely with the subjectʼs mean 
absolute error during the session  (Nassar et al., 2010). 
 
We quantified the extent to which each new outcome influenced the subsequent 
prediction as the learning rate in a simple delta–rule model (Eq. 3)  (Nassar et al., 2010). 
The learning rate was equal to the magnitude of change in the prediction 
expressed as a fraction of the error made on the previous prediction. Thus, a 
learning rate of one indicated abandonment of the previous prediction in favor of 
the most recent outcome. A learning rate of zero indicated maintenance of the 
previous prediction despite a non–zero prediction error.  
 
Subjects tended to use variable learning rates that spanned the entire allowed 
range, from zero to one. Within this range, learning rates tended to be higher for 
larger errors, scaled by the noise of the generative distribution (Fig. 2A). Learning 
rates also tended to be highest on the trial after a change point and then decay 
for several trials thereafter (Fig. 2B). These basic trends were similar across 
subjects, although individual subjects used dramatically different distributions of 
learning rates (Fig. 2C).  
  
Reduced Bayesian model 
The learning rates used by subjects were consistent with both a full and a 
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simplified version of the optimal (Bayesian) model  (Nassar et al., 2010;Adams 
and MacKay, 2007;Fearnhead and Liu, 2007;Wilson et al., 2010). One 
advantage of the reduced Bayesian model is that it updates beliefs according to a 
delta rule in which the learning rate is computed according to only two 
parameters computed per trial: change–point probability and relative uncertainty 
(Fig. 3A). 
 
Change–point probability approximates the posterior probability that the mean of 
the generative distribution changed since the previous trial, given all previous 
data. If the mean did change, then previous outcomes should be unrelated to 
future ones and not contribute to an updated prediction. Accordingly, the model 
uses learning rates that scale linearly towards one (thus discarding historical 
information) as change–point probability approaches one (Fig. 3A). Change–
point probability is computed by comparing the probability of each new outcome 
given either the current predictive distribution or the occurrence of a change point 
(Eq. 5). Its value increases monotonically as a function of the absolute difference 
between predicted and actual outcome, scaled according to the standard 
deviation of the generative distribution (Eq. 6, Fig. 3B). 
 
Relative uncertainty is a function of total uncertainty, which in our task arises 
from two sources. The first source, noise, reflects the unreliability with which a 
single sample can be predicted from a distribution with a known mean. The 
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second source reflects the unreliability of the current estimate of the mean, which 
decreases as more data are observed from a distribution. Relative uncertainty is 
the magnitude of this second form of uncertainty as a fraction of total uncertainty, 
analogous to the gain in a Kalman filter. Relative uncertainty determines the 
learning rate when change–point probability is zero and sets the y–intercept of 
the relationship between change–point probability and learning rate otherwise 
(Fig. 3A). The effects of relative uncertainty on model learning rates are greatest 
on the trials following a change point, when its value peaks at 0.5 and then 
decays over several trials (Eq. 7; Fig 3C). 
 
Like the human subjects, the model tended to compute learning rates that were 
highest just following a change point in the mean of the generative distribution 
and then decayed for several trials independently of noise. When applied to the 
exact same outcome sequences as the subjects, the model also tended to 
produce similar learning rates (Fig. 3D). 
 
We related change–point probability and relative uncertainty computed in the 
model to the mean pupil diameter (“pupil average”) and change in pupil diameter 
(“pupil change”) measured during the 2–s outcome–viewing period (Fig. 1 inset), 
using two linear regression models. The first, simpler model had four parameters: 
change–point probability and relative uncertainty computed from the reduced 
Bayesian model, the standard deviation of generative distribution, and a binary 
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variable describing whether or not the prediction error was exactly zero. The 
second model included all of these parameters, as well as several potential 
confounding factors such as eye position and velocity (see Methods). The 
models are complementary: the first avoids potential interactions between large 
numbers of parameters and thus has coefficients that are more readily 
interpretable, whereas the second avoids missing out on the many factors that in 
principle could affect our pupil measurements. Both models captured a significant 
amount of variability in the pupil data (For pupil average/pupil change data, an F–
test rejected the null model relative to the small model for 27/15 of the 30 
subjects, and a nested F–test rejected the small model relative to the large model 
for 29/19 of the 30 subjects, p<0.05). 
 
Below we first report the most prominent effects from these regression analyses, 
which were similar for the two models and include roughly monotonic 
relationships between pupil change and change–point probability and between 
pupil average and relative uncertainty. We later show that these relationships 
were in fact slightly more complicated and included a dependence on baseline 
pupil diameter that helps us to interpret the results in terms of known properties 
of the arousal system. 
 
Pupil change reflected change–point probability 
The change in pupil diameter during the outcome–viewing period, like change–
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point probability in our model, tended to increase as a function of error 
magnitude, scaled as a function of noise (Fig. 4A; compare to Figs. 3B). 
Accordingly, when computed by the model using the same sequence of 
outcomes experienced by each subject, change–point probability tended to be 
positively predictive of z–scored pupil change (Fig. 4B ordinate). The 
complement was also true: change–point probability varied systematically as a 
function of pupil change for data pooled across the population (Fig. 4C). In 
contrast, there was no consistent relationship between change–point probability 
and pupil average (Fig. 4B abscissa). 
 
One notable exception to the positive relationship between pupil change and 
error magnitude occurred for trials in which the error was exactly zero, which 
corresponded to relatively large pupil changes (left–most data in Fig. 4A). 
Accordingly, a binary variable added to the linear model that described whether 
or not the subject correctly predicted the outcome was related to pupil change 
(the mean value of the regression coefficient was 0.180 zPC for the four–
parameter regression model and 0.156 zPC for the larger model; p<0.05 for H0: 
mean=0 for each model) but not pupil average (mean regression coefficient=–
0.076 and –0.092 zPA for the smaller and larger regression models, respectively, 
p>0.05). Thus, pupil change reflected not only change–point probability, but also 
whether or not the subject correctly predicted the observed outcome. 
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Average pupil diameter reflected belief uncertainty 
The average pupil diameter during the outcome–viewing period, like relative 
uncertainty in our model, tended to peak on the trial after a change point and 
then diminish in magnitude as more relevant information reinforced the existing 
belief (Fig 5A; compare to Figs. 2B and 3C). Accordingly, when computed by the 
model using the same sequence of outcomes experienced by each subject, 
relative uncertainty tended to be positively predictive of pupil average (Fig. 5B 
abscissa). This result did not simply reflect differences in motor output following 
change points (e.g., longer button presses to choose a learning rate near one), 
because similar results were obtained in a control experiment in which subject 
predictions were reset using a learning rate of 0.5 on each trial, thus requiring the 
same motor act to choose a learning rate of either zero or one (mean regression 
coefficient=0.30 and 0.35 zPA/RU for the smaller and larger regression models, 
respectively, p<0.05). The complement was also true: relative uncertainty varied 
systematically as a function of pupil average for data pooled across the 
population (Fig. 5C). In contrast, there was no consistent relationship between 
relative uncertainty and pupil change (Fig. 5B ordinate). 
 
Overall uncertainty in our task depends on not only relative uncertainty but also 
noise, which we manipulated by varying the standard deviation of the generative 
distribution in blocks (STD=5 or 10). Consistent with our model, in which noise is 
only used to compute change–point probability (Eqs. 5 and 6), these 
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manipulations of noise were reflected in pupil change but only insofar as pupil 
change represented change–point probability (Fig. 4A). These manipulations of 
noise did not have any other systematic effects on either pupil change or pupil 
average (p>0.1 for H0: a mean value of zero for the regression coefficient 
describing the influence of noise on the given pupil measurement for both 
regression models). Thus, for this task pupil average did not appear to reflect 
overall uncertainty about a future outcome but rather a specific form of 
uncertainty that arises after change points and signals the need for rapid 
learning. 
 
Pupil metrics reflected individual learning differences  
As noted above (Fig. 2C), there was a great deal of variability in the average 
learning rates used by individual subjects. These individual differences are 
thought to reflect biases that govern the extent to which subjects tend to interpret 
the cause of prediction errors in terms of either noise or change points  (Nassar 
et al., 2010). One advantage of our reduced model is that it can simulate these 
individual differences in terms of the subjective hazard rate, which is the 
expected rate at which change points will occur. Accordingly, fitting the model to 
behavioral data from individual subjects with subjective hazard rate as a single 
free parameter yielded fit values that varied systematically with average learning 
rates (r=0.93, H0: r=0, p<0.001; Fig 6A).  
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These individual differences in the inferred (fit) subjective hazard rates 
corresponded to individual differences in both the temporal dynamics and 
magnitude of outcome–locked pupil responses. We quantified the temporal 
dynamics using an index that related the pupil response on a given trial to a 
mean–subtracted version of the template shown in Fig. 6B. This template 
describes the strength of the across–subject, linear relationship between pupil 
diameter and hazard rate in a sliding time window. This relationship was 
strongest soon after outcome onset, thus likely reflecting prior expectations about 
the newly arriving outcome. There was a positive relationship between the mean 
value of this index and fit hazard rate for individual subjects (r=0.51, p<0.01). In 
addition, there was a positive relationship between pupil average and fit hazard 
rate for individual subjects (r=0.40, p<0.05).  
 
Based on these relationships, we constructed a linear regression model using the 
temporal–dynamics index and pupil average to explain individual differences in 
task performance. The model yielded strong, pupil–based predictions of per–
subject values of both fit hazard rate (r=0.59, p<0.001) and average learning rate 
(r=0.59, p<0.001; Fig 6C). Thus, individual differences in average learning rate, 
which can be described computationally as differing expectations about the rate 
of change–points, could be predicted from the temporal dynamics and average 
magnitude of pupil diameter measured during outcome viewing. 
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Pupil metrics predicted trial–by–trial learning rates 
The relationships between pupil metrics and parameters of the reduced Bayesian 
model suggest that measurements of pupil diameter during the outcome–viewing 
period can be used to predict the subsequent learning rate. For example, we 
found positive relationships between pupil change and change–point probability 
(Fig. 4) and between pupil average and relative uncertainty (Fig. 5). Thus, 
observing relatively high values of either pupil metric on a given trial should 
indicate that the subject will use a larger–than–average learning rate when 
adjusting beliefs according to the outcome observed on that trial. We tested this 
idea directly, as follows. 
 
First, we examined the relationship between pupil change, pupil average, and 
learning rate for individual subjects. We used a regression model to describe 
learning rate (z–scored per subject) in terms of pupil change and pupil average. 
On average, this linear regression computed per subject yielded a positive 
coefficient for pupil change (mean=0.108 zLR/zPC, p<0.05 for H0: mean=0) and a 
smaller, not statistically significant, positive coefficient for pupil average 
(mean=0.085 zLR/zPA, p=0.13; Fig. 7A). 
 
Second, we used a simple, weighted sum of pupil change and pupil average to 
assess their combined predictive power across subjects. Using weights equal to 
the mean value of the per–subject regression coefficients from the previous 
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analysis (Fig. 7A), the weighted sum was moderately predictive of learning rate 
across all subjects (r=0.067, p<0.001). However, this analysis did not take into 
account a systematic, negative dependence of the sum of these per–subject 
coefficients (which is related to the overall ability of the weighted sum to account 
for learning rate) on subjective hazard rate predicted by pupil dynamics (Fig. 7B). 
Subjects with low pupil–predicted hazard rates had pupil responses that were 
good predictors of learning rate. Subjects with increasingly high pupil–predicted 
hazard rates had pupil responses that were increasingly less predictive, and in 
some cases negatively predictive, of learning rate. 
 
Third, we used a more complicated linear model that also included across–
subject differences in pupil dynamics that related to subjective hazard rates, 
which markedly improved our overall ability to use pupil metrics to predict 
learning rates. This model had three terms: 1) the sum of pupil change and pupil 
average computed per trial, weighted according to average regression 
coefficients in Fig. 7A; 2) the pupil–predicted hazard rate, computed per subject 
(see Fig 6C); and 3) the multiplicative interaction between these two variables. 
Using this model, pupil measurements could effectively predict learning rates for 
all data from all subjects (r=0.38, p<0.001). These predictions accounted for 
variations in learning rates both across (Fig. 6B) and within (Fig. 7C) subjects. 
 
Task–independent pupil manipulation altered behavior 
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To examine whether the correlations between pupil measures and learning 
behavior might reflect an underlying causal process, we used an arousal 
manipulation that affected pupil diameter and measured its effects on learning 
behavior. In particular, we occasionally and without warning switched the auditory 
cue that preceded fixation. Subjects were told that these auditory–cue switches 
were unrelated to the task and they therefore should ignore the specific sounds. 
Nevertheless, this manipulation led to increases in both pupil average and pupil 
change on trials in which the fixation cue was switched (Fig 8A; t–test for H0: 
mean effect size=0, p<0.001 for both pupil average and pupil change). Thus, we 
caused consistent changes in the pupil measures that were correlated with the 
computational variables needed to solve the task. 
 
This manipulation caused systematic changes in task performance that 
depended on baseline pupil diameter (Fig. 8B). For trials with relatively small 
baseline diameter (i.e., less than its per–subject median value), individual 
subjects tended to use larger learning rates on auditory–switch trials than 
otherwise (Fig 8B abscissa; mean across subjects=0.113, t–test for H0: mean=0, 
p<0.01). For trials with relatively large baseline diameter, subjects used slightly 
smaller learning rates on auditory–switch trials than otherwise, although this 
trend was not statistically significant (Fig 8B ordinate; mean=–0.037, p=0.35). 
The average difference in the size of these effects from small– versus large–
diameter trials was >0, implying that the effects of this manipulation depended on 
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baseline pupil diameter (Fig 8B diagonal; paired t–test, p<0.001). These effects 
did not result from systematic differences in task conditions for switch versus 
non–switch trials, because the same three analyses yielded no effects when 
applied to learning rates computed by our reduced Bayesian model (p>0.5).  
 
This dependence on baseline pupil diameter is suggestive of the Yerkes–Dodson 
“inverted U” relationship between arousal and learning. According to that idea, 
learning is highest for moderate levels of arousal and lowest for either overly high 
or overly low levels of arousal  (Yerkes and Dodson, 2004). Our subjects 
appeared to be consistently engaged during task performance, implying that we 
were probably not sampling overly low or high arousal states. Nevertheless, in a 
narrower range and assuming a correspondence between arousal state and 
baseline pupil diameter, we found that the relationships between learning 
behavior and our arousal manipulation were qualitatively consistent with an 
“inverted U.” In particular, auditory–switch trials tended to correspond to the 
largest increases in learning rate when baseline pupil diameter was relatively low 
(steepest ascent in the “inverted U”) and the largest decreases in learning rate 
when baseline pupil diameter was relatively high (steepest descent in the 
“inverted U”; Fig. 8C, open circles). 
 
This “inverted U” relationship was also apparent in our previous pupil 
measurements, in two ways. First, across subjects, those with larger average 
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pupil diameters during outcome viewing tended to use learning rates that were 
less, or even negatively, predicted by fluctuations in pupil metrics relative to other 
subjects (Fig 7B). Second, subjects that had lower pupil–predicted hazard rates 
used learning rates that were positively correlated with pupil metrics when their 
baseline pupil diameter was low but negatively correlated when their baseline 
pupil diameter was high (Fig 8C, filled circles). Thus, results from both our pupil-
manipulation and pupil-measurement experiments were consistent with an 




We examined the relationship between pupil diameter, which is related to arousal 
and autonomic state, and learning rate, which describes the extent to which new 
information is used to adjust existing cognitive beliefs. Consistent with previous 
work  (Nassar et al., 2010;Behrens et al., 2007;Krugel et al., 2009), we found that 
human subjects performing a predictive–inference task were most heavily 
influenced by outcomes that occurred shortly after a change point in the 
outcome–generating process. One possible mechanism for this effect is a 
dynamic regulation of the relative influence of incoming information on cortical 
processing  (Yu and Dayan, 2005). Insights into the computations required for 
such a regulator are provided by a reduced model that approximates the ideal 
observer for the task, describes subject behavior, and bases learning rates on 
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two parameters that we found to be represented in pupil measurements: change–
point probability and relative uncertainty. 
 
In our model, change–point probability depends on the absolute value of the 
most recent prediction error and drives increased learning after surprisingly large 
errors. We found that change–point probability was positively correlated with 
changes in pupil diameter. This relationship is consistent with early pupillometry 
studies that showed an inverse relationship between stimulus–evoked pupil 
responses and stimulus probability, as well as more recent work interpreting 
outcome–locked pupil responses in terms of the surprise associated with errors 
in judging uncertainty, called the risk prediction error (Raisig et al., 
2010;Friedman et al., 1973;Preuschoff et al., 2011). We also found that pupil 
change was not always directly related to change–point probability, with 
particularly large pupil changes on trials with exactly zero error that might have 
been surprisingly rewarding and/or reflected an association with an atypical 
consequence (i.e., no possibility of updating the next prediction). 
 
Relative uncertainty, the second parameter in our model, represents uncertainty 
about the true underlying mean and drives learning from outcomes that occur 
after a change point. We found that relative uncertainty was correlated with 
average pupil diameter. We also found that changes in another form of 
uncertainty that should not drive learning (i.e., changes in the standard deviation 
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of the generative process in our task) did not lead to similar effects on pupil 
diameter. These results are complementary to a recent finding that pupil diameter 
tends to increase during exploratory decisions that occur during periods of 
uncertainty about the best available option  (Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2010). 
These findings suggest that pupil–linked arousal systems encode an uncertainty 
signal that facilitates both learning and information–seeking behaviors. 
 
We also found strong individual differences in task behavior that could be 
captured by fitting a prior expectation about the rate of change points (hazard 
rate) to behavioral data. We found that subjects who were fit by higher hazard–
rate models tended to have larger pupil dilations during the outcome–viewing 
period. This physiological difference arose early in the viewing period, consistent 
with the idea that these individual differences reflected a prior expectation about 
the source of the upcoming error. 
  
We used these relationships between pupil metrics and change–point probability, 
relative uncertainty, and the hazard–rate prior to predict the extent to which 
subjects were influenced by each new outcome. We also manipulated pupil 
diameter using a task–irrelevant auditory manipulation that resulted in changes in 
task performance that were consistent with our measured relationships between 
pupil metrics and key task variables. These results provide new insights into the 
specific computations that are reflected in pupil diameter and establish their 
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causal role in belief updating. 
 
These computations likely involve, at least in part, neural activity in the locus 
coeruleus. One intriguing possibility is that the two key variables from our model 
are encoded by two distinct modes of locus coeruleus activation  (Aston-Jones 
and Cohen, 2005): change–point probability, reflected in pupil change, is 
encoded by phasic activation of the locus coeruleus, whereas relative 
uncertainty, reflected in pupil average, is encoded by tonic activation of the locus 
coeruleus. Although direct confirmation is still needed, this idea is supported by 
several lines of evidence, including: 1) a compelling example of simultaneous 
measurements of locus coeruleus activity and pupil diameter in a monkey that 
are closely correlated  (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005); 2) similar modulations of 
pupil diameter and locus coeruleus activity under certain task conditions, such as 
changes in utility in that affect behavioral engagement  (Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 
2010;Gilzenrat et al., 2010); and 3) a proposed anatomical substrate involving 
common activation from the nucleus paragigantocellularis, which contributes to 
both locus coeruleus and sympathetic nervous system function  (Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2010;Aston-Jones et al., 1986). The consequence of locus coeruleus 
involvement would be the task–related release of norepinephrine throughout the 
nervous system. Consistent with our results, norepinephrine release is thought to 
permit or facilitate changes in behavior that follow unexpected changes in the 
environment and learning in general, possibly by modulating experience–
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dependent neural plasticity  (Yu and Dayan, 2005;Sara et al., 1994;Aston-Jones 
et al., 1997;Tully and Bolshakov, 2010;Harley, 1987;Corbetta et al., 2008;Bouret 
and Sara, 2005). 
 
More generally, our results are consistent with the idea that brain areas that 
regulate the influence of newly arriving information on existing beliefs are also 
strongly linked to arousal and autonomic function  (Behrens et al., 2007;Yu and 
Dayan, 2005;Jepma et al., 2010;Gilzenrat et al., 2010;Preuschoff et al., 
2011;Critchley et al., 2001;Critchley, 2005). These areas likely include not just 
the locus coeruleus but also the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which has 
strong reciprocal connections with the locus coeruleus and whose activity 
encodes several signals closely related to change–point probability, including 
unsigned prediction errors and learning rates  (Behrens et al., 2007;Aston-Jones 
and Cohen, 2005;Krugel et al., 2009;Matsumoto et al., 2007). This arousal 
system appears to govern not simply overall alertness or other non–specific 
factors that might affect overall task performance, but rather a computationally 
sophisticated process that rationally regulates the influence of new sensory 
information in a dynamic environment. These computations take into account 
both ongoing processing of task–relevant variables like change–point probability 
and relative uncertainty and state variables including prior expectations about the 
rate of change. These factors are combined in a manner that is consistent with 
the Yerkes–Dodson “inverted U” relationship between arousal level and learning 
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rate (Fig. 8C)	  	  (Yerkes	  and	  Dodson,	  2004).  
 
In summary, our work suggests a relationship between arousal state and learning 
rate that is likely a result of a coordinated learning–arousal network including the 
locus coeruleus and ACC. The representation of normative learning variables in 
this network suggests that subtle changes in arousal might reflect rational 





Predictive–inference task. Human subject protocols were approved by the 
University of Pennsylvania Internal Review Board. Thirty subjects (19 female, 11 
male; age range = 19–29 years) participated in the primary study and an 
independent sample of 29 subjects (17 female, 12 male; age range = 19–25 
years) participated in the arousal manipulation study after providing informed 
consent. Both studies used a predictive–inference task that required subjects to 
predict each subsequent number to be presented in a series  (Nassar et al., 
2010). For each trial t, a single integer (Xt) was presented that was a rounded 
pick sampled independently and identically from a Gaussian distribution whose 
mean (μt) changed at unsignaled change points and whose standard deviation 
(σt) was fixed to either 5 or 10 within each block of 200 trials. Change points 
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occurred with a probability of zero for the first three trials following a change point 
and 0.1 for all trials thereafter. 
 
To facilitate measurements of non–luminance–mediated effects on pupil 
diameter, we used a different visual display and task timing than in our previous 
study2. Subjects were shown a numeric representation of their current prediction 
at a central location on a CRT monitor. Background screen pixels were a 
checkerboard of light and dark pixels (mean±STD luminance in a circle with 
radius 6.5 cm= 0.457±0.010 cd/m2). Numbers were drawn in an intermediate 
gray color (0.445±0.005 cd/m2). When viewed passively by a control group of 
four subjects outside of the context of the predictive–inference task, no individual 
stimulus (number) had a significant effect on average pupil diameter or evoked 
changes in pupil diameter (t–test for H0: equal means between each stimulus and 
all others, p>0.3 for all stimuli after correcting for multiple comparisons), nor did 
the number of digits contained within the stimulus affect either pupil variable 
(p>0.4). 
 
For each trial, the subject indicated his or her updated prediction using a video 
gamepad. Each prediction was constrained to be between the previous prediction 
and the most recent outcome, thus limiting learning rates to between zero and 
one. After the new prediction was chosen, the numeric representation of this 
prediction disappeared, an auditory cue was played, and a numeric 
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representation of the new outcome was shown. Subjects were instructed to fixate 
centrally for 2 s at this point; failure to do so (within a square window, 9° per side) 
resulted in a tone indicating a fixation error. After 2 s the new outcome 
disappeared, the prediction re–appeared, and an auditory cue was played to 
indicate that the prediction should be updated. Fourteen subjects also 
participated in a control version of the task in which the prediction was reset after 
viewing the new outcome to reflect an update equivalent to a learning rate of 0.5. 
For this task, the same motor output (in terms of number or duration of button 
presses) was required to use a learning rate of either zero or one on each trial. 
 
Subjects were told that the numbers were generated from a noisy process and 
that several discreet change points would occur over the course of the task. They 
were instructed to make a prediction on each trial (Bt) such that the average error 
made on all predictions, , would be minimized. Payout depended on 
how well they achieved this goal, as described previously  (Nassar et al., 2010). 
 
The pupil–manipulation task was identical to primary version of the task, except 
that the auditory cue played at the beginning of fixation was occasionally 
switched to another sound from a library of 31 sound effects downloaded from an 
online library. Sounds were 0.09–1.4 s in duration (mean±STD = 0.72±0.42 s) 
and played at 56–70 dB (A–weighted; mean±STD = 62.5±3.9 dB). Switch trials 
occurred at random, with a probability of 0.1 on the 9 trials following a switch, 0.8 
! 
Bt " Xt
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thereafter. On switch trials, the given sound was played, on average, 7 dB louder 
than otherwise. Seven of 29 subjects completing the pupil–manipulation task 
were excluded from further analyses because of an excessive number of fixation 
errors (blinks or lost fixation on >40 percent of trials). 
 
Pupil–diameter measurements. Pupil diameter was sampled at 120 Hz and 
recorded throughout the task using an infrared video eye–tracker (ASL, Inc.). 
Blinks were identified using a custom blink filter based on pupil diameter and 
vertical and horizontal eye position, then removed by linear interpolation of 
values measured just before and after each identified blink. Blink–filtered 
diameter was low–pass filtered using a Butterworth filter with a cutoff frequency 
of 3.75 Hz. These filtered measurements were then z–scored within each 
session.  
 
All analyses excluded trials in which blinks or fixation errors during outcome 
viewing were detected online (these events were followed by a beep to remind 
the subject to minimize their occurrence). The first 20 trials from each block were 
also excluded to avoid possible changes in average luminance at block 
boundaries. Pupil average was computed for each trial by taking the mean of all 
240 z–scored pupil measurements from the 2 s–long outcome–viewing period of 
the trial. Pupil change was computed for each trial by subtracting the average 
pupil measurement from early in the outcome–viewing period (0–1 s after 
	   101	  
outcome presentation) from the average pupil measurement from late in the 
outcome–viewing period (1–2 s after outcome presentation). Trials that included 
blinks that were detected offline (but not online) were used to compute pupil 
average by interpolating values from just before and just after the blink. These 
trials were not used to compute pupil change, which was much more sensitive to 
the timing of blinks. 
 
Reduced Bayesian model. Optimal performance on the predictive–inference 
requires inferring the probability distribution over possible outcomes on the next 
timestep, given all previous data and the process by which those data were 
generated: . Because the relationship between the data on the next 
timestep is independent of all previous data conditioned on the mean of the 
current distribution (µ), the solution can be formulated in terms of µ:  
 
              [1] 
                [1] 
 
and the probability distribution over possible means given previous data can be 
inverted according to Bayesʼ rule: 
       
             [2] 
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Although computationally tractable solutions to this problem exist, these solutions 
specify learning rates that are complicated functions of either the probability 
distribution over all possible means1 or over all possible "runs" of non–change–
point trials 19. To simplify the algorithm, the reduced model computes the 
posterior probability distribution over possible means as described above but 
maintains only the first two moments of this distribution. This assumption 
massively reduces the number of required computations but has minimal effects 
on performance 2. An added advantage of this model is that it can be formulated 
as a delta rule: 
 





where B is the belief about the mean of the underlying distribution; α is the 
learning rate; and δ is the prediction error, which is the difference between the 
actual and predicted outcome. The learning rate depends on two variables that 
are updated on each trial: 
         
Bt+1 = Bt + αt × δt
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               [4] 
 
where change–point probability (Ω) reflects the probability that µt is not equal to 
µt–1, and relative uncertainty (τ ) reflects the variance on the predictive distribution 
in µ (i.e., uncertainty about the location of the mean) divided by the variance on 
the predictive distribution in X (i.e., total uncertainty about the location of the next 
outcome). 
 
Performance of the reduced Bayesian model also depends on an expectation 
about the prior probability on change points, or the hazard rate. Specifically, 
hazard rate directly influences the computation of change–point probability on 
each trial: 
 
               [5] 
 
 
Where U and N represent uniform and normal distributions, respectively; H is the 
hazard rate; Bt is the modelʼs prediction on trial t; and σ2 is the total variance on 
the predictive distribution, which is discussed below. We incorporated hazard rate 
into the model in two ways: 1) using the true generative hazard rate for trials in 
which a change point did not recently occur (0.1) or 2) by fitting the model to 
behavior by minimizing the total squared difference between subject and model 
	   104	  
predictions using a constrained search algorithm (fmincon in MATLAB) with 
hazard rate as a free parameter. 
 
The total variance on the predictive distribution in the model comes from two 
sources: 
   [6] 
    
 
The first source is the standard deviation on the outcome–generating distribution 
(N). The second source is uncertainty about the mean of that distribution and 
depends on both N and relative uncertainty (τ). Here we set N to be the actual 
experimental standard deviation, but we update τ after each outcome according 






such that if a change point occurs, relative uncertainty is reset to 0.5 (first term in 
numerator); if a change point does not occur, relative uncertainty is reduced 
(second term in numerator); and if the model is uncertain about whether a 
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(third term in numerator). 
 
Statistical analyses. Trial–by–trial values of pupil average and pupil change were 
each z–scored for the full session (zPA and zPC, respectively) and then fit with a 
linear regression model using four parameters: 1) change–point probability, 
computed by the reduced Bayesian model for each trial; 2) relative uncertainty, 
computed by the reduced Bayesian model for each trial; 3) noise, the standard 
deviation of the outcome–generating distribution; and 4) a binary vector 
specifying whether or not the subject correctly predicted the outcome on that trial. 
We also used a larger model that, in addition to the above four parameters, 
included: the average horizontal and vertical eye position and the change in 
horizontal and vertical eye position measured during the outcome–viewing 
period; the subjectʼs prediction and the computer–generated outcome from the 
current trial; the pupil change measured on the previous trial; and the trial 
number within the block and within the session. 
 
Pupil–predicted hazard rates were derived from pupil measurements and the 
reduced Bayesian model as follows. First, we inferred the subjective hazard rate 
used by each subject by fitting his or her behavioral data to the reduced Bayesian 
model with hazard rate (H) as the only free parameter. Next, we fit a linear 
regression model explaining H in terms of pupil measurements. That model had 
two terms, computed per subject: 1) the mean value of pupil average, and 2) an 
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index of pupil dynamics. The index was computed as the mean value of the dot 
product of trial–by–trial pupil measurements and the mean–subtracted curve 
shown in Fig. 6B. Finally, we used the coefficients from a linear fit that excluded 
the data from an individual subject to combine the mean pupil average and pupil–
dynamics index (from the excluded subject) into a pupil–predicted hazard rate for 
that subject.   
 
Pupil–predicted learning rates were computed according to the relationships 
between pupil metrics and model parameters. Linear fits to the relationship 
between pupil average and relative uncertainty were computed for each subject, 
and these fits were used estimate relative uncertainty for each trial–by–trial 
measurement of pupil diameter. Linear fits to the relationship between pupil 
change and change–point probability were computed for each subject, and these 
fits were used to estimate change–point probability for each trial–by–trial 
measurement of pupil change. To compute predicted learning rates, the two 
predicted model quantities were combined according to Eq. 4. We also used a 
more complex linear model that took into account pupil–predicted hazard rates; 
see text for details. 
 
Arousal-induced learning effects for the inverted–U analyses were computed 
separately for sound–manipulation and non–manipulation sessions. For sound–
manipulation sessions, learning rates were fit to a cumulative Weibull as a 
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function of error magnitude for each subject and noise condition, to account for 
the relationship shown in Fig. 4A. Residuals from this fit, which reflected error-
independent variability in learning rate, were z–scored per subject. Initial pupil 
diameter, as measured by the average diameter during the first 100 ms of the 
outcome phase, was also z–scored per subject. Data were binned across 
subjects according to the initial diameter z–score. The effect of the sound 
manipulation was computed as a signed dʼ describing the difference in the z–
scored residual learning rates used on auditory shift versus non–auditory shift 
trials. For non–manipulation sessions, the relationship between pupil metrics and 
learning rate was characterized only for subjects with low pupil–predicted hazard 
rates (<0.6). Subjects with high pupil–predicted hazard rates tended to have 
small or negative relationships between pupil metrics and learning rate and thus 
were omitted from this analysis. Arousal effect size was computed as the 
correlation coefficient between the weighted sum of pupil metrics and learning 
rate, each z–scored per subject (positive/negative values indicate that learning 
rates tended to increase/decrease as pupil effects increased) for equally sized 
bins of baseline pupil diameter (z–scored per subject). 
 





Figure 1. Predictive–inference task sequence and pupillometry. Learning rate 
was computed by dividing the difference in the prediction from one trial to the 
next by the difference between the current outcome and the current prediction. 
Inset: mean±SEM pupil diameter, averaged across z–scores computed per 
subject, aligned to outcome presentation (time=0). Pupil average was computed 
for each trial as the mean pupil diameter, z–scored by subject, across the entire 
2–s fixation window (vertical dashed lines). Pupil change was computed for each 
trial as the difference in mean diameter, z–scored by subject, measured late 






















































Figure 2. Task performance. A, Learning rates were highest after subjects made 
larger errors, scaled by noise (as indicated). Points and errorbars are mean±SEM 
from all subjects. B, Learning rates were highest on change–point trials and 
decayed thereafter, similarly for both noise conditions. Points and errorbars are 
mean±SEM from all subjects. C, Learning–rate distributions across all trials from 
each of the 30 subjects (abscissa), sorted by median learning rate. Horizontal 
































































Figure 3. Reduced Bayesian model. A, Learning rate as a function of change–
point probability (abscissa) and relative uncertainty (line shading), as computed 
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of error magnitude (abscissa) for the two different noise conditions, as indicated, 
computed for a given relative uncertainty (equal to 0.02 for this figure). C, 
Mean±SEM relative uncertainty computed by the model aligned to change points 
from all sequences experienced by the subjects for the two different noise 
conditions. D, Trial–by–trial comparison of subject and model learning rates. 
Model learning rates were computed using the same sequence of outcomes 
experienced by each subject. Points and error bars are mean±SEM data from all 
subjects grouped into 20 five–percentile bins according to the corresponding 

































Figure 4. Relationship between pupil change and change–point probability. A, 
Mean±SEM pupil change from all trials and all subjects for running bins of 150 
trials, binned according to the absolute prediction error and sorted by noise, as 
indicated. B, Regression coefficients describing the linear relationship between 
change point–probability (pCH) and z–scored pupil change (zpc, ordinate) versus 
the regression coefficients describing the linear relationship between pCH and z–
scored pupil average (zPA, abscissa). Points are regression coefficients computed 
for each subject individually, using the four–parameter regression model. Arrows 
indicate mean values from this model (dark, equal to 0.174 zPC/pCH, t-test for H0: 
mean=0, p<0.001 for the ordinate, –0.022 zPA/pCH, p=0.58 for the abscissa) or 
from the full model (light, equal to 0.148 zPC/pCH, p<0.001 for the ordinate, –0.014 
zPA/pCH, p=0.70 for the abscissa). Dark arrows are partially occluded by light 
ones. C, Change–point probability from the reduced Bayesian model versus pupil 
change. Points and error bars are mean±SEM data from all subjects grouped into 
20 five–percentile bins. The solid line is a linear fit to the unbinned data (slope = 










































































Figure 5. Relationship between pupil diameter and relative uncertainty. A, 
Mean±SEM pupil average from all subjects as a function of trials relative to task 
change points. Asterisk indicates trials differing significantly from all other trials 
(permutation test for H0: equal means after correction for multiple comparisons, 
p<0.05). B, Regression coefficients describing the relationship between relative 
uncertainty (RU) and z–scored pupil change (zpc, ordinate) versus the regression 
coefficients describing the relationship between RU and z–scored pupil average 
(zPA, abscissa). Points are regression coefficients computed for each subject 
individually, using the four–parameter regression model. Arrows indicate mean 
values from this model (dark, equal to 0.135 zPC/RU, t-test for H0: mean=0, 
p=0.28 for the ordinate, 0.35 zPA/RU, p<0.05 for the abscissa) or from the full 
model (light, equal to 0.127 zPC/RU, p=0.24  for the ordinate, 0.40 zPA/RU, p<0.01 
for the abscissa). Dark arrows are partially occluded by light ones. C, Relative 
uncertainty from the reduced Bayesian model versus pupil average. Points and 
error bars are mean±SEM data from all subjects grouped into 20 five–percentile 
bins. The solid line is a linear regression to unbinned data (slope = 0.0055 
































































Figure 6. Individual differences in learning rate, hazard rate, and pupil diameter. 
A, Mean learning rate per subject versus the hazard rate of the reduced Bayesian 
model that best fit that subjectʼs performance (points). The solid line is a linear fit 
(r=0.93, p<0.001). B, Regression coefficients describing the relationship between 
fit hazard rates and bin–by–bin pupil measurements across subjects, computed 
in sliding 8.3–ms bins and aligned to outcome presentation (time=0). Dotted lines 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. C, Relationship between pupil–predicted 
hazard rate and average learning rate for each subject (points). Pupil–predicted 
hazard rates were computed using a linear regression model that included both 
shape and magnitude of the average pupil response for each subject (see 















































































Figure 7. Pupil metrics predict learning rate. A, Regression coefficients describing 
the linear, trial–by–trial relationships between pupil change and the subsequent 
learning rate (ordinate) and between pupil average and the subsequent learning 
rate (abscissa). Points are regression coefficients computed for each subject 
individually, using a four–parameter regression model that also included trial 
number and block number as covariates. B, The relationship between learning 
rate and pupil parameters depended on the subjectʼs baseline pupil response. 
For each subject, the sum of the regression coefficients from panel A are plotted 
as a function of the pupil–predicted hazard rate from Figure 6C. The line is a 
linear fit (r= –0.059, p<0.001). C, Predicted versus actual learning rate. Both 
values are z–scored per subject. Data from all subjects are grouped into 20 
equally sized bins of predicted learning rate. The line is a linear fit to the 
















































































Figure 8. Effects of the pupil manipulation. A, Evoked changes in pupil diameter. 
For each subject, pupil average (ordinate) and pupil change (abscissa) were z–
scored across all trials. Each point represents the difference in the mean z–
scores for auditory switch versus non–switch trials for an individual subject. 
Positive values indicate larger values on switch trials. B, Evoked changes in 
learning behavior. For each subject, learning rate was z–scored across all trials 
and fit to a cumulative Weibull as a function of error magnitude for each noise 
condition, to account for the relationship shown in Fig. 4A. Each point represents 
the difference in the mean value of the residuals from these fits for auditory 
switch versus non–switch trials for an individual subject, separated by trials in 
which the initial pupil diameter was smaller (ordinate) or larger (abscissa) than its 
median value. Positive values indicate larger learning rates on auditory switch 
trials. C, A possible relationship between learning and arousal based on an 
“inverted U” (light gray, modeled as Gaussian). A given change in learning for a 
given a change in pupil metrics (ordinate), plotted as a function of baseline pupil 
diameter (abscissa), is shown for: 1) the hypothesized Gaussian (its derivative is 
shown in dark gray), 2) the measured effects of the auditory manipulation (open 
points), and 3) the measured relationship between pupil metrics and learning rate 
during non-manipulation sessions. See Methods for details. 
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CHAPTER 4 	  
 
 
A	  healthy	  fear	  of	  the	  unknown:	  perspectives	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
parameter	  fits	  from	  computational	  models	  in	  neuroscience	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Abstract	  	  	  	  
Computational	  models	  are	  commonly	  used	  to	  infer	  the	  latent	  factors	  
responsible	  for	  generating	  behavior.	  However,	  the	  complexity	  of	  many	  
behaviors	  can	  handicap	  the	  interpretation	  of	  such	  models.	  Here	  we	  provide	  
perspectives	  on	  problems	  that	  can	  arise	  when	  interpreting	  parameter	  fits	  
from	  models	  that	  provide	  incomplete	  descriptions	  of	  behavior.	  We	  illustrate	  
these	  problems	  using	  commonly	  used	  and	  neurophysiologically	  motivated	  
reinforcement-­learning	  models	  fit	  to	  simulated	  behavioral	  data	  sets	  from	  
learning	  tasks.	  These	  models	  can	  pass	  a	  host	  of	  standard	  goodness-­of-­fit	  tests	  
and	  other	  model-­selection	  diagnostics	  even	  when	  they	  do	  not	  include	  a	  
complete	  description	  of	  behavior.	  We	  show	  that	  such	  incomplete	  models	  can	  
be	  misleading	  by	  yielding	  biased	  estimates	  of	  the	  parameters	  explicitly	  
included	  in	  the	  model.	  This	  problem	  is	  particularly	  pernicious	  when	  the	  
neglected	  factors	  are	  unknown	  and	  therefore	  not	  easily	  identified	  by	  model	  
comparisons	  and	  similar	  methods.	  An	  obvious	  conclusion	  is	  that	  a	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parsimonious	  description	  of	  behavioral	  data	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  an	  
accurate	  description	  of	  the	  underlying	  computational	  mechanisms.	  Moreover,	  
general	  goodness-­of-­fit	  measures	  are	  not	  a	  strong	  basis	  to	  support	  claims	  that	  
a	  particular	  model	  can	  provide	  a	  generalized	  understanding	  of	  the	  
computational	  factors	  that	  govern	  behavior.	  To	  help	  overcome	  these	  
challenges,	  we	  advocate	  the	  design	  of	  tasks	  that	  provide	  direct	  reports	  of	  the	  
computational	  variables	  of	  interest.	  Such	  direct	  reports	  complement	  
computational	  modeling	  approaches	  by	  providing	  a	  more	  complete,	  albeit	  
possibly	  more	  task-­specific,	  representation	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  drive	  behavior.	  
Computational	  models	  then	  provide	  a	  means	  to	  connect	  such	  task-­specific	  
results	  to	  a	  more	  general	  algorithmic	  understanding	  of	  the	  brain.	  	  
	  	  	  The	  use	  of	  models	  to	  infer	  the	  neural	  computations	  that	  underlie	  behavior	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  common	  in	  neuroscience	  research,	  especially	  for	  cognitive	  and	  perceptual	  tasks	  involving	  decision-­‐making	  and	  learning.	  As	  their	  sophistication	  and	  usefulness	  expand,	  these	  models	  become	  increasingly	  central	  to	  the	  design,	  analysis,	  and	  interpretation	  of	  experiments.	  We	  consider	  this	  to	  be	  generally	  a	  positive	  development	  but	  provide	  here	  some	  perspectives	  on	  the	  challenges	  inherent	  to	  this	  approach,	  particularly	  when	  behavior	  might	  be	  driven	  by	  unexpected	  factors	  that	  can	  complicate	  the	  interpretation	  of	  model	  fits.	  Our	  goal	  is	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to	  raise	  awareness	  of	  these	  issues	  and	  present	  complementary	  approaches	  that	  can	  help	  ensure	  that	  that	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  brain	  does	  not	  become	  overly	  conditioned	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  existing	  models	  fit	  to	  particular	  data	  sets.	  	  We	  illustrate	  these	  challenges	  using	  a	  set	  of	  models	  that	  describe	  the	  ongoing	  process	  of	  learning	  values	  to	  guide	  actions	  and	  are	  used	  extensively	  in	  the	  field	  of	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  	  (Beeler	  et	  al.,	  2010;Doll	  et	  al.,	  2011;Frank	  et	  al.,	  2009;Jepma	  and	  Nieuwenhuis,	  2010;Walton	  et	  al.,	  2010;Sul	  et	  al.,	  2011;Seo	  and	  Lee,	  2008;Strauss	  et	  al.,	  2011;Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010;Luksys	  et	  al.,	  2009;Daw	  et	  al.,	  2006;Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007;Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  These	  models	  adjust	  expectations	  about	  future	  outcomes	  according	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  actual	  and	  predicted	  outcomes,	  known	  as	  the	  prediction	  error.	  Originally	  developed	  in	  parallel	  in	  both	  animal-­‐	  and	  machine-­‐learning	  fields	  	  (Rescorla	  and	  Wagner,	  1972;Bertsekas	  and	  Tsitsiklis,	  1996;Sutton	  and	  Barto,	  1998),	  this	  relatively	  simple	  form	  of	  reinforcement-­‐learning	  algorithm,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “delta	  rule”	  because	  the	  prediction	  error	  is	  typically	  represented	  as	  a	  the	  Greek	  symbol	  delta	  (∂)	  in	  the	  equations,	  has:	  1)	  provided	  efficient	  solutions	  to	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  biologically	  relevant	  problems	  	  (Sutton	  and	  Barto,	  1998);	  2)	  accounted	  for	  many,	  but	  not	  all,	  learning	  phenomena	  exhibited	  by	  both	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  subjects	  	  (Sutton	  and	  Barto,	  1998);	  3)	  provided	  a	  generative	  architecture	  that	  has	  been	  used	  to	  predict	  behavior	  across	  tasks,	  compare	  brain	  activity	  to	  learning	  variables	  within	  a	  single	  task,	  and	  explore	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  behaviors	  that	  one	  might	  expect	  to	  find	  in	  a	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variable	  population	  	  (Miller	  et	  al.,	  1995;Dayan	  and	  Daw,	  2008);	  and	  4)	  guided	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  neural	  computations	  expressed	  by	  the	  brainstem	  dopaminergic	  system	  	  (Schultz	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  These	  successes	  have	  led	  to	  the	  proposal	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  delta-­‐rule	  model	  parameters	  fit	  to	  behavioral	  data	  from	  human	  subjects	  performing	  simple	  learning	  tasks	  might	  serve	  as	  a	  more	  precise	  diagnostic	  tool	  for	  certain	  mental	  disorders	  than	  existing	  methods	  	  (Huys	  et	  al.,	  2011;Huys	  et	  al.,	  2009;Maia	  and	  Frank,	  2011).	  Thus	  reinforcement-­‐learning	  models	  are	  becoming	  highly	  influential	  in	  guiding	  and	  filtering	  our	  understanding	  of	  normal	  and	  pathological	  brain	  function.	  	  Here	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  term	  in	  most	  delta-­‐rule	  models	  called	  the	  learning	  rate.	  The	  learning	  rate,	  α,	  determines	  the	  amount	  of	  influence	  that	  the	  prediction	  error,	  δ,	  associated	  with	  a	  given	  outcome	  has	  on	  the	  new	  expectation	  of	  future	  outcomes,	  Ε:	  	  EQ	  1	  	  As	  its	  name	  implies,	  the	  learning	  rate	  determines	  how	  slowly	  or	  quickly	  the	  model	  adapts	  to	  errors.	  A	  fixed	  value	  near	  zero	  implies	  that	  expectations	  are	  updated	  slowly,	  essentially	  averaging	  over	  a	  long	  history	  of	  past	  outcomes.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  fixed	  value	  near	  one	  implies	  that	  expectations	  are	  updated	  quickly	  to	  match	  the	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most	  recent	  outcomes.	  Thus,	  the	  learning	  rate	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  influence	  each	  unpredicted	  outcome	  exerts	  on	  the	  subsequent	  expectation.	  	  	  Recent	  work	  has	  highlighted	  the	  advantages	  of	  using	  learning	  rates	  that,	  instead	  of	  remaining	  fixed,	  are	  adjusted	  adaptively	  according	  to	  environmental	  dynamics	  	  (Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010;Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007;Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009;Yu	  and	  Dayan,	  2005;Preuschoff	  and	  Bossaerts,	  2007;Mathys	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  For	  example,	  adaptive	  learning	  rates	  can	  help	  ensure	  that	  expectations	  remain	  stable	  during	  periods	  of	  stability	  but	  change	  rapidly	  in	  response	  to	  abrupt	  environmental	  changes.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  idea,	  human	  behavior	  on	  tasks	  containing	  abrupt	  changes	  conforms	  to	  models	  in	  which	  the	  influence	  of	  each	  outcome	  depends	  on	  the	  statistics	  of	  other	  recent	  outcomes	  	  (Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010;Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007;Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Such	  rational	  adjustments	  of	  learning	  rate	  are	  most	  prominent	  after	  changes	  in	  action-­‐outcome	  contingencies	  that	  lead	  to	  surprisingly	  large	  prediction	  errors	  	  (Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010;Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  Here	  we	  consider	  in	  detail	  two	  of	  these	  change-­‐point	  tasks.	  The	  first,	  an	  estimation	  task,	  requires	  subjects	  to	  predict	  the	  next	  in	  a	  series	  of	  outcomes	  (randomly	  generated	  numbers)	  	  (Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Each	  outcome	  is	  drawn	  from	  a	  normal	  distribution	  with	  a	  fixed	  mean	  and	  variance.	  However,	  the	  mean	  of	  this	  distribution	  is	  occasionally	  re-­‐sampled,	  producing	  abrupt	  change-­‐points	  in	  the	  series	  of	  outcomes.	  Learning	  rates	  can	  be	  measured	  directly	  on	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  basis,	  using	  
	   122	  
predictions	  and	  outcomes	  plugged	  into	  Eq.	  1.	  Previous	  work	  showed	  that	  subjects	  performing	  this	  task	  tended	  to	  choose	  learning	  rates	  that	  were	  consistent	  with	  predictions	  from	  a	  reduced	  form	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  ideal-­‐observer	  algorithm,	  including	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  error	  magnitude	  and	  learning	  rate.	  However,	  the	  details	  of	  this	  relationship	  varied	  considerably	  across	  individual	  subjects.	  Some	  subjects	  tended	  to	  use	  highly	  adaptive	  learning	  rates,	  including	  values	  near	  zero	  following	  small	  errors	  and	  values	  near	  one	  following	  surprisingly	  large	  prediction	  errors.	  In	  contrast,	  other	  subjects	  used	  a	  much	  narrower	  range	  of	  learning	  rates,	  choosing	  similar	  values	  over	  most	  conditions.	  This	  across-­‐subject	  variability	  was	  described	  by	  a	  flexible	  model	  that	  could	  generate	  behaviors	  ranging	  from	  that	  of	  a	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  delta	  rule	  to	  that	  of	  the	  reduced	  Bayesian	  algorithm,	  depending	  on	  the	  value	  of	  a	  learning	  rate	  “adaptiveness”	  parameter.	  	  	  The	  second	  task	  is	  a	  four-­‐alternative	  forced-­‐choice	  task	  that	  includes	  occasional,	  unsignaled	  change-­‐points	  in	  the	  probabilistic	  associations	  of	  monetary	  rewards	  for	  each	  choice	  target	  	  (Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Learning	  rates	  are	  not	  measured	  directly,	  as	  they	  can	  be	  for	  the	  estimation	  task,	  but	  rather	  inferred	  from	  model	  fits.	  Like	  for	  the	  estimation	  task,	  previous	  studies	  suggested	  that	  learning	  rates	  adapted	  to	  recent	  outcomes,	  particularly	  following	  large,	  unexpected	  errors.	  These	  learning-­‐rate	  dynamics	  also	  varied	  across	  individual	  subjects	  in	  a	  manner	  that,	  interestingly,	  was	  related	  to	  allelic	  variants	  of	  the	  COMT	  enzyme,	  which	  is	  involved	  in	  synaptic	  clearance	  of	  dopamine	  in	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex.	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  The	  existence	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  across-­‐subject	  variability	  can	  have	  dramatic	  effects	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  behavioral	  data	  fit	  by	  models	  with	  simpler,	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  delta	  rules.	  To	  demonstrate	  these	  effects,	  we	  simulated	  performance	  for	  both	  the	  estimation	  task	  and	  the	  four-­‐choice	  task	  using	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness	  levels	  and	  fit	  the	  simulated	  data	  to	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  models.	  In	  all	  cases,	  the	  simpler,	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model	  was	  preferred	  over	  a	  null	  model	  constituting	  random	  choice	  behavior	  even	  after	  penalizing	  for	  additional	  complexity	  (e.g.,	  using	  BIC	  or	  AIC;	  see	  Supplemental	  Materials	  for	  details).	  Despite	  passing	  these	  model-­‐selection	  criteria,	  we	  highlight	  two	  misleading	  conclusions	  that	  might	  be	  drawn	  from	  these	  fits:	  biased	  estimates	  of	  learning	  rates	  and	  of	  exploratory	  behavior.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  mis-­‐estimating	  learning	  rates	  is	  depicted	  in	  Fig.	  1	  A&B.	  Panel	  A	  shows	  simulations	  based	  on	  the	  estimation	  task,	  for	  which	  we	  measured	  the	  learning	  rate	  directly	  from	  the	  simulated	  behavioral	  response	  on	  each	  trial	  (black	  circles	  and	  error	  bars	  reflect	  median	  and	  interquartile	  range,	  respectively,	  across	  800	  simulated	  trials).	  Panel	  B	  shows	  simulations	  based	  on	  the	  four-­‐choice	  task,	  for	  which	  we	  determined	  the	  learning	  rate	  on	  each	  trial	  based	  on	  its	  value	  in	  the	  internal,	  generative	  process	  used	  in	  the	  simulations.	  In	  both	  cases,	  increasing	  the	  adaptive	  nature	  of	  the	  learning	  rate	  led	  to	  learning	  rates	  that	  were	  increasingly	  variable,	  as	  expected.	  However,	  these	  learning	  rates	  also	  tended	  to	  become	  smaller	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in	  magnitude.	  This	  reduction	  in	  average	  magnitude	  reflected	  the	  design	  of	  the	  simulated	  tasks,	  which	  included	  relatively	  few	  change-­‐points	  that,	  in	  the	  adaptive	  model,	  are	  associated	  with	  higher	  learning	  rates.	  	  However,	  the	  best-­‐fitting	  values	  of	  the	  learning-­‐rate	  parameter	  in	  a	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model	  tell	  a	  different	  story	  (Fig.	  1	  A	  &B,	  gray	  points).	  When	  behavior	  was	  simulated	  using	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  (learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness	  =	  0),	  the	  best-­‐fitting	  models	  naturally	  captured	  the	  appropriate	  value.	  However,	  when	  behavior	  was	  simulated	  using	  increasingly	  adaptive	  learning	  rates,	  the	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  models	  returned	  systematically	  larger	  estimates	  of	  learning	  rate	  than	  were	  actually	  used	  by	  the	  simulated	  subjects.	  Thus,	  learning	  rate	  fits	  from	  a	  fixed-­‐learning	  rate	  model	  were	  not	  a	  good	  measure	  of	  the	  true	  influence	  of	  outcomes	  on	  subsequent	  predictions	  for	  a	  subject	  that	  used	  adaptive	  learning	  rates.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  mis-­‐estimating	  exploratory	  behavior	  is	  depicted	  in	  Fig.	  1	  C&D.	  In	  machine	  learning,	  the	  inverse-­‐temperature	  parameter	  of	  a	  soft-­‐max	  function	  is	  often	  used	  to	  optimize	  the	  tradeoff	  between	  exploiting	  actions	  known	  to	  be	  valuable	  in	  the	  present	  (emphasized	  at	  higher	  inverse	  temperatures)	  and	  exploring	  actions	  that	  might	  be	  valuable	  in	  the	  future	  (emphasized	  at	  lower	  inverse	  temperatures)	  	  (Sutton	  and	  Barto,	  1998;Ishii	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  Similarly,	  reinforcement-­‐learning	  models	  often	  include	  an	  inverse-­‐temperature	  parameter	  that	  is	  used	  to	  characterize	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  subjects	  explore	  alternative	  actions,	  rather	  than	  exploiting	  the	  one	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thought	  to	  be	  most	  valuable	  	  (Daw	  et	  al.,	  2006;Luksys	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Accordingly,	  when	  we	  simulated	  behavior	  on	  either	  the	  estimation	  task	  or	  the	  four-­‐choice	  task	  using	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  and	  an	  action-­‐selection	  process	  governed	  by	  an	  inverse-­‐temperature	  parameter,	  fits	  from	  a	  model	  with	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  and	  an	  inverse-­‐temperature	  process	  returned	  appropriate	  estimates	  of	  the	  inverse	  temperature	  used	  in	  the	  generative	  process	  (left-­‐most	  circles	  in	  Fig.	  1C&D,	  corresponding	  to	  learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness=0).	  	  	  However,	  when	  the	  simulated	  subjects	  used	  increasingly	  adaptive	  learning	  rates,	  inverse-­‐temperature	  fits	  from	  a	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model	  substantially	  overestimated	  the	  true	  variability	  in	  action	  selection	  (circles	  in	  Fig	  1	  C&D:	  inferred	  inverse	  temperature	  decreases	  as	  learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness	  increases).	  These	  biased	  parameter	  estimates	  were	  not	  simply	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model.	  Fitting	  an	  alternative	  model	  that	  used	  optimal	  (maximally	  adaptive)	  learning	  rates	  	  (Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010;Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  same	  simulated	  subjects	  yielded	  the	  opposite	  pattern	  of	  results:	  the	  model	  accurately	  inferred	  the	  level	  of	  exploratory	  action	  selection	  for	  simulated	  subjects	  that	  choose	  learning	  rates	  adaptively	  but	  overestimated	  this	  quantity	  for	  subjects	  that	  used	  simpler	  strategies	  of	  less-­‐adaptive,	  or	  even	  fixed,	  learning	  rates	  (squares	  in	  Fig	  1C:	  inferred	  inverse	  temperature	  decreases	  as	  learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness	  decreases).	  For	  both	  models,	  these	  problems	  were	  not	  apparent	  from	  standard	  analyses	  of	  best-­‐fitting	  parameter	  values,	  which	  had	  similar	  confidence	  intervals	  and	  covariance	  estimates	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for	  biased	  and	  unbiased	  fit	  conditions	  (see	  Supplemental	  Materials	  for	  details).	  These	  problems	  also	  did	  not	  simply	  reflect	  difficulties	  in	  estimating	  model	  parameters	  when	  the	  inverse	  temperature	  was	  low	  and	  behavior	  was	  more	  random,	  because	  the	  problem	  was	  also	  apparent	  when	  the	  inverse	  temperature	  was	  high.	  Thus,	  subtle	  differences	  in	  learning	  that	  were	  not	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  inference	  model	  caused	  underestimation	  of	  the	  inverse-­‐temperature	  parameter,	  which	  might	  be	  misinterpreted	  as	  increases	  in	  exploratory	  action	  selection.	  	  Diagnosis	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  problems	  is	  difficult,	  especially	  when	  the	  subtle	  aspect	  of	  behavior	  that	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  model	  is	  unknown.	  Model-­‐selection	  practices	  that	  compare	  likelihoods	  of	  various	  models	  (after	  either	  cross	  validation	  or	  penalization	  of	  parameter	  numbers)	  are	  useful	  for	  identifying	  the	  better	  of	  two	  or	  more	  models.	  However,	  these	  practices	  require	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  of	  the	  models	  to	  be	  tested,	  and	  they	  cannot	  provide	  any	  insight	  into	  whether	  the	  best	  of	  the	  tested	  models	  provides	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  behavior.	  One	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  interpret	  likelihoods	  directly	  and	  set	  a	  criterion	  for	  what	  might	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  “good”	  model.	  However,	  these	  metrics	  cannot	  say	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  model	  is	  correct.	  For	  example,	  consider	  a	  test	  of	  the	  suitability	  of	  a	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model	  for	  simulated	  subjects	  that	  can	  vary	  in	  terms	  of	  learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness	  and	  exploratory	  behavior.	  Similar	  values	  of	  AIC,	  BIC,	  and	  other	  likelihood-­‐based	  quantities	  are	  obtained	  for	  fixed	  delta-­‐rule	  models	  fit	  to	  two	  very	  different	  subjects:	  one	  who	  uses	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  model,	  and	  relatively	  high	  exploration;	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and	  another	  who	  uses	  a	  highly	  adaptive	  learning	  rate,	  which	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  model,	  and	  relatively	  low	  exploration.	  Interpretation	  of	  parameter	  fits	  from	  the	  latter	  case	  would	  be	  misleading,	  whereas	  parameter	  fits	  from	  the	  former	  would	  be	  unbiased	  and	  informative.	  	  To	  overcome	  these	  limitations,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  effective	  to	  look	  for	  indications	  that	  a	  model	  is	  failing	  under	  specific	  sets	  of	  conditions	  for	  which	  behavior	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  model.	  For	  the	  case	  of	  adaptive	  learning,	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  models	  fail	  to	  address	  adaptive	  responses	  to	  inferred	  change-­‐points	  in	  the	  action-­‐outcome	  contingency.	  Thus,	  it	  can	  be	  instructive	  to	  examine	  the	  likelihoods	  of	  these	  models	  computed	  for	  choice	  data	  collected	  shortly	  after	  change-­‐points.	  For	  the	  case	  of	  the	  estimation	  task,	  a	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model	  shows	  an	  obvious	  inability	  to	  account	  for	  data	  from	  trials	  just	  after	  a	  change-­‐point	  for	  all	  but	  the	  least	  adaptive	  simulated	  subjects	  (Fig	  2A;	  dip	  in	  log-­‐likelihood	  at	  trial	  1).	  However,	  this	  approach	  is	  not	  effective	  for	  the	  four-­‐choice	  task	  (Fig	  2B).	  	  Another	  potentially	  useful	  approach	  for	  diagnosing	  misinterpreted	  learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness	  is	  to	  compute	  parameter	  fits	  using	  subsets	  of	  data	  according	  to	  their	  timing	  relative	  to	  change-­‐points.	  For	  the	  estimation	  task,	  eliminating	  data	  from	  trials	  immediately	  following	  change-­‐points	  has	  dramatic	  effects	  on	  fits	  for	  both	  learning	  rate	  (Fig	  2C)	  and	  inverse	  temperature	  (Fig	  2E).	  However,	  this	  diagnostic	  approach	  is	  far	  less	  effective	  for	  the	  four-­‐choice	  task	  (Fig.	  2	  D&F).	  Thus,	  for	  tasks	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like	  the	  estimation	  task	  that	  provide	  explicit	  information	  about	  the	  subject’s	  underlying	  expectations,	  the	  insufficiency	  of	  the	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model	  can	  be	  fairly	  simple	  to	  diagnose.	  However,	  for	  tasks	  like	  the	  four-­‐choice	  task	  in	  which	  information	  about	  the	  subject’s	  expectations	  is	  limited	  to	  inferences	  based	  on	  less	  informative	  choice	  behavior,	  parameter	  biases	  are	  still	  large	  (Fig.	  1B,	  D)	  but	  model	  insufficiency	  is	  far	  less	  apparent.	  	  	  A	  sobering	  conclusion	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  these	  examples	  is	  that	  even	  when	  the	  parameter	  fits	  from	  a	  computational	  model	  are	  reasonably	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  dataset,	  and	  even	  when	  this	  likelihood	  is	  robust	  to	  perturbations	  in	  the	  specific	  trials	  that	  are	  fit	  or	  the	  settings	  of	  other	  parameters	  in	  the	  model,	  the	  model	  might	  still	  be	  missing	  specific	  features	  of	  the	  data.	  Missing	  even	  a	  fairly	  nuanced	  feature	  of	  the	  data	  (such	  as	  adaptive	  learning)	  can	  lead	  the	  parameters	  in	  the	  model	  to	  account	  for	  the	  feature	  in	  surprising	  ways.	  These	  unexpected	  influences	  can	  lead	  to	  parameter	  fits	  that,	  if	  interpreted	  naïvely,	  might	  suggest	  computational	  relationships	  that	  are	  unrelated	  to,	  or	  even	  opposite	  to,	  the	  true	  underlying	  relationships.	  Here	  we	  use	  an	  example	  from	  reinforcement	  learning,	  but	  the	  lessons	  apply	  to	  any	  model	  fitting	  procedure	  that	  requires	  the	  interpretation	  of	  best-­‐fitting	  parameter	  values.	  Certain	  parameters,	  like	  the	  inverse-­‐temperature	  parameter	  in	  many	  reinforcement-­‐learning	  models,	  seem	  particularly	  susceptible	  to	  this	  problem,	  because	  they	  are	  sensitive	  to	  many	  forms	  of	  behavioral	  variability	  that	  might	  or	  might	  not	  have	  alternative	  explanations.	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  These	  challenges	  highlight	  the	  narrow	  wire	  on	  which	  the	  computational	  neuroscientist	  walks.	  On	  one	  hand,	  we	  seek	  to	  generalize	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  physiological	  and	  behavioral	  data	  from	  different	  tasks	  onto	  a	  tractable	  set	  of	  computational	  principles.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  results	  that	  we	  obtain	  from	  each	  experiment	  are	  conditioned	  on	  assumptions	  from	  the	  particular	  model	  through	  which	  they	  are	  obtained.	  We	  believe	  that	  the	  goals	  of	  computational	  neuroscience	  are	  possible	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  contradiction.	  Obtaining	  generalizable	  results	  depends	  on	  not	  only	  good	  modeling	  practices	  	  (Daw,	  2009)	  but	  also	  the	  extensive	  use	  of	  model-­‐free	  analysis	  to	  dissect	  and	  interpret	  data	  from	  both	  experiments	  and	  simulated	  model	  data.	  For	  example,	  the	  estimation	  task	  described	  above	  was	  designed	  to	  allow	  learning	  rates	  from	  individual	  trials	  to	  be	  computed	  directly	  and	  not	  inferred	  via	  model	  fits	  to	  resulting	  choice	  behaviors.	  This	  approach	  revealed	  clear	  task-­‐dependent	  effects	  on	  adaptive	  learning	  	  (Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  In	  principle,	  congruence	  between	  such	  model-­‐free	  analyses	  and	  fit	  model	  parameters	  can	  help	  support	  interpretations	  of	  those	  parameters	  and	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  testing	  modeling	  assumptions	  and	  predictions	  directly	  rather	  than	  via	  comparisons	  of	  different	  model	  sets	  	  (Ding	  and	  Gold,	  2012;Walton	  et	  al.,	  2010;Frank	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  In	  contrast,	  inconsistencies	  between	  model-­‐free	  analyses	  and	  fit	  model	  parameters	  can	  help	  guide	  how	  the	  model	  can	  be	  modified	  or	  expanded	  –	  keeping	  in	  mind,	  of	  course,	  that	  adding	  to	  a	  model’s	  complexity	  can	  improve	  its	  overall	  fit	  to	  the	  data	  but	  often	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by	  overfitting	  to	  specious	  features	  of	  the	  data	  and	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  the	  contributions	  of	  individual	  parameters	  	  (Ding	  and	  Gold,	  2012).	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Figure	  1.	  Learning-­rate	  adaptiveness	  can	  be	  misinterpreted	  as	  elevated	  
learning	  rates	  and	  decreased	  inverse	  temperatures	  for	  the	  estimation	  (A,C)	  or	  
four-­alternative	  (B,D)	  tasks	  (see	  text).	  In	  all	  panels,	  the	  abscissa	  represents	  learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness	  (0	  is	  equivalent	  to	  using	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate;	  higher	  numbers	  indicate	  higher	  adaptiveness	  to	  unexpected	  errors).	  A	  &	  B.	  Actual	  (black)	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and	  model-­‐inferred	  (gray)	  learning	  rates	  used	  by	  agents	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  learning-­‐rate	  adaptiveness.	  Points	  and	  error	  bars	  represent	  the	  median	  and	  interquartile	  range,	  respectively,	  of	  data	  from	  six	  simulated	  sessions.	  C	  &	  D.	  Best-­‐fitting	  values	  of	  the	  inverse-­‐temperature	  parameter,	  intended	  to	  describe	  exploratory	  behavior,	  inferred	  using	  a	  fixed	  delta-­‐rule	  (circles)	  or	  approximately	  Bayesian	  (squares)	  model.	  Shades	  of	  gray	  indicate	  the	  level	  of	  exploratory	  behavior	  of	  the	  simulated	  agent,	  as	  indicated.	  Arrows	  indicate	  the	  actual	  value	  of	  the	  inverse	  temperature	  parameter	  used	  in	  the	  generative	  process.	  Points	  and	  error	  bars	  (obscured)	  represent	  the	  mean	  and	  standard	  error	  of	  the	  mean,	  respectively,	  of	  data	  from	  six	  simulated	  sessions.	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Figure	  2.	  Poor	  fits	  from	  models	  that	  ignore	  learning-­rate	  adaptiveness	  are	  
easily	  identified	  in	  the	  estimation,	  but	  not	  the	  four-­choice,	  task.	  A	  &	  B.	  Mean	  log	  likelihood	  associated	  with	  a	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model,	  per	  simulated	  trial	  from	  the	  estimation	  (A)	  or	  four-­‐choice	  (B)	  task,	  aligned	  to	  change-­‐points	  in	  the	  generative	  process.	  Lighter	  shades	  of	  gray	  represent	  data	  from	  simulated	  agents	  with	  higher	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levels	  of	  learning	  rate	  adaptiveness.	  C–F.	  Learning	  rates	  (C	  and	  D)	  or	  inverse	  temperatures	  (E	  and	  F)	  inferred	  from	  model	  fits	  that	  exclude	  log-­‐likelihood	  information	  from	  trials	  occurring	  0–10	  trials	  after	  change-­‐points	  (abscissa)	  for	  estimation	  (C	  and	  E)	  and	  four	  choice	  (D	  and	  F)	  tasks.	  The	  transient	  changes	  in	  A,	  C,	  and	  E	  evident	  for	  all	  but	  the	  least	  adaptive	  simulated	  agents	  reflect	  the	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model’s	  inability	  to	  account	  for	  behavior	  just	  following	  change-­‐points	  on	  the	  estimation	  task;	  no	  comparable	  effects	  are	  evident	  for	  the	  four-­‐choice	  task.	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Chapter	  4:	  Supplemental	  material	  
Predictive-­inference	  task	  simulations.	  
Task	  design.	  The	  subject’s	  task	  was	  to	  predict	  the	  value	  of	  each	  subsequent	  outcome	  presented	  in	  a	  sequence.	  Outcomes	  were	  generated	  by	  rounding	  picks	  from	  a	  normal	  distribution	  with	  a	  standard	  deviation	  equal	  to	  35	  (values	  between	  5	  and	  40	  gave	  similar	  results)	  and	  a	  mean	  that	  was	  initiated	  as	  a	  random	  value	  picked	  from	  a	  uniform	  distribution	  ranging	  from	  zero	  to	  300.	  For	  each	  trial,	  a	  weighted	  coin	  flip	  determined	  whether	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  distribution	  would	  remain	  the	  same	  as	  on	  the	  previous	  trial	  (p=0.7,	  non-­‐change-­‐point	  trials)	  or	  whether	  the	  mean	  would	  be	  re-­‐picked	  from	  a	  uniform	  distribution	  ranging	  from	  zero	  to	  300	  (p=0.3,	  change-­‐point	  trial).	  Each	  sequence	  consisted	  of	  800	  outcomes.	  
Simulated	  behavior.	  Task	  performance	  was	  simulated	  using	  the	  computational	  model	  that	  was	  best	  able	  to	  describe	  the	  range	  of	  behaviors	  of	  human	  subjects	  described	  previously	  	  (Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  model	  updates	  beliefs	  about	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  generative	  distribution	  after	  observing	  each	  new	  outcome	  according	  to	  the	  error	  made	  in	  predicting	  that	  outcome:	  
S.	  Eq.	  1:	  
where	  E	  is	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  the	  distribution	  and	  δ	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  actual	  outcome	  and	  the	  predicted	  one	  (E).	  The	  learning	  rate,	  α,	  is	  adjusted	  from	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trial-­‐to-­‐trial	  in	  accordance	  with	  estimates	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  change-­‐point	  probability	  with	  a	  set	  of	  equations	  derived	  from	  the	  Bayesian	  ideal	  observer	  for	  the	  task.	  These	  inference	  equations	  for	  this	  model	  (see	  Nassar	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  for	  details)	  include	  two	  meta-­‐parameters:	  hazard	  rate	  and	  LR	  adaptiveness	  (previously	  termed	  likelihood	  weight).	  Hazard	  rate	  controls	  the	  subjective	  expectation	  on	  the	  prior	  probability	  of	  a	  change-­‐point,	  which	  in	  human	  subjects	  tends	  to	  overshoot	  the	  actual	  value	  and	  in	  our	  simulations	  was,	  accordingly,	  set	  to	  0.5.	  LR	  adaptiveness	  determines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  unlikely	  outcomes	  are	  used	  to	  recognize	  change-­‐points	  and	  in	  turn	  adjust	  learning	  rates.	  A	  LR	  adaptiveness	  value	  of	  zero	  is	  equivalent	  to	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate,	  whereas	  a	  LR	  adaptiveness	  value	  of	  one	  is	  consistent	  with	  optimal	  belief	  updating.	  To	  model	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  human	  subjects	  in	  this	  regard	  to	  this	  parameter,	  we	  simulated	  ten	  subjects	  evenly	  spaced	  across	  the	  allowable	  range	  from	  zero	  to	  one.	  
We	  simulated	  behavior	  using	  the	  inference	  model,	  described	  above,	  in	  tandem	  with	  a	  probabilistic	  action-­‐selection	  process	  using	  an	  inverse-­‐temperature	  parameter.	  This	  process	  was	  implemented	  by	  computing	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  each	  option,	  p(x),	  according	  to	  a	  softmax	  function:	  
S.	  Eq.	  2:	  
where	  Vx	  is	  inversely	  proportional	  to	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  potential	  prediction	  (x)	  and	  the	  estimate	  derived	  from	  the	  inference	  model	  described	  above	  (Et),	  and	  β	  is	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the	  inverse	  temperature,	  which	  determines	  the	  variability	  in	  action	  selection	  and	  has	  previously	  been	  used	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  exploratory	  behavior.	  Here	  we	  used	  inverse	  temperatures	  ranging	  from	  0.2	  to	  1.	  For	  each	  set	  of	  parameters,	  the	  simulated	  subjects	  completed	  five	  task	  sessions.	  
Model	  fitting.	  We	  fit	  simulated	  behavior	  from	  the	  predictive-­‐inference	  task	  using	  a	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  model.	  This	  model	  updated	  beliefs	  according	  to	  S.	  Eq.	  1,	  albeit	  with	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  (α)	  for	  all	  trials	  from	  a	  given	  session.	  This	  model	  also	  used	  the	  same	  action-­‐selection	  mechanism	  described	  above	  (S.	  Eq.	  2).	  This	  model	  was	  fit	  to	  simulated	  behavior	  with	  learning	  rate	  and	  inverse	  temperature	  as	  free	  parameters,	  using	  a	  constrained	  search	  algorithm	  (fmincon	  implemented	  in	  Matlab)	  to	  minimize	  the	  negative	  log	  likelihood	  of	  the	  model	  relative	  to	  the	  simulated	  behavioral	  data.	  
Four-­alternative	  forced-­choice	  simulations.	  
Task	  design.	  The	  four-­‐alternative	  forced-­‐choice	  task	  simulated	  here	  was	  previously	  developed	  and	  used	  by	  Krugel	  and	  colleagues	  	  (Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  choose	  between	  four	  possible	  alternatives	  according	  to	  perceived	  value.	  After	  choosing	  an	  alternative,	  the	  subject	  was	  shown	  the	  value	  of	  the	  outcome	  associated	  with	  that	  choice.	  There	  were	  two	  possible	  outcome	  values:	  a	  high	  value	  (250	  pts)	  and	  a	  low	  value	  (50	  pts).	  For	  each	  trial,	  one	  (best)	  alternative	  is	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  yield	  a	  large	  reward.	  To	  maximize	  our	  ability	  to	  achieve	  reliable	  model	  fits,	  we	  simulated	  sessions	  with	  10,000	  trials	  in	  which	  outcomes	  were	  assigned	  to	  each	  
	   138	  
possible	  choice	  by	  the	  following	  process:	  
1)	  A	  weighted	  coin	  flip	  determined	  whether	  the	  best	  target	  would	  remain	  in	  the	  same	  location	  as	  on	  the	  previous	  trial	  (the	  probability	  of	  a	  change	  =	  0.1).	  
	   If	  Change:	  a	  new	  best	  target	  is	  sampled	  at	  random	  from	  all	  targets.	  
	   Otherwise:	  the	  best	  target	  remains	  in	  the	  same	  position	  as	  previously.	  
2)	  Outcome	  values	  were	  chosen	  at	  random	  (from	  the	  two	  possible	  values)	  for	  each	  alternative	  with	  p(high	  value)	  =	  0.8	  for	  the	  best	  alternative	  and	  0.2	  for	  all	  other	  alternatives.	  
Simulated	  subject	  behavior.	  Behavior	  was	  simulated	  according	  to	  the	  adaptive	  learning-­‐rate	  model	  used	  by	  Krugel	  and	  colleagues	  that	  was	  best	  capable	  of	  describing	  the	  behavior	  of	  human	  subjects	  	  (2).	  In	  brief,	  choices	  were	  selected	  according	  to	  a	  softmax	  action-­‐selection	  rule	  that	  depended	  on	  a	  value	  function	  (q)	  and	  an	  inverse	  temperature	  term	  (3):	  
S.	  Eq.	  3	  
After	  each	  trial,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  chosen	  option	  for	  the	  current	  timestep	  (EI,t)	  was	  updated	  according	  to	  the	  reward	  prediction	  error	  on	  that	  trial:	  
S.	  Eq.	  4	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where	  δ	  reflects	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  actual	  outcome	  value,	  and	  α	  is	  the	  learning	  rate.	  The	  learning	  rate	  was	  adjusted	  on	  each	  trial	  according	  to	  the	  slope	  of	  the	  recent,	  unsigned	  prediction	  errors	  (m):	  	  
	  
S.	  Eq.	  5	  	  	  Thus,	  learning	  rate	  increased	  if	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  prediction	  errors	  was	  large	  but	  decreased	  if	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  recent	  prediction	  errors	  was	  small.	  The	  form	  of	  f(m)	  was	  a	  double-­‐sigmoid	  transfer	  function:	  
S.	  Eq.	  6	  
where	  the	  learning	  rate	  adaptiveness	  parameter,	  λ,	  determines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  learning	  rates	  are	  altered	  according	  to	  recent	  absolute	  errors.	  When	  λ	  is	  equal	  to	  zero,	  learning	  rates	  become	  stable	  and	  thus	  maintain	  their	  initial	  value	  (which	  in	  our	  simulations	  was	  set	  to	  zero).	  When	  λ	  takes	  larger	  values,	  the	  learning	  rate	  becomes	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  the	  slope	  of	  recent	  absolute	  prediction	  errors.	  
Model	  fitting.	  We	  fit	  simulated	  behavior	  with	  a	  model	  that	  included	  the	  same	  action-­‐selection	  (S.	  Eq.	  3)	  and	  learning	  mechanisms	  (S.	  Eq.	  4)	  described	  above	  but	  used	  a	  fixed	  learning	  rate	  for	  all	  trials	  (instead	  of	  S.	  Eqs.	  5	  and	  6).	  Thus,	  the	  model	  had	  two	  free	  parameters	  (learning	  rate	  and	  inverse	  temperature),	  which	  were	  fit	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simultaneously	  to	  simulated	  behavioral	  data	  by	  minimizing	  negative	  log	  likelihood	  using	  the	  Matlab	  function	  fmincon.	  	  
Standard	  model	  selection	  tests.	  
All	  model	  fits	  described	  in	  the	  main	  text	  were	  better	  descriptors	  of	  behavior	  than	  null	  models	  that	  reflected	  random	  choice	  behavior	  for	  the	  respective	  tasks,	  as	  measured	  by	  BIC	  or	  AIC	  (BIC	  values	  are	  shown	  in	  S.	  Figs.	  1	  and	  2).	  That	  is,	  even	  the	  most	  ill-­‐suited	  models	  (e.g.,	  fixed	  learning-­‐rate	  models	  fit	  to	  adaptive	  learning	  behavior)	  would	  not	  be	  rejected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  appropriate	  likelihood-­‐based	  tests.	  	  	  
 
	   141	  
  




































































	   143	  
CHAPTER 5 	  
 
 
Ongoing	  work	  and	  future	  directions	  	  	  In	  chapters	  2-­‐4	  I	  show	  that	  human	  subjects	  conform	  to	  the	  basic	  tenants	  of	  a	  normative	  model	  for	  making	  predictions	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment,	  that	  this	  behavior	  can	  be	  simulated	  using	  a	  slight	  extension	  to	  a	  biologically	  inspired	  delta-­‐rule	  model,	  and	  that	  the	  key	  variables	  of	  this	  model	  seem	  to	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  pupil-­‐linked	  arousal	  system	  and	  driving	  belief-­‐updating	  behavior,	  and	  that	  the	  subtle	  extensions	  of	  this	  model	  have	  substantial	  impact	  on	  standard	  model	  fitting	  procedures.	  	  In	  this	  final	  chapter	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  significance	  of	  specific	  results	  from	  these	  chapters,	  identify	  some	  important	  open	  questions,	  and	  describe	  some	  additional	  experiments	  that	  I	  have	  embarked	  on	  to	  answer	  these	  questions.	  	  	  
Mechanism	  of	  adaptive	  learning	  rate.	  The	  pupillometric	  studies	  described	  in	  chapter	  3	  revealed	  that	  pupil-­‐linked	  arousal	  systems	  reflected	  the	  two	  variables	  necessary	  for	  computing	  learning	  rate	  according	  to	  a	  modified	  delta	  rule	  capable	  of	  near-­‐optimal	  inference	  in	  dynamic	  environments.	  The	  sound	  manipulation	  experiment	  highlighted	  the	  behavioral	  importance	  of	  this	  signal	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  an	  unexpected	  auditory	  stimulus	  capable	  of	  causing	  a	  change	  in	  pupil	  diameter	  also	  led	  to	  systematic	  changes	  in	  learning	  rate.	  This	  relationship	  was	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  known	  and	  theorized	  effects	  of	  noradrenaline	  released	  from	  the	  locus	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coeruleus	  (LC),	  the	  levels	  of	  which	  are	  thought	  to	  covary	  with	  baseline	  arousal	  measures	  including	  pupil	  diameter	  	  (Aston-­‐Jones	  and	  Cohen,	  2005).	  	  	  One	  intriguing	  question	  stemming	  from	  this	  work	  is	  how,	  exactly,	  a	  global	  neuromodulatory	  signal	  such	  as	  the	  one	  that	  LC	  might	  affect	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  new	  observations	  are	  incorporated	  into	  an	  updated	  prediction	  about	  the	  world.	  	  One	  interesting	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  change	  in	  learning	  rate	  reflects	  a	  boost	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  sensory	  information	  propagates	  through	  cortico-­‐thalamic	  circuitry	  toward	  association	  cortex	  where	  abstract	  beliefs	  are	  represented.	  	  This	  possibility	  is	  supported	  by	  several	  neurophysiological	  studies	  that	  show	  enhanced	  throughput	  of	  sensory	  information	  relative	  to	  noise	  during	  noradrenergic	  modulation	  	  (Waterhouse	  et	  al.,	  1998;Hurley	  et	  al.,	  2004;Devilbiss	  and	  Waterhouse,	  2000;Devilbiss	  and	  Waterhouse,	  2004).	  One	  possible	  mechanism	  through	  which	  signal	  amplification	  might	  be	  achieved	  is	  a	  change	  in	  the	  gain	  of	  the	  non-­‐linear	  activation	  function	  of	  sensory	  neurons	  	  (Servan-­‐Schreiber	  et	  al.,	  1990).	  	  	  This	  type	  of	  radical	  change	  to	  the	  input-­‐output	  function	  controlling	  activity	  of	  neurons	  in	  sensory	  cortex	  should	  lead	  to	  a	  drastic	  shift	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  through	  the	  brain.	  	  One	  strong	  prediction	  made	  by	  this	  model	  is	  that	  fMRI	  BOLD	  signals	  in	  sensory	  cortex	  should	  covary	  more	  with	  those	  in	  prefrontal	  regions	  when	  NE	  levels	  are	  high.	  As	  a	  collaborative	  project	  related	  to	  my	  thesis	  work,	  I	  have	  worked	  with	  Dr.	  Joe	  McGuire	  and	  Dr.	  Joe	  Kable	  to	  conduct	  an	  experiment	  in	  which	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16	  subjects	  completed	  the	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  predictive	  inference	  task	  described	  in	  chapters	  2-­‐4	  in	  an	  fMRI	  scanner.	  Our	  initial	  analyses	  have	  focused	  on	  identifying	  specific	  regions	  that	  have	  enhanced	  BOLD	  responses	  to	  various	  conditions	  that	  tend	  to	  drive	  learning	  and	  have	  identified	  an	  area	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  dorsal	  cingulate	  cortex.	  	  However,	  our	  future	  plans	  include	  examining	  whether	  correlations	  between	  BOLD	  responses	  in	  the	  occipital	  and	  prefrontal	  cortices	  depend	  on	  subject	  learning	  rate	  (and	  by	  extension	  LC	  activity).	  	  	  Another	  potential	  mechanism	  for	  the	  arousal-­‐induced	  changes	  in	  learning	  is	  amplification	  of	  feedback	  signals	  mediating	  behavioral	  updating.	  This	  behavioral	  updating	  signal	  is	  thought	  to	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  reward	  prediction	  error.	  	  Several	  areas	  of	  the	  brain	  including	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (ACC),	  the	  habenula,	  and	  most	  famously	  the	  ascending	  dopaminergic	  system	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  contain	  cells	  the	  fire	  in	  proportion	  to	  reward	  prediction	  errors	  	  (Matsumoto	  and	  Hikosaka,	  2007;Matsumoto	  et	  al.,	  2007;Schultz	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  	  Since	  fMRI	  work	  from	  our	  collaboration	  as	  well	  as	  others	  indicated	  a	  relationship	  between	  fMRI	  BOLD	  activity	  in	  ACC	  and	  learning	  rate	  	  (Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007;Krugel	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  I	  designed	  an	  experiment	  to	  look	  directly	  at	  feedback	  signals	  in	  ACC	  of	  rhesus	  macaques	  in	  a	  task	  where	  optimal	  behavior	  requires	  adaptive	  learning.	  	  The	  task	  prompts	  the	  monkey	  to	  choose	  one	  of	  ten	  possible	  targets.	  The	  correct	  target	  is	  then	  revealed	  to	  the	  subject,	  and	  after	  a	  delay	  before	  either	  receiving	  a	  juice	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reward	  (if	  he	  chose	  the	  rewarded	  target)	  or	  beginning	  the	  next	  trial	  (otherwise).	  The	  process	  by	  which	  rewarded	  targets	  is	  determined	  contains	  both	  noise	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  spatial	  probability	  distribution	  across	  all	  targets)	  and	  change-­‐points	  (as	  the	  best	  target	  is	  re-­‐picked	  on	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  trials).	  	  	  Adaptive	  learning	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  analyzing	  switch	  behavior	  as	  a	  function	  of	  change-­‐point	  probability,	  which	  can	  be	  inferred	  through	  the	  spatial	  distance	  between	  chosen	  and	  rewarded	  targets,	  and	  uncertainty,	  which	  is	  related	  to	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  since	  the	  last	  change-­‐point.	  Like	  human	  subjects,	  both	  of	  the	  monkeys	  trained	  on	  this	  task	  display	  adaptive	  learning	  that	  is	  greatest	  after	  surprising	  outcomes	  or	  shortly	  after	  a	  change	  in	  outcome	  contingency.	  Our	  preliminary	  recordings	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  an	  increase	  in	  overall	  firing	  of	  ACC	  neurons	  during	  high	  learning	  trials,	  which	  could	  be	  one	  simple	  interpretation	  of	  the	  BOLD	  response.	  	  Rather,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  trend	  toward	  enhanced	  signaling	  of	  outcome	  (ie	  error	  or	  correct)	  in	  single	  units	  in	  ACC	  on	  trials	  where	  learning	  rate	  was	  high.	  In	  principle	  such	  a	  signal	  enhancement	  could	  give	  rise	  to	  enhanced	  updating	  on	  these	  trials,	  however	  this	  dataset	  is	  still	  preliminary	  and	  confirmation	  of	  this	  idea	  will	  require	  more	  neural	  recordings,	  which	  will	  be	  completed	  by	  Yin	  Li,	  a	  neuroscience	  graduate	  student	  in	  the	  Gold	  Lab	  over	  the	  coming	  year.	  	  	  
Origins	  of	  individual	  differences.	  A	  striking	  feature	  of	  the	  behavioral	  and	  pupillometric	  data	  reported	  in	  chapters	  2	  and	  3	  is	  the	  incredible	  physiologic	  and	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behavioral	  diversity	  across	  subjects.	  	  The	  finding	  that	  individual	  differences	  in	  learning	  were	  related	  to	  individual	  differences	  in	  pupil	  response	  suggests	  the	  possibility	  that	  these	  differences	  might	  depend	  on	  baseline	  neuromodulatory	  state.	  One	  strategy	  for	  testing	  this	  possibility	  is	  to	  identify	  groups	  differing	  in	  underlying	  neuromodulatory	  state	  and	  determine	  whether	  these	  groups	  differ	  in	  behavior	  on	  the	  predictive	  inference	  task.	  	  I	  have	  taken	  this	  approach	  in	  two	  collaborative	  projects	  that	  relate	  directly	  to	  my	  thesis	  work.	  The	  first	  such	  project	  relies	  on	  the	  differences	  in	  dopamine	  signaling	  in	  old	  and	  young	  adults	  	  (Li	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  Although	  I	  postulate	  that	  noradrenergic	  signaling	  is	  mediating	  the	  enhanced	  learning	  after	  change-­‐points,	  dopamine	  and	  noradrenaline	  share	  many	  antecedent	  conditions	  and	  can	  serve	  redundant	  roles	  in	  some	  forms	  of	  learning	  	  (Ouyang	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  To	  examine	  whether	  age-­‐related	  differences	  in	  learning	  behavior	  I	  have	  embarked	  on	  a	  collaborative	  project	  with	  Dr.	  Ben	  Eppinger	  and	  Dr.	  Shu-­‐Chen	  Li	  at	  the	  Max	  Planck	  Institute	  for	  human	  development	  in	  Berlin.	  The	  study	  will	  include	  60	  young	  and	  60	  old	  subjects	  that	  will	  be	  genotyped	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  DAT1	  and	  DRP32	  polymorphisms,	  which	  affect	  functional	  dopamine	  signaling.	  Although	  genotyping	  is	  not	  yet	  complete,	  the	  behavioral	  data	  from	  an	  initial	  cohort	  of	  30	  young	  and	  old	  subjects	  show	  a	  modest	  group	  difference	  with	  older	  subjects	  using	  significantly	  reduced	  learning	  rates	  (see	  figure	  5.1).	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A	  second	  collaborative	  project	  is	  underway	  examining	  whether	  schizophrenic	  patients,	  who	  have	  increased	  D2	  dopamine	  signaling	  but	  diminished	  D1	  dopamine	  signaling,	  differ	  from	  I.Q.	  matched	  controls	  in	  behavior	  on	  a	  variant	  of	  the	  predictive	  inference	  task.	  Data	  is	  being	  collected	  Dr.	  David	  Leitman	  and	  Dr.	  Bruce	  Turetzky	  in	  the	  department	  of	  Psychiatry	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania.	  	  Although	  initial	  data	  from	  schizophrenic	  subjects	  also	  suggest	  a	  decrease	  in	  learning	  rate	  in	  this	  group,	  in	  principle	  differences	  in	  more	  subtle	  aspects	  of	  predictive	  inference	  behavior	  (ie.	  relative	  uncertainty	  and	  hazard	  rate	  best	  describing	  subject	  behavior)	  between	  the	  schizophrenic	  and	  aged	  groups	  might	  provide	  insight	  into	  distinct	  roles	  that	  different	  receptor	  subtypes	  might	  have	  in	  setting	  baseline	  learning	  behavior.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.1	  	  Age	  differences	  in	  learning	  rate.	  	  Average	  learning	  rate	  for	  younger	  (age	  20-­30	  
years,	  blue)	  and	  older	  (age	  60-­70	  years,	  green)	  adults	  as	  a	  function	  of	  trials	  after	  a	  change-­
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Change-­points	  in	  perception.	  Predictions	  about	  future	  outcomes	  are	  not	  only	  useful	  for	  guiding	  behavior,	  but	  also	  for	  interpreting	  ambiguous	  sensory	  stimuli.	  	  Previous	  work	  suggests	  that	  humans	  and	  animals	  combine	  sensory	  information	  with	  expectations	  about	  the	  probability	  of	  potential	  stimuli	  in	  a	  roughly	  Bayesian	  fashion	  	  (Knill	  and	  Pouget,	  2004).	  This	  combination	  process	  allows	  smaller	  perceptual	  errors	  on	  average	  in	  a	  stable	  regime,	  but	  also	  biases	  all	  perceptual	  estimates	  toward	  the	  expected	  stimuli.	  One	  potential	  issue	  with	  biasing	  perceptions	  according	  to	  expectations	  is	  that	  under	  many	  circumstances	  contexts	  can	  change	  leading	  to	  expectations	  that	  are	  violated.	  The	  use	  of	  such	  violated	  expectations	  would	  decrease	  perceptual	  accuracy	  and	  thus	  a	  system	  designed	  to	  minimize	  perceptual	  errors	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment	  should	  immediately	  reject	  prior	  expectations	  that	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  incoming	  sensory	  information.	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  test	  this	  idea	  directly	  I	  designed	  an	  auditory	  localization	  task	  that	  built	  on	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  predictive	  inference	  task	  described	  in	  chapter	  2.	  The	  task	  was	  instantiated	  by	  Shilpa	  Sarode	  and	  Kamesh	  Krishnamurthy	  and	  used	  to	  collect	  preliminary	  data	  that	  was	  recently	  presented	  at	  the	  Society	  for	  Neuroscience	  conference.	  Human	  subjects	  were	  instructed	  to	  predict	  (stimulus	  expectation)	  and	  then	  indicate	  (stimulus	  perception)	  on	  each	  trial	  the	  virtual	  source	  location	  of	  a	  binaurally	  presented	  noise	  burst,	  filtered	  using	  a	  standard	  head-­‐related	  transfer	  function	  associated	  with	  different	  frontal,	  azimuthal	  source	  locations.	  The	  locations	  were	  drawn	  independently	  for	  each	  trial	  from	  a	  normal	  distribution	  (the	  “source	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context”),	  but	  the	  mean	  of	  this	  distribution	  was	  re-­‐picked	  on	  a	  random	  subset	  of	  trials	  according	  to	  a	  change-­‐point	  process.	  After	  each	  trial,	  the	  subject	  was	  shown	  a	  visual	  representation	  of	  the	  true	  stimulus	  location.	  	  We	  characterized	  the	  influence	  of	  prior	  expectations	  on	  perception	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  prediction	  errors	  (stimulus	  expectation)	  and	  perceptual	  errors	  (stimulus	  perception)	  measured	  on	  each	  trial.	  Consistent	  with	  optimal	  inference	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment,	  the	  influence	  of	  prior	  expectations	  on	  perception	  was	  smallest	  just	  after	  a	  change-­‐point,	  even	  on	  the	  first	  stimulus	  from	  the	  new	  distribution.	  The	  influence	  of	  prior	  expectations	  increased	  gradually	  as	  subjects	  encountered	  more	  stimuli	  from	  the	  new	  distribution	  and	  the	  expectations	  became	  more	  reliable.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  brain	  can	  rapidly	  calibrate	  the	  relative	  influence	  of	  prior	  expectations	  and	  incoming	  sensory	  information	  according	  to	  ongoing	  assessments	  of	  their	  reliability	  to	  guide	  perception.	  	  Thus	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  dynamic	  re-­‐weighting	  of	  prior	  information	  occurs	  on	  a	  perceptual	  timescale	  much	  faster	  then	  that	  necessary	  for	  the	  behavior	  described	  in	  chapters	  2	  and	  3.	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CHAPTER 6 	  
 
Conclusions:	  generality	  of	  findings	  	  Previous	  chapters	  developed	  the	  notion	  of	  influence	  in	  learning,	  demonstrated	  the	  computational	  factors	  determining	  influence,	  and	  mapped	  these	  factors	  onto	  measurements	  of	  a	  pupil-­‐linked	  arousal	  network.	  Although	  the	  notion	  of	  influence	  is	  quite	  general,	  our	  examinations	  of	  computational	  and	  physiological	  mechanisms	  of	  influence	  were	  made	  specifically	  in	  a	  predictive	  inference	  task	  developed	  explicitly	  for	  that	  purpose.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  bridge	  the	  findings	  from	  previous	  chapters	  to	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  mechanisms	  of	  learning	  in	  the	  brain.	  	  	  Although	  there	  are	  many	  distinct	  forms	  of	  learning	  that	  can	  be	  measured	  with	  specific	  tasks	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  these	  disparate	  types	  of	  learning	  might	  engage	  a	  few	  separate	  but	  interacting	  learning	  systems.	  One	  such	  system	  is	  a	  network	  including	  the	  ascending	  dopaminergic	  system	  (ventral	  tagmental	  area	  and	  substantia	  nigra	  pars	  compacta)	  as	  well	  as	  dorsal	  and	  ventral	  striatum.	  	  This	  network	  is	  thought	  to	  implement	  an	  actor/critic	  form	  of	  reinforcement	  learning	  that	  uses	  state	  representations	  supplied	  by	  prefrontal	  cortices	  to	  inform	  expectations	  of	  action	  values	  in	  striatum.	  	  Action	  values	  in	  dorsal	  striatum	  are	  used	  to	  select	  actions,	  whereas	  value	  representations	  in	  ventral	  striatum	  serve	  to	  supply	  expectations	  that	  are	  combined	  with	  sensory	  feedback	  in	  the	  ascending	  dopaminergic	  system	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  reward	  prediction	  error	  signal	  used	  to	  train	  the	  state-­‐action	  mappings	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stored	  in	  connection	  weights	  in	  striatum.	  When	  positive	  prediction	  errors	  are	  signaled	  (through	  enhanced	  dopamine	  release	  in	  the	  striatum)	  synaptic	  weights	  of	  neurons	  mapping	  recently	  encountered	  states	  onto	  recently	  chosen	  actions	  are	  enhanced	  	  (Takahashi	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  This	  allows	  the	  network	  to	  learn	  to	  choose	  actions	  when	  they	  are	  valuable	  without	  having	  an	  explicit	  model	  of	  the	  how	  an	  action	  in	  one	  state	  might	  map	  onto	  the	  next,	  and	  thus	  is	  often	  called	  “model-­‐free”	  	  (Daw	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  	  This	  model	  free	  learning	  network	  shares	  features	  with	  the	  delta	  rule	  model	  employed	  in	  chapters	  2-­‐4	  for	  updating	  inference	  based	  on	  outcomes.	  	  Both	  models	  employ	  the	  use	  of	  prediction	  errors	  to	  instruct	  learning.	  Both	  models	  contain	  a	  learning	  rate	  term	  that	  essentially	  controls	  the	  influence	  of	  new	  prediction	  errors	  on	  expectations	  maintained	  either	  as	  an	  abstract	  belief	  (in	  the	  reduced-­‐Bayesian	  model)	  or	  as	  a	  striatal	  connectivity	  matrix	  determining	  state-­‐action	  mapping.	  Amplification	  of	  the	  learning	  rate	  in	  the	  physiological	  model-­‐free	  learning	  network	  could	  be	  accomplished	  by	  amplifying	  phasic	  dopamine	  signals	  that	  encode	  reward	  prediction	  errors.	  Although	  it	  is	  currently	  unknown	  whether	  these	  signals	  are	  modulated	  by	  the	  computational	  factors	  that	  govern	  learning	  rate,	  projections	  of	  locus	  coeruleus	  to	  dopaminergic	  nuclei	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  sub-­‐population	  of	  dopaminergic	  neurons	  that	  encodes	  salience	  rather	  than	  reward	  prediction	  error	  may	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  incorporating	  arousal	  encoded	  learning	  computations	  into	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the	  reinforcement	  signal	  	  (Mejías-­‐Aponte	  et	  al.,	  2009;Matsumoto	  and	  Hikosaka,	  2009)	  .	  	  	  An	  obvious	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  systems	  is	  that	  the	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  represents	  beliefs	  and	  prediction	  errors	  on	  an	  abstract	  space,	  whereas	  the	  striatal/dopaminergic	  system	  seems	  to	  explicitly	  represent	  values	  and	  reward	  prediction	  errors	  in	  a	  valence	  space	  where	  positive	  values	  and	  reward	  prediction	  errors	  are	  represented	  by	  higher	  firing	  rates	  of	  striatal	  and	  dopaminergic	  neurons	  respectively.	  This	  allows	  the	  output	  of	  the	  network,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  firing	  rates	  of	  striatal	  neurons,	  to	  provide	  a	  signal	  proportional	  to	  the	  probability	  with	  which	  a	  particular	  action	  should	  be	  chosen	  	  (Takahashi	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Although	  such	  a	  network	  can	  efficiently	  incorporate	  reward	  information	  to	  reinforce	  chosen	  actions,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  such	  a	  network	  would	  represent	  the	  type	  of	  outcome	  information	  provided	  in	  our	  predictive	  inference	  task.	  The	  outcomes	  in	  the	  predictive	  inference	  task	  specify	  the	  action	  that	  would	  have	  provided	  the	  most	  reward,	  so	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  same	  network	  could	  incorporate	  this	  information	  by	  simulating	  the	  action	  that	  would	  have	  provided	  the	  most	  reward	  and	  then	  reinforcing	  the	  connectivity	  matrix	  through	  a	  fictive	  reward	  prediction	  error	  signal.	  	  	  While	  it	  is	  unknown	  whether	  the	  striatum	  has	  access	  to	  such	  fictive	  learning	  signals,	  such	  signals	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  exist	  in	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  (ACC)	  an	  area	  of	  prefrontal	  cortex	  that	  is	  heavily	  innervated	  by	  dopaminergic	  nuclei	  	  (Briand	  et	  al.,	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2007;Kennerley	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  .	  It	  could	  be	  that	  these	  signals	  measured	  in	  ACC	  are	  reflecting	  a	  more	  global	  neuromodulatory	  signal	  broadcast	  by	  DA	  neurons,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  striatum	  might	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  signal,	  allowing	  it	  to	  effectively	  learn	  about	  both	  chosen	  and	  un-­‐chosen	  options.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  anterior	  cingulate	  cortex,	  which	  is	  known	  to	  support	  a	  number	  of	  the	  necessary	  computations	  for	  predictive	  inference	  in	  our	  task	  (prediction	  errors,	  learning	  rates)	  and	  be	  highly	  involved	  in	  many	  forms	  of	  behavioral	  updating	  might	  perform	  model-­‐free	  inference	  directly	  	  (Kennerley	  et	  al.,	  2011;Behrens	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  Regardless	  of	  where	  these	  algorithms	  are	  implemented,	  one	  general	  concern	  raised	  by	  the	  sound	  manipulation	  experiment	  (chapter	  3)	  is	  to	  the	  specificity	  with	  which	  learning	  rates	  can	  be	  selectively	  modified.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  brain	  might	  be	  simultaneously	  maintaining	  and	  updating	  beliefs	  about	  several	  variables,	  say	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  certain	  restaurant	  and	  the	  safety	  of	  a	  certain	  neighborhood.	  When	  the	  brain	  obtains	  surprising	  data	  in	  one	  of	  these	  domains	  (say	  a	  terrible	  meal	  at	  the	  restaurant)	  it	  seems	  at	  first	  glance	  that	  the	  brain	  should	  reset	  its	  beliefs	  in	  that	  domain	  (amplify	  learning	  about	  the	  restaurant)	  while	  maintaining	  beliefs	  in	  the	  other	  (stable	  beliefs	  about	  neighborhood).	  However,	  finding	  that	  a	  surprising	  sound	  could	  alter	  the	  influence	  of	  numerical	  outcomes	  on	  updated	  beliefs	  suggests	  that	  the	  brain	  does	  not	  completely	  compartmentalize	  adjustments	  in	  learning	  to	  a	  particular	  stimulus-­‐relevant	  domain.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  for	  this	  effect	  relies	  on	  the	  underlying	  structure	  of	  change-­‐points	  encountered	  in	  the	  world.	  	  If	  change-­‐points	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tend	  to	  be	  correlated	  over	  dimensions,	  then	  observing	  a	  surprising	  stimulus	  in	  one	  dimension	  should,	  in	  fact,	  prescribe	  rapid	  learning	  in	  the	  other	  dimensions.	  For	  example,	  sudden	  economic	  hardship	  might	  lead	  a	  neighborhood	  to	  become	  unsafe	  and	  a	  restaurant	  owner	  to	  tend	  toward	  lower	  quality	  ingredients.	  	  Thus	  observation	  of	  a	  bad	  hamburger	  indicates	  the	  possibility	  of	  economic	  decline,	  which	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  uncertainty	  about	  he	  safety	  of	  the	  neighborhood	  and	  in	  turn	  rapid	  learning	  about	  that	  variable.	  It	  is	  unknown	  to	  what	  extent	  real-­‐world	  change-­‐points	  might	  have	  this	  sort	  of	  correlation	  structure	  or	  to	  what	  extent	  correlations	  in	  learning	  rate	  across	  dimensions	  match	  real-­‐world	  statistics,	  however	  work	  addressing	  these	  questions	  will	  be	  critical	  to	  understanding	  the	  true	  optimality	  of	  arousal	  induced	  modulation	  of	  learning	  rate.	  	  	  Hard-­‐wired	  assumptions	  about	  latent	  structure	  of	  change-­‐points	  incorporated	  in	  the	  arousal	  driven	  learning	  system	  might	  account	  for	  some	  implicit	  expectations	  about	  the	  latent	  structure	  of	  the	  world,	  however	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  brain	  also	  learns	  such	  latent	  structures	  explicitly	  through	  experience	  and	  incorporates	  this	  knowledge	  into	  inferences	  about	  the	  world	  	  (Daw	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  This	  type	  of	  learning	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  model-­‐based,	  as	  it	  requires	  building	  an	  explicit	  probabilistic	  model	  of	  how	  various	  states	  map	  onto	  one	  another.	  In	  contrast	  to	  model-­‐free	  learning,	  which	  is	  thought	  to	  take	  place	  in	  the	  striatum,	  model-­‐based	  learning	  is	  thought	  to	  occur	  largely	  in	  prefrontal	  regions	  including	  dorsal	  lateral	  prefrontal	  cortex	  	  (Gläscher	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Although	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  reduced	  Bayesian	  model	  rely	  on	  model	  free	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(prediction	  error)	  signals,	  other	  aspects	  require	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  states	  evolve	  over	  time,	  or	  the	  probabilistic	  structure	  of	  the	  generative	  environment.	  In	  particular,	  change-­‐point	  probability	  calculations	  are	  based	  on	  the	  probabilistic	  mapping	  of	  a	  latent	  variable	  (mean	  of	  distribution)	  to	  an	  observable	  one	  (actual	  outcome).	  This	  mapping	  is	  likely	  learned	  over	  time;	  subjects	  used	  more	  adaptive	  learning	  rates,	  as	  well	  as	  hazard	  rates	  better	  matching	  the	  experimental	  conditions,	  under	  conditions	  where	  they	  had	  more	  training	  (compare	  performance	  in	  chapter	  3	  to	  that	  in	  chapter	  2).	  One	  mechanistic	  explanation	  for	  this	  might	  be	  that	  model-­‐based	  learning	  is	  used	  to	  develop	  finely	  tuned	  probabilistic	  expectations,	  which	  are	  in	  turn	  used	  to	  calculate	  learning	  rates	  that	  are	  broadcast	  through	  the	  noradrenergic	  system	  and	  then	  used	  to	  amplify	  learning	  signals	  in	  a	  model-­‐free	  learning	  network.	  Although	  interactions	  between	  model-­‐free	  and	  model-­‐based	  learning	  systems	  have	  been	  observed	  in	  the	  striatum,	  it	  is	  unclear	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  interactions	  depend	  on	  arousal	  systems	  or	  reflect	  the	  optimization	  process	  described	  above	  	  (Daw	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  	   	  
Concluding	  remarks	  	  	  The	  brain	  is	  exquisitely	  evolved	  to	  collect	  sensory	  information	  and	  use	  it	  to	  inform	  future	  actions.	  	  However,	  in	  a	  dynamic	  and	  stochastic	  world,	  a	  single	  sensory	  snapshot	  does	  not	  provide	  perfect	  information	  regarding	  the	  best	  possible	  future	  action,	  and	  a	  strategy	  for	  combining	  snapshots	  over	  time	  is	  required.	  The	  best	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strategy	  for	  incorporating	  new	  sensory	  information	  in	  a	  changing	  world	  requires	  dynamically	  adjusting	  the	  influence	  of	  new	  snapshots	  according	  to	  the	  predictive	  quality	  of	  older	  ones.	  Here	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  human	  subjects	  conform	  to	  this	  strategy	  when	  assigning	  influence	  to	  abstract	  information	  in	  a	  predictive	  inference	  task	  and	  that	  such	  behavior	  could	  be	  achieved	  with	  a	  simple	  model-­‐free	  reinforcement-­‐learning	  rule,	  albeit	  with	  some	  model-­‐based	  assessments	  of	  stimulus	  probabilities.	  Interestingly,	  under	  stable	  conditions	  this	  near-­‐optimal	  model	  prescribes	  becoming	  relatively	  insensitive	  to	  new	  sensory	  information.	  At	  first	  glance	  this	  prediction	  seems	  surprising;	  why	  would	  the	  brain	  spend	  so	  much	  energy	  maximizing	  the	  informational	  content	  in	  each	  sensory	  snapshot	  only	  to	  ignore	  them?	  	  	   	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  even	  perfect	  sensors	  are	  only	  as	  informative	  as	  the	  external	  environment.	  The	  informational	  content	  of	  an	  observation	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  negative	  log	  probability	  of	  that	  observation,	  such	  that	  improbable	  events	  are	  highly	  informative	  and	  completely	  predictable	  ones	  are	  uninformative.	  Since	  outcomes	  become	  predictable	  during	  a	  stable	  contingency	  they	  also	  become	  less	  informative.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  information	  content	  drops	  off	  during	  a	  stable	  period	  depends	  critically	  on	  exactly	  what	  type	  of	  information	  is	  measured:	  while	  information	  about	  the	  present	  is	  always	  provided	  by	  observations,	  information	  about	  the	  future	  approaches	  zero	  after	  several	  observations	  in	  a	  stable	  regime	  (see	  figure	  6.1).	  Through	  this	  lens	  optimal	  inference	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  appropriately	  gating	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sensory	  experience	  according	  to	  its	  relevant	  informational	  content,	  where	  relevance	  explicitly	  requires	  pertaining	  to	  future	  events.	  	  Arousal	  has	  long	  been	  thought	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  controlling	  the	  flow	  of	  sensory	  information	  and	  arousal	  systems	  including	  locus	  coeruleus	  are	  most	  responsive	  to	  improbable	  (ie.	  highly	  informative)	  stimuli	  	  (Pfaff,	  2006;Aston-­‐Jones	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  Through	  diffuse	  projections	  locus	  coeruleus	  has	  the	  capability	  of	  influencing	  stimulus	  representations	  across	  modalities	  and	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  abstraction.	  This	  dissertation	  demonstrates	  that	  arousal	  systems	  play	  a	  role	  in	  controlling	  the	  influence	  of	  abstract	  sensory	  observations	  on	  higher	  order	  beliefs	  according	  to	  the	  relevant	  information	  provided	  by	  those	  observations.	  This	  work	  not	  only	  bolsters	  a	  burgeoning	  view	  of	  generalized	  brain	  arousal	  as	  physical	  implementation	  of	  information	  based	  sensory	  gating	  	  (Pfaff,	  2006),	  but	  also	  addresses	  the	  larger	  question	  as	  to	  why	  low	  arousal	  states	  exist	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Where	  previous	  work	  has	  discounted	  decrements	  in	  arousal	  as	  lapses	  in	  a	  fallible	  attention	  system,	  the	  findings	  developed	  here	  suggest	  a	  normative	  explanation:	  stable	  variability	  in	  our	  environment	  can	  allow	  unexpected	  stimuli	  to	  contain	  no	  information	  relevant	  to	  future	  decisions.	  By	  reducing	  sensory	  flow	  under	  such	  conditions,	  we	  minimize	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  we	  are	  misled	  by	  distracting	  and	  uninformative	  stimuli.	  Thus	  decrements	  in	  arousal	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  the	  brain	  to	  resist	  learning	  from	  unpredicted	  but	  uninformative	  stimuli.	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  Figure	  6.1	  Decay	  in	  information	  from	  data	  generated	  by	  a	  noisy	  process.	  A)	  Entropy	  (expected	  information,	  in	  bits)	  computed	  as	  the	  expectation	  of	  negative	  log	  probability	  for	  each	  outcome	  where	  probabilities	  are	  computed	  by	  discretizing	  the	  predictive	  distribution	  from	  the	  optimal	  inference	  algorithm	  at	  each	  time-­‐step.	  B)	  Mutual	  information	  (in	  bits)	  contained	  in	  subsequent	  observations	  from	  the	  same	  noisy	  process.	  Mutual	  information	  is	  computed	  as	  the	  entropy	  over	  a	  given	  observation	  (as	  above)	  minus	  the	  entropy	  over	  the	  next	  observation.	  Mutual	  information	  between	  two	  subsequent	  observations	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  in	  an	  observation	  that	  pertains	  to	  the	  next	  (future)	  observation.	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